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The CLGF Research Colloquium, generously hosted by the Uganda Management Institute in 
Kamapala in May2013, produced many outstanding papers, several of which are published in this 
issue.  Our thanks to many of the staff and students of UMI, and to Lucy Slack and Gareth Wall 
from CLGF, who made the colloquium such a success.   
Phil Amis, Chair of CLGF’s Research Advisory Group, in his OPINION piece, looks at the future of 
local government in the Post-2015 development agenda. From a critical reading of documents by the 
UN task team on the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the High Level Panel of 
experts he concludes that local government will have a core role in delivering most of the new SDGs, 
and calls for explicit recognition of its role. He suggests a way to overcome the problem of defining 
‘targets’ at local government level, through a hybrid approach that retains national SDG targets, but  
sets an explicit aim gives of disaggregating and implementing these at local level.   
Two RESEARCH & EVALUATION papers explore Uganda’s much-vaunted local government, 
introduced in the mid-1980s and in the 1995 Uganda Constitution as a way of restoring state 
credibility in the post-war reconciliation process.  Lazarus Nabaho from UMI gives a stinging 
critique of the 2005 Constitutional Amendment, which gave central government powers to hire and 
fire Chief Administrative Officers, resulting in split loyalties for the CAOs, and weakening their local 
accountability.  David Ssonko argue that this ambitious and politically driven programme has had 
mixed results, due to central interference, a politically-driven increase in the number of districts, gaps 
in service delivery and endemic corruption. 
From the UK, Andy Asquith revisits local authorities that he studied in the late 1990s to see how they 
have adapted to the left-of-centre Labour Government’s reform programme.  His sample of two 
London boroughs (with different politics), a northern city, two rural counties, and a southern market 
town, were classified as ‘transactional’, ‘community’, ‘business’ or ‘entrepreneurial- citizenship’ 
oriented, and he found the latter in the ascendency with an LG renaissance under Labour control. 
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In Ghana, the role of social accountability in deepening local democracy is explored by Rudith King, 
Amponsah Owusu, and Imoro Braimah, who found that despite legislative backing to improve 
public finance through civic engagement and transparent budgeting, the weak capacity of Assembly 
Members hindered effectiveness. Hamza Zakaria examines controversy over Ghana’s public sector 
performance, and uses path dependency theory – which suggests that the timing and sequence of 
events matter in policy development – to explore the new donor-backed performance-based grants 
based on a Functional Organisational Assessment Tool, are  having an impact.  Meanwhile Nicholas 
Boamah  examines the thorny issue of local government finance and the wasted potential of property 
tax as a viable source of revenue, due to weak administration, public contempt and perceived 
corruption in his detailed study of its application in Offinso South Municipality.   
David Mandiyanike looks at the history of Zimbabwe’s uneasy rural district councils, an amalgam of 
former settler-run rural councils and district councils, at the uneven progress of capacity building 
between 1994 and 2001, and its erosion during Zimbabwe’s post -1999 political and economic crisis 
with problems such as strong ZANU-PF, council suspensions and war-vet invasions,    Daniel Tonwe 
and Osa Osemwota explore the challenges of integrating traditional leadership into modern local 
government in Nigeria, arguing that the continuing public respect for traditional rulers should be 
embrace and leaders should be involved in strategy development and implementation.  Finally in the 
Angelita Kithatu-Kiwekete reports on a comparative study of the revenue-raising potential of semi-
autonomous utility agencies in Nairobi and Johannesburg. 
In the POLICY & PRACTICE papers, from Australia Grahame Collier and Rebecca Jones report on 
the highly successful Urban Sustainability Support Alliance, a large and faceted NSW-wide 
programme, running from 2007 – 2011, that significantly raised sustainability awareness amongst its 
local authority targets. Gad Ruzaaza Ndaruhutse argues that a community-based model of local 
health care training, can transform health care provision in local government jurisdictions of Uganda. 
S’bonsile Zama focuses on Dipaleseng Municipality, Mumpalanga in South Africa to how 
inadequate service provision contributed to the 2009 riots that gripped the region in protest against 
poor housing and service delivery. 
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Introduction 
A complex process of global consultation is currently under way to discuss the shape of the MDGs 
Post 2015. The aim of this paper is to address the question of where Local Government (LG) should fit 
into this debate, as a modest contribution to the ongoing consultation process1. The paper is structured 
as follows: the first section describes in more detail the global consultation process on the Post 2015 
agenda; the second describes how Local Government relates to the current MDGs; the third section 
explores how some of the consultation documents see the role of LG before considering what the role 
of LG could be in the new agenda. The final section speculates on more radical roles for LG, in terms 
of what we should be asking for, and suggests new roles for LG in partnerships with other civil society 
organizations in poverty reduction. 
This is a policy paper rather than an academic one, and represents only the views of the author, and is 
not associated with official positions of the University of Birmingham or those of the CLGF Board. 
The on-going MDG consultation process 
The current MDGs are targets for 2015. There is now a complex process of consultation about what 
should replace the MDGs Post 2015. The current MDGs were approved unanimously by all UN 
member states on the 8th September 2000, followed by further negotiations on the exact formulation, 
agreed at a World Bank meeting in March 2001. The outcome was a division of labour between the 
Bretton Woods organizations, with the World Bank and IMF continuing to control production of 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the UN driving the MDG Process (Hulme & Scott, 
2010: 4-5).  
                                                            
1 This is an update of a paper presented at the Commonwealth Local Government Research Colloquium, 
Ugandan Management Institute, Kampala, Uganda, 13-14 May 2013  
 
Amis                                                                                     Post 2015 MDG Agenda? 
   
 
CJLG November 2013 
5 
 
The MDGs as we know them were contained in a four page annex the, Road Map Towards the 
Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, passed late in 2001. The process was 
led by Kofi Annan, and was a considerable personal achievement, reaching an almost unique level of 
global agreement and consensus. However what is striking about the process was the extent to which 
the low and middle income countries, the subjects of the targets, had very little input into the process. 
Goal 8, Develop a Global Partnership for Development was the only goal with a major input by 
developing countries on what the developed countries should do (Hulme and Scott, 2010: 5).  
Nevertheless, the MDGs were a global consensus on time-bound development targets and gained a 
level of 'sustained attention that is unprecedented for any UN development declaration' (Hulme and 
Scott, 2010: 5). 
The process of consultation on the Post 2015 agenda has two strands. First was a process led by all the 
UN agencies with an agreed a common position, led by the UN system task team on the Post 2015 UN 
Development Agenda. They produced a document, Realising the Future we Want for All as a report to 
the Secretary General (UN, 2012). This is an important document and represents the results of 
collective work and a position paper of all the UN agencies represented in the UN system2. The 
purpose of this report, as noted in its summary, 'is to serve as the first reference point for the broader 
consultations to take place' (UN, 2012: ii). 
Meanwhile a range of national and international consultation processes are on-going to provide inputs 
into the process, with the UNDP mandated to provide leadership. A special session of the general 
CLGF conference in Kampala (May 2013) was devoted to contributing to the process.  
The second major document is entitled A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform 
Economies through Sustainable Development.  The report, prepared by the 'High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Persons on the Post 2015 Development Agenda' (hereafter referred to as HLP, 2013), was 
published in May 2013. This document, without really acknowledging it, follows much of the 
groundwork of the UN reports and reworks some of their themes but, critically, identifies an indicative 
(or illustrative list) of twelve goals and 54 targets that provides a much clearer focus of the potential 
shape of the Post 2015 MDGs. This paper considers these and the role of LG in more detail later. It is 
likely that the goals and targets are the main concern of the November 2013 inter-governmental 
negotiation in New York, rather than more general development statements. 
The end point of these processes is that sometime in late 2014 or early 2015 there will be a resolution 
submitted to the UN assembly with a view to creating and endorsing the MDGs mark 2 (sometimes 
                                                            
2 This paper is to a large extent stimulated by two events I attended in October 2012 the EADI meeting and the 
celebrations of 50 years at the ISS (Institute of Social Studies) Den Hague, and an addenda to the CLGF Board 
meeting. Prof Rob Voss discussed the UN process and the relevant documentation while at the CLGF meeting 
we were briefed by the UK official from the secretariat supporting the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons. 
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called the Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs). A few points are clear at this stage − the 
intention is that support should be unanimous and, more explicitly, have the endorsement of China. 
Anything less would be seen as a failure.3 This has obvious significance for the extent to which 
subjects such as democracy, accountability and human rights are included in either implicit or explicit 
formulations. The role of Local Government might perhaps be one of those no-go subjects. 
The role of Local Government in the current MDGs4  
In tackling the issue of urban poverty, local governments are the main agencies overseeing squatter 
upgrading and the provision of public health services. In addition, in the majority of local government 
systems, primary health and education are LG functions, i.e. LG is responsible for planning and siting 
of clinics and schools, and sometimes paying for teachers and medics. In most government systems 
water supply is also a LG function. This is both a political reality, and is also supported by economic 
theory as being the appropriate level of government to oversee these functions (Shah and Shah, 2006: 
10). Recent research has clearly shown the importance of local accountability in the successful 
delivery of public services, and that it is easier to make these systems work at the local level (World 
Bank, 2004). 
However, LG has potentially negative levers (eg: the police and 'public order' agencies) for 'bad 
governance'. The evidence shows that heavy-handed control can be very effective in destroying jobs, 
mainly in the informal sector. This is an important insight as in many circumstances it is much easier 
to destroy jobs than to create them (Amis, 2002). Thus it is important to ensure that local government 
has the capacity to govern effectively. While LG may not on its own generate economic development, 
but under weak governments, there is a strong chance that poor governance will inhibit growth.  
The chart in Figure 1 illustrates linkages and relationships between the MDGs and LG functions. 
While LG is involved in direct provision to most MDGs it also has an indirect supporting role and/or 
some relationship with most MDGs. The provision of basic infrastructure including roads, police and 
fire service, solid waste management and land use planning are all important in such capacities.  
It has recently been argued that many of the benefits that high income countries enjoy are the direct 
results of functioning Local Government. This is significant in terms of education, health, transport, 
land use planning and a range of welfare provisions (Satterthwaite et al, 2013). Furthermore the 
extensive responsibility and mandate of Local Government for delivering the MDGs is also well 
documented. However, while LG mandate is very significant, in many cases this is undermined by the 
lack of resources and capability that LG has in reality. The key point, discussed further below, is that 
                                                            
3 Comment UK, official working on the High Level Panel 
4 This section is updated from the Background Paper (Improving Local Government: the Commonwealth Vision)  
to the 2009 CLGF Conference in Freeport Grand Bahamas) 
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if LG is to play a central role in delivering the MDGs it needs the resources and capacity so to do. 
Thus strengthening LG is a pre-requisite to meeting the MDGs, rather like economic growth is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to address poverty (Satterthwaite et al, 2013). 
Figure 1 The role of Local Government in delivering the MDGs 
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Trends strengthening Local Government  
Since the original formulation of the MDGs in the early 2000s it is possible to suggest that there have 
been some significant changes that have made LG more, rather than less important.  First has been the 
process of urbanisation which of necessity makes LG more important as the agency delivering the 
majority of urban services.  It is now estimated that one in seven of the World’s population lives in an 
informal settlement (Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2013), and the increased emphasis on urban poverty as a 
development issue similarly makes LG more important.  
Recent narratives taking a wider and more multi-disciplinary approach to poverty with the importance 
of ideas like entitlements, voice and power, are also significant new developments. In the question of 
lack of voice, most people do not distinguish between local and central government. Thus, in seeking 
to make government more responsive, local government is the most important candidate. 
Many of the adaptation and mitigation strategies to address climate change − in terms of preparedness 
for extreme weather events, and increased emphasis on energy efficiency in strategies for housing or 
transport − are again primarily in the domain of LG.  Finally the increase global movements 
campaigning for democracy and the recognition of diversity (and conflict prevention and peace-
building) makes LG more important. In many cases the rebuilding of local government has led the 
way in cases of post-conflict reconstruction. In this context the importance of fragile states in the 
development discourse should be noted. Finally it should be also noted that it in most disasters, of 
whatever sort, it is usually LG that picks up the pieces and is a major player post-disaster response. 
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Realizing the Future We Want for All, and the HLP 
This section first considers the UN document drafted in 2012, before examining the HLP report, and 
then suggesting areas for potentially greater involvement for LG. For ease of comparison on various 
electronic versions, the referencing lists paragraph numbers of the relevant sections rather than the 
page numbers. 
The 2012 UN report, Realizing the Future We Want for All, begins by exploring performance of the 
current MDGs − not unsurprisingly for a UN report it generally reports that this has been favourable. 
The political and development importance of having a universal commitment to poverty is widely 
supported and noted. In addition the value of having limited but measurable goals and targets is also 
applauded for creating some political and policy momentum around their fulfilment (UN, 2012: paras 
11-16). On the negative side, the report notes a range of subjects that the MDGs did not adequately 
address  including productive employment, violence against women, social protection, inequality, 
social exclusion, biodiversity, persistent malnutrition,  non-communicable diseases, malnutrition, 
reproductive health, complexities related to demographic dynamics, peace and security, governance, 
the rule of law and human rights (UN, 2012: para 19). Furthermore, as frequently highlighted, the 
MDG framework provides no comment on the 'means' to achieve the stated objective (UN, 2012: para 
20). This was justified as allowing local strategies. From a LG perspective the most relevant worth 
noting is that 'who' should deliver the MDGs was also not discussed 
The next section considers the lessons for Post 2015. Thus it suggest that the format of concrete goals, 
targets and indicators should be retained; that there should be more on the means to address targets 
and that flexibility is needed for targets at all levels: regional, national and sub national. Finally a new 
there is a new list of suggestions on areas which should be included such as: climate change; 
inequality; resilience to natural disasters; demographic dynamics [ageing population]; dealing with 
urban growth; peace and security; improving governance and state capabilities; and respecting human 
rights and cultural diversity (UN, 2012: paras 24-27). 
What is clear from this and from subsequent discussions is that some sort of new MDG framework is 
intended. The debate is thus likely to be around the content, and the questions around 'how' (means) 
and 'who' (relevant institutions or agencies) to implement the agenda. 
The document then notes the global trends, challenges and opportunities to which the Post 2015 
agenda should respond − which include the earlier discussion concerning changes since the original 
MDGs, and the potential role of Local Government in development. 
The report then begins to map out its vision. First, the vision is that it should be grounded in three 
fundamental principles: human rights; equality (including gender equality) and sustainability (UN, 
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2012: paras 57-64). The report then notes the core dimensions on which the strategy will be built: 
inclusive social development; environmental sustainability; inclusive economic development; and 
peace and security.  These dimensions are likely to remain as central to the overall broad framework.  
Indeed the HLP has recast them as the following five themes namely: leave no one behind; put 
sustainable development at the core; transform economies for jobs and inclusive growth; build peace 
and effective, open and accountable institutions for all; and forge a new global partnership.  
The text from the HLP is worth noting on the role of LG thus: 
[LGs] form a vital bridge between national governments, communities and citizens and will have a 
critical role in new global partnership.  
The Panel believes that one way to support the role of LG is by recognising that targets might be pursed 
differently at the sub-national level – for example, so that example urban poverty is not treated the same 
as rural poverty. 
Local authorities have a critical role in setting priorities, executing plans, monitoring results and 
engaging with local firms and communities. In many cases, it is hard for local authorities that deliver 
essential public services in health, education, policing, water and sanitation to reach all communities. 
Even if not directly delivering services, LGs often have a role in establishing the planning, regulatory and 
enabling environment – for business, energy supply, mass transit or building standards. They also have a 
central role in disaster and risk management – identifying risks, early warning and building resilience. 
LGs also have a role in helping slum-dwellers access better housing and jobs and are the source of the 
most successful programmes supporting the informal sector and micro-enterprises” (HLP 2013:10-11).   
As someone who has argued the case for the role of LG in the MDGs, this is the most positive 
statement that I have read in a high-level UN or other policy document. This may imply that the LG 
and/or urban lobby for the first time is getting serious traction. This is also acknowledged in a recent 
publication which broadly notes the invisibility of LG to almost all official/international/UN policy 
statements (Satterthwaite et al, 2013: 24-25).  
The HLP has gone much further than the UN documents in explicitly acknowledging the important 
role of Local Government: despite this, it is the detail of the Post 2015 MDGs negotiations that may 
determine the role of LG, at this stage (November 2013) clearly an unknown issue. however the 
general lack of interest in LG remains. In this negotiation it is difficult to know what counts, especially 
as, in the majority of the task force papers that support the UN process, the existence of LG is almost 
completely invisible. Even when LG is included, it is assumed to be subsumed in overall national 
governance discussions, thus denying LG any independence or autonomy (Satterthwaite et al, 2013).  
While the main UN report is broadly positive about the role of LG the HLP is more much more 
explicit on its importance, underlined by the desire to disaggregate indicators below national level. 
This is potentially very important, but its relevance may well depend on how the recommendation is 
implemented in practice. It is relatively easy to imagine some indicators of poverty or education 
disaggregated to urban and rural targets, but the aim is to go beyond this.  The potential of the 
approach is dependent both on data availability, and the nature on sub-national units. There is an 
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enormous difference between setting targets for State in India,– often with populations in excess of 50 
million − and for Districts in sub-Saharan Africa. The detail and modalities still need to be addressed. 
Unfortunately the detail of how LG will fit in remains to be seen. It is hoped that the HLP still remains 
the key text and/or influence rather than reverting to the more normal policy prescriptions that ignore 
LG. Figure 2 below describes the potential role for LG in the illustrative goals suggested by the HLP.  
Figure 2 Potential roles for Local Government within the new Framework  
 
 Goal Comment Local Government role 
1 End Poverty Replaces and reworks MDG. Still the main 
overarching objective as in the original 
formulation.  
All four targets are to be disaggregated. LG 
as argued has major role in reducing poverty 
2 Empower Girls and 
Women and Achieve 
Gender Equality 
Replaces and reworks MDG 3. Wider 
Gender objective than earlier 
All four targets are to be disaggregated. LG 
again involved often with local administration 
and regulations and with work on violence. 
3 Provide Quality and 
Education and 
Lifelong learning 
Replaces and reworks MDG 2. This now 
goes beyond primary education to includes 
a quality measure rather than a quantity. 
All four targets are to be disaggregated. LG 
important via its involvement in the 
education sector 
4 Ensure Healthy Lives Replaces and reworks MDG 4,5 and 6. The 
merging of three goals into a single goal 
suggests how dominant the health agenda 
was in the original formulation   
All five targets are to be disaggregated. LG 
important via its involvement in the health 
sector and through public health actions. 
5 Ensure  Food Security 
and Good Nutrition 
New Goal concerned with food security and 
nutrition indicators. 
Two out of five targets are to be 
disaggregated. Indirect role for LG 
6 Achieve Universal 
Access to Water and 
Sanitation 
Welcome new goal on water and Sanitation. 
Evidence suggests that it is appropriate 
alongside a poverty approach as in quite a 
few cases they are not congruent. 
Two out of four targets are to be 
disaggregated. The provision of water and 
sanitation facilities is a classic and very 
important LG function. 
7 Secure Sustainable 
Energy 
Very important new goal that to a large 
extent talks to the Climate change agenda 
Two out of four targets are to be 
disaggregated. LG important in 
implementing the regulations in terms of 
energy efficiency 
8 Create Jobs, 
Sustainable 
Livelihoods, and 
Equitable Growth 
Major, problematic and ambitious goal that 
talks to the economic growth and 
employment agendas. 
All four targets are to be disaggregated. LG 
can be important in facilitating economic 
growth –issue of also not limiting 
employment in the informal sector  
9 Manage Natural 
Resource Assets 
Sustainably 
Replaces and reworks MDG 7. Seeks to 
address the more general environmental 
concerns on sustainability and biodiversity 
None of the five targets are to be 
disaggregated. Generally a national policy 
but LG often important in implementation. 
10 Ensure Good 
Governance and 
Effective Institutions 
New goal that talks to governance and 
implicitly democracy and human rights. 
Likely to be most controversial and 
contentious  
Two out of five targets are to be 
disaggregated. LG important but may be 
subsumed under national concerns. 
11 Ensure Stable and 
Peaceful Societies 
New goal that implicitly is addressing the 
issues of conflict, diversity and fragile states. 
Two out of four targets are to be 
disaggregated. LG can be important in 
supporting peace and stability  
12 Create a Global 
Enabling Environment 
and Catalyse Long-
term Finance 
Replaces and reworks MDG 8. Seen as 
important in building a new partnership and 
an attempt to widen the original formulation 
to include, trade, finance and commitments 
to climate change. 
None of the six targets are to be 
disaggregated 
Source: Author 
Fully 30 of the 54 targets – remembering that they are illustrative targets and are still subject to 
negotiation – are recommended to be disaggregated.  Indeed this figure increases to 32 out of 54 where 
LG is potentially, involved if the two targets concerned with municipal waste and energy efficiency 
are added, which both have very strong LG connections. This represents approximately 60% of the 
potential future targets. 
Amis                                                                                     Post 2015 MDG Agenda? 
   
 
CJLG November 2013 
11 
 
In the consultation process there are clearly dangers for the shape of the Post 2015 agenda which can 
be outlined as follows. First, perhaps the most dangerous and predictable tendency, will be an endless 
process of lobbing and consultation (NGOs, UN agencies and Governments) that will result in an 
overload of the agenda
5
. This is understandable as there are many good causes and aspects of poverty 
which could legitimately be included. The challenge − and it is not an easy one − is to make effective 
judgements over relative priorities. This will certainly be a more complex and political process than 
the top-down and elitist definition of the original formulation of the MDGs. However it could be 
argued that HLP has done well in 'only' replacing the eight original goals with a suggested twelve.  
The second danger − which goes back to the question of 'how to meet the MDGs' − is that the 
framework will be too prescriptive. This is likely to be exacerbated by the need for an international 
consensus to agree the new framework. From my discussions, it would be considered a failure if a 
framework was not adopted, which effectively means that some sort of consensus must be achieved6.  
This of necessity must include China. There is a potential danger that the MDGs might follow the 
process of the OECD/DAC  (Development Assistance Committee), which drew up impressive and 
clear aid rules that were enshrined in the Paris Declaration on aid alignment and harmonisation in 
2005, but these were substantially watered down, both through the follow-up Accra Agenda in 2008, 
and the Busan Declaration of 2011. It appears that the desire to include the new donors especially 
China meant that the text was so general as to have become almost meaningless7. In some cases the 
text is contradictory especially on the role of tied aid. The result of the need for consensus − and the 
participation of China8 − is that the principles have been brought down to the lowest common 
denominator. The inclusion of text on fragile states and on aid transparency is the only significant and 
notable achievements.  
The other outcome from the Busan Declaration (2011), despite minimal agreement, has been an agreed 
process to continue the discussion on a range of subjects, a preferred option at international meetings 
and/or summits where a meaningful consensus cannot be achieved. This seems to be the route that the 
Climate Change discussions are taking after the failure at Copenhagen and subsequent meetings in 
Durban (2011).  It is worth noting that the relationships between major actors is more strained than in 
2000 when the original MDG framework was agreed as: the EU no longer represents such a coherent 
block; the US is now more engaged in development;  there is a closer link between the security and 
development narratives; Russia is more assertive, and the BRICS are more important, in particular 
                                                            
5I think this is inevitable even if one takes a very cynical view of this ongoing 'consultation' process, it will be 
problematic to limit the agendas that are included.  
6 See Footnote 2 
7 In teaching, the principles of Paris 2005 are very clear to explain, whereas Busan has much less clarity 
8 China was seen as so important that when they effectively walked out on the process the then UK Minster for 
International Development personally flew to China to urge them to reconsider! 
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China whose economy is now second only to the United States.  There is also a new range of donors 
beyond the traditional OECD/DAC group. 
Assuming that some framework can be agreed – which seems likely – despite the apparent enthusiasm 
for considering the 'means' or 'how' questions, these may well be either left out or so compromised as 
to be rendered effectively meaningless.  Clearly these are some of the issues that will form the detail of 
on-going negotiations. 
The final danger is that the Post 2015 framework remains, as with the current MDGs, too donor 
centric, and too focused on the process of international Aid. Recent work, including the latest 
European Development Report9, is seeking to move beyond aid, to a much more nuanced discussion of 
North-South relationships, which includes discussion of Aid and Financing (money); Trade and 
Investment (goods) and finally Migration (people). This immediately leads on to discussions of EU 
subsidies and protection of agriculture, and access to labour markets via immigration policies, with the 
realisation that flows of remittances and private sector investment dwarf official development aid . If 
we want to end world poverty then surely it makes sense to include some of these issues? Yet, while 
there is some discussion on going 'beyond aid', I have seen very little on implementation, but it is not 
clear whether this is because of technical difficulty or the likely political difficulties of changing 
immigration and/or agricultural subsidies in the North. 
Finally in the Post 2015 process, it is worth thinking about whether, strategically, it is more important 
for the LG lobby to take a stance about the role of LG with the main development agencies, or argue 
for something in the final framework. Given the complexity and political nature of this process, both 
are probably equally important.  
Has the LG sector suffered from not being formally included in the original MDG formulation?  Did 
its inclusion in the Accra Accord (2008) which gave it a more formal role, actually make any 
difference? The point I am making is that LG in almost all systems – unitary or federal is ultimately 
dependent upon its own national government policies and behaviour10. In the end, we much accept this 
reality of how LG fits into the picture. 
So what is the Local Government (or CLGF) perspective? 
A good starting point for developing a LG perspective on the Post 2015 agenda is a recent article on 
the urban sector by Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2013). In this polemical but persuasive paper they note 
the dramatic increase in urban poverty − it is now suggested that 1 out over every 7 people in the 
world now lives in an informal settlement.  However, official statistics consistently fail to adjust for 
                                                            
9 Presentation by James Mackie at the recent October (2012) EADI meeting at ISS, Den Hague. 
10 This is why any MDG report with LG recommendations could be seen to undermine national sovereignty.  
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the greater expense of living in an urban area. The data on water supply and connections are at best 
questionable. Furthermore that the estimates of numbers living in slums are at best estimates 
especially given the lack of census in many countries. The health conditions in some informal 
settlements are not only worse than rural areas but even than national averages, as data from Nairobi 
and Kenya clearly shows. The conclusion is that growing urban poverty is one of the major problems 
facing the South, and moreover that it will undoubtedly increase in the future (Satterthwaite and 
Mitlin, 2013, 7-8). 
The core of the authors' argument is the success of intermediate civil society organizations like 
Shack/Slum Dwellers International and other federations of homeless and landless people have been 
effective in reducing urban poverty. These are usually relatively modest interventions but are driven 
by the poor themselves but  crucially   through positive coalition and alliances with local government. 
As they put it:  
There is evidence of the effectiveness of such an alternative approach to poverty reduction [depend 
on] interventions that have worked with urban poor men and women, and supported their productive 
engagement with local governments (Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2013: 9).  
Strength of this approach is that it allows for collective initiatives, and that many of the problems of 
slums and service delivery that the urban poor face are amenable to collective provision and solution. 
Many of the problems slum dwellers face are related to the environment, where there is a limit to 
which individual welfare solutions,– such as conditional cash transfers,– can succeed. Providing these 
collective solutions or supporting collective consumption has always been one, if not, the most critical 
functions that local government does in terms of service delivery (water and sanitation); transport 
(roads); storm water drains and solid waste disposal, and primary education and health. While there is 
some evidence that these integrated urban functions are under threat11 they remain critical for the poor. 
Finally in relation to urban poverty, we face an unusual and unique situation in the increase and scale 
of urban poverty. We know it is politically significant12 (and is exacerbated by the potential lack of 
employment opportunities for young men − angry or otherwise); and we have the knowledge and 
funds to tackle the situation. 
There is in this approach a wider, but important, central point in that if we want to make governments 
more accountable and/or give the poor greater voice then the vehicle for making this happen is LG. An 
core element of this argument is that LG, in partnership with civil society organisations, is the key to 
reducing urban poverty. If the challenge is to go 'beyond government' to address poverty, then LG 
becomes both a critical partner and a key intermediate agency. The challenge is to bridge the gap 
                                                            
11See the arguments around the idea of 'fragmented urbanization', which suggest that one of the major 
mechanisms of supporting the welfare state, and positive interventions to benefit the poor by government, is 
being threatened by both privatization and the rise of gated and private sector urbanization. This argument has 
been advanced primarily from the experience of urban development in the North. 
12 The cities of the South are potentially the weakest link in the global capitalist system. 
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between formal donor agencies and those who can actually deliver (i.e.: civil society organizations) for 
the poor. 
The Figure 3 includes suggestions from Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2013) on what the international 
agencies should consider to include or think about in terms of the MDGs. 
Figure 3 Post MDGs and development assistance in the urbanising world 
Eight points for development assistance agencies to consider  
 
1. Don’t just set targets be clear about how they can be meet and by whom 
2. Go back to universal targets 
3. Consider where finance is needed, available to whom and accountable to whom 
4. Have indicators that actually match goals and targets 
5. Support local processes to generate the data needed for setting priorities and benchmarks  and 
monitoring progress 
6. Encourage and support local governments and civil society organizations to develop their own 
goals and targets to recognize their roles and responsibilities with the Post 2015 development 
process 
7. Avoid vague and ambiguous statements 
8. What about Climate change? 
 
Source: Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2013: 29-30) 
 
We need to make a similar and more creative argument for the role of Local Government, rather than 
allowing LG to continue as the junior partner of national government. 
On reflection it is surprisingly difficult to articulate what the LG sector really wants. At a minimum, as 
argued here and elsewhere, we want/need to be recognised and acknowledged for what we do. 
However apart from the ideas of sub-National targets, do we need a more explicit role for LG? 
Satterthwaite et al (2013: 24) suggest the following key elements should be included: 
 The explicit recognition of [LG] as primary stakeholders 
 Attention to LG capacity to deliver on their mandated responsibilities; 
 Attention to the capacity of local citizens and civil society to hold their LG accountable 
 
What seems to be emerging is the idea of a goal/target to strengthen LG.  The problem is that there is 
no obvious parameter or indicator to measure LG. Thus for example UK LG is highly competent but 
relies almost exclusively on transfers from the centre; whereas there are many LGs in sub-Saharan 
Africa which may have high levels of autonomy – in finance and other spheres but are unable to 
provide their mandated functions.  In this, discussion the legal system does not suffice. What we need 
is political will from the centre to support LG, an approach fraught with political pressures at the local, 
national, and international levels. Nevertheless such a commitment, with all its caveats, might be more 
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acceptable to the majority of countries than some of the HLP governance targets. These may, or may 
not, be some of the issues currently under negotiation at the UN. 
Summary and conclusion: the devil is in the detail  
Commenting on the Post 2015 agenda and process is very problematic as it is observing a process that 
is continually evolving and one where the procedures are opaque. At the moment (November 2013) 
the haggling is still taking place at intergovernmental groups at the UN. Nevertheless it seems likely 
that the Governance targets are potentially the most contested13. 
One political escape route that emerges is the suggestions that targets should be agreed for national 
level, but the way they are disaggregated and implemented to be decided at the national/local level. 
This would potentially allow some of the more contentious targets, such as the HLP's target 10c) 
'increase public participation in political processes and civic engagement at all levels' to be 
interpreted in terms that are acceptable to the relevant national governments. This target is the nearest 
one that talks to the question of LG capacity.  
Finally the core argument − that a strong LG sector is a pre-requisite for meeting the Post 2015 MDGs 
seems difficult to progress. The key to pursuing this is a well-resourced and capable LG sector. To 
achieve this we need a commitment to support LG from National Governments. This is very difficult 
to operationalise, and could be argued to invade national sovereignty. Nevertheless, to empower LG to 
play a central role in the Post 2015 agenda, this is what we need. In conclusion  from a LG perspective 
the situation now (November 2013) is more optimistic about the Post 2015 MDGs than at the Kampala 
Conference in May 2013. However there is still much to play for. 
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Abstract 
The Uganda Constitution of 1995 spelt out the principle of decentralization by devolution. 
Accordingly, from 1995 to 2005, district local governments had a dejure mandate to hire and fire all 
categories of civil servants through their respective district service commissions (DSCs). Following 
the Constitutional amendment in September 2005, the right to hire and fire district chief 
administrative officers (CAOs) reverted to central government. Critics of recentralization of CAO 
appointments contend that the shift in the policy and legislation for managing CAOs runs contrary to 
the principles of decentralization by devolution. This paper argues that recentralization of CAOs has 
confused reporting, reduced the autonomy of sub-national governments in civil service management, 
undermined accountability of CAOs to elected councils, and  shifted the loyalty of  CAOs from local 
governments with and for which they work  to central government that appoints and deploys them. To 
deepen accountability in local governments, the paper advocates for decentralization of CAO 
appointments, but for participation of central government in recruitment of CAOs within the confines 
of a separate personnel system. It further calls for a rethinking of the current call by the 9th 
Parliament to recentralize human resource in health in local governments owing to accountability 
challenges of managing the civil service in sub-national governments under an integrated personnel 
system. 
Key words: Recentralization, Chief Administrative Officers, Accountability, Local Governments 
1. Introduction  
Uganda made a radical shift in decentralization policy and legislation in 2005. This shift entailed 
central government reclaiming powers to hire Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) and deputy chief 
administrative officers. From 1995 to September 2005, local governments had a dejure mandate to 
appoint and discipline all civil servants, including CAOs through their respective district service 
commissions (DSCs). Placing CAOs under local councils was intended to deepen accountability of 
the CAO to elected representatives of the people. A locally accountable CAO was deemed to be a 
pillar of devolved local governance.  
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Since recentralization of CAO appointments in 2005, the discourse on implications of recentralization 
for accountability in local governments has largely been at a conceptual level and has tended to echo 
arguments put forward before recentralization. As Manyak and Katono (2010: 8) asked, 
Has recentralization [of CAOs] seriously damaged the accountability link between elected 
and appointed officials at the district and local level?  
This qualitative paper analyses the implication of recentralization of CAO appointments on downward 
accountability in local governments in Uganda. Data for the paper were gathered through interviewing 
three purposively selected CAOs and two elected district chairpersons from predominantly rural 
districts of Uganda, and were analyzed using thematic and content analysis. Though the findings are 
not generalizable to all local governments, they nuance our understanding of perverse effects of 
recentralization of appointment of local government staff on accountability in local governments. The 
paper extends scholarship on civil service management in local governments in Uganda from 
examining the underlying reasons for recentralization to considering the aftermath of recentralizing 
the appointment of the CAO. 
2. Background  
Uganda's current decentralization policy reform was launched in 1992 and consolidated through 
enactment of the of the Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute in 1993 (Steiner, 2006; 
Muhumuza, 2008; Kakumba, 2008; Makara, 2009). The country's decentralization reform was labeled 
'exceptional' among developing countries in terms of the scale and scope of the transfer of power and 
responsibilities to the local level (Steiner, 2006). Mitchinson (2003: 241) described Uganda's 
decentralization reform as: 'one of the most radical devolution initiatives in the  developing world'..  
Under Uganda's decentralization framework, the district is the highest level of local government. 
Below the district are lower local governments (municipalities, city divisions, town councils, and sub-
counties). The District Council is the highest political organ of local government and comprises the 
elected district chairperson as the political head plus a number of councilors representing electoral 
areas of the district and interest groups  youth, people with disabilities and women) (Nabaho, 
2012:79). Three fundamental innovations are discernible from Uganda's decentralization policy: a 
separate personnel system, intergovernmental fiscal relations, and a new power structure (Makara, 
2009:137). Under the new personnel system, a District Service Committee was established in each 
district local government (under the Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute, 1993 and Legal 
Notice Supplement 1 of 1994) and entrusted with the mandate to appoint, confirm, promote, and 
discipline all district and urban council employees, with exception of the district executive secretary 
(DES) and deputy district executive secretary (DDES). The DES was the head of the district public 
service as well as the accounting officer.  
Following the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, DESs and their deputies, who became CAOs 
and deputy CAOs under the new system, were also placed under the separate personnel system. This 
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in effect meant that they would be appointed, disciplined and removed from office by the District 
Service Commissions (DSCs).  Article 188 (1) of the Constitution (GoU 1995: 98) specifically stated 
that, 'There shall be a chief administrative officer for every district', while subsection (2) of the same 
Article stated that, 'The chief administrative officer shall be appointed by the district service 
commission and shall be the chief accounting officer for the district'. 
 The rationale for personnel decentralization was to make all staff executing decentralized functions 
accountable to local governments through the CAO or town clerk as the case may be (Nsibambi, 
2000). The mandate of district local government to hire and fire their staff, including CAOs and their 
deputies, was further consolidated in the Local Government Act of 1997. The transfer of appointments 
to district local governments through the DSCs was considered to be one of the cornerstones of 
Ugandan decentralization reforms (Bossert & Beauvais, 2002).  
3. Recentralization of appointment of  Chief Administrative Officers  
In 2003, the Government of Uganda started rethinking the policy and local government legislation. 
One of the proposed policy shifts was recentralizing of CAO appointments, taking this responsibility 
away from DSCs. The related discourse from 2003 to September 2005 hinged on whether to 
recentralize CAOs or maintain the status quo. Competing views were expressed. Central government 
was the strongest pro-centralization voice, while the donor community and Uganda Local 
Government Association (ULGA) strongly opposed the imposition of an integrated personnel system 
on the district personnel arrangements. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA, 2008:21) has 
distilled the following as central arguments given in favour of recentralization of CAOs: 
a) a central-government appointed CAO would be more protected from local political 
interference and pressures; 
b) in view of the local government dependence on central government financial transfers, the 
CAO should be held centrally accountable to reduce rampant resource misappropriation;  
c)  recentralization would  lead to recruitment of suitable CAOs; and  
d) CAOs as senior civil servants would be transferable without being re-interviewed, which 
would reduce the turnover of CAOs and avoid equating decentralization with localization. 
Let us contextualize the above issues. Admittedly, there was an urgent need to insulate CAOs from 
incessant and undue local political interference and pressures, but the point of contention was how to 
do it. Appointment of CAOs by districts − though good for downward accountability − exposed them 
to tremendous local pressure to contravene established regulations and procedures, especially on 
financial management and resource allocation (Kiyaga-Nsubuga & Olum, 2009). CAOs who did not 
succumb to these pressures were dismissed by their respective DSCs (Francis & James, 2003; Kiyaga-
Nsubuga & Olum, 2009; Manyak & Katono, 2010).  Francis and James (2003) highlight a case where 
a DSC of one district dismissed a deputy CAO, under pressure from the district executive, for 
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questioning the use of the unconditional grant for elected leaders' allowances. Central government put 
forward three reasons for recentralizing CAO appointments. 
First, recentralization was deemed a feasible strategy for shielding CAOs against political interference 
and to enhance their job security. Recentralization would enable the CAO to be independent from the 
political control of district councils. This would in turn create an environment for CAOs to operate 
within the provisions of the law as it would eliminate pressure on the CAO to approve illegal 
expenditure. Recentralization has evidently shielded CAOs against undue local political pressure. 
Mentor Consult (2008: 27) found that CAOs were satisfied with the decision to recentralize their 
appointment. One CAO is quoted in the Mentor Report as saying, 
We are no longer puppets of what they [local politicians] would say; those days we would 
be forced to do things as they wanted because it was not possible to stand up to them.  
This statement underscores the intense political pressure that CAOs were previously exposed to under 
the separate personnel system. However, there are justifiable fears in some quarters that 
recentralization may correspondingly shift political pressure on administrators away from local 
politicians to the central government.  
Second, the rationale hinged on ensuring financial probity in the use of central government transfers 
under fiscal decentralization. The Local Government Act (CAP 243; GoU 1997) provides three types 
of fiscal transfers (conditional, unconditional and equalization grants) to local governments to 
implement their decentralized responsibilities (Muhumuza, 2008; Makara, 2009; Awortwi, 2011):   
 Unconditional grants are given as a minimum grant to local government to run decentralized 
services.  
 Conditional grants are given for services agreed with central government and provided by 
local governments, and may not be used for any other purpose apart from the one for which it 
is provided.  
 Equalization grants are given to those local governments lagging behind the national average 
standards in service delivery (Makara, 2009).   
By 1999, central government transfers amounted to over 93% of the local government funding (Saito, 
2003). At the same time, cases of resource misappropriation were frequently reported in the media, 
and reports of the Auditor General. In view of the above, central government argued for powers to 
appoint accounting officers who would be centrally accountable for central government transfers and 
use them frugally for maximum service delivery. Central government would therefore be in position 
to sanction accounting officers who flout financial management laws and regulations, in contrast to a 
separate personnel system where it would merely recommend to DSCs to take disciplinary action 
against errant accounting officers.  
Third, it was argued that recentralization would pave the way for recruitment of suitable CAOs. 
Undoubtedly, the recruitment arrangements for local government staff, including CAO, tended and 
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still tends to be inward looking and biased against candidates from other districts, favouring ‘sons and 
daughters of the soil'− i.e. people of local origin (Francis & James, 2003; Kakumba 2003, 2008; 
Awortwi, 2011; Nabaho, 2011, 2012; Nabaho & Kiiza, 2013).  Instead of appointing staff 'for the 
district from the national labour market', errant DSCs tend to appoint staff 'for the district from the 
local/district labour market' (Nabaho, 2012: 80), limiting opportunities for recruiting people with 
relevant competences (IGG, 2008). The decision by the Public Service Commission to retire some 
CAOs due to lack of requisite qualifications immediately after recentralization lends credence to the 
idea  that some DSCs had breached merit principles during recruitment and selection of staff.  
Fourth, under a separate personnel system CAOs and their deputies could not easily be transferred to 
another local government jurisdiction, but had to be re-interviewed and offered appointment on 
transfer of service.  Critics argued that this approach to managing top local government administrators 
equated decentralization to localization, and that the separate personnel system confined them to a 
rather closed system where their career progress could easily be suffocated (Kakumba, 2008). Thus, 
any personnel arrangement that would enable CAOs to be transferred around the country would help 
their career development.  
However, using recentralization of the CAO to achieve the objectives outlined above has been 
described by critics of recentralization as 'throwing the baby out with the bath-water'. Opponents of 
recentralization were unconvinced by these arguments and called for maintaining the status quo of the 
separate personnel management system for top local government staff. The Constitutional Review 
Commission Report, 2003 maintained the importance of having a locally accountable CAO as a pillar 
of devolved governance. The Commission argued that without local control of the CAO, councils 
would have limited control over the entire local government performance, and that central 
government appointment of CAOs would cut the most crucial accountability link between the elected 
local councils and local government staff, resulting in a snowball effect whereby local accountability 
would be undermined (Steffensen, 2006; JICA, 2008).  
The Uganda Local Government Association (ULGA), in its submission to the Parliamentary Session 
Committee on Public Service and Local Government on Constitutional (Amendment) Bill No.2, 2005 
and Local Governments (Amendment) Bill No.8, 2005 in May 2005, vehemently opposed 
recentralization of the CAO. ULGA (2005: 9) maintained that, 
The proposal to revert to the position of LG[local government] CAOs being appointed and 
controlled at the CG [central Government] level is a recall of the already transferred 
powers possessed by LGs [local governments] in handling this particular office. It will 
confuse reporting and accountability. It will lead to more officers of LGs being 
recentralized. In the long run, the entire structure will collapse. CG already has its full 
representation through the Resident District Commissioner (RDC). The real outcome of the 
proposal in the Bill is the fact of recentralization against decentralization. 
The anti-recentralization camp also argued that the proposed recentralization would undermine the 
principles and objectives of decentralization, by weakening the powers of the electorate, through their 
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representative councils, to control technical staff. Recentralization would further raise issues of 
supervision and accountability of the CAO to districts. 
However, those in favour of recentralization eventually won, and Parliament amended the 
Constitution in September 2005, and the Local Government Act 2006, to give responsibility for CAO 
appointments to the Public Service Commission (PSC). The status of the CAO has, since 2005, 
changed from one of being a district local government employee to that of being a central government 
employee in the district.  Nevertheless, the CAO remains responsible to the elected district 
chairperson. Operationally, the PSC controls the appointment and exercises disciplinary control over 
the CAO; routine management (posting and transfer) of the CAO is a responsibility of the Ministry of 
Local Government, while the CAO's performance appraisal is handled by the elected district 
chairperson. Recentralization of the CAO has definitely changed the texture of human resource 
management in local governments.  
During the decade from 1995 to 2005 the entire human resource management function in local 
governments operated under a completely separate personnel arrangement. Uganda has now gone 
back to the pre-1995 arrangement for managing CAOs − a move labeled by some as ‘the President 
[Yoweri Museveni] killing his own baby [decentralization by devolution]' (Manyak & Katono, 2010: 
5). It is now evident that Uganda's local government system has a dual character: an integrated 
personnel system for CAOs, deputy CAOs and municipal town clerks, and a separate personnel 
system for other local government staff (Kakumba, 2008; Nabaho, 2011, 2012; Nabaho & Kiiza, 
2013). This apparent policy shift has changed the philosophical basis of decentralization by 
devolution and created tensions between the philosophy and practice of decentralization (Kiyaga-
Nsubuga & Olum, 2009).   
4. Post-recentralization discourse on recentralizing CAO appointments 
The critical question for scholars of local governance is why the provisions of the repealed Local 
Government (Resistance Councils) Statute, 1993, concerning management of top local government 
administrators were resurrected in September 2005 through amendment of the 1995 Constitution and 
Local Government Act (CAP 243). In other words, why did the arrangement for managing top 
administrators revert to a system that operated a decade earlier and that was at odds with the 
principles of decentralization by devolution?  
The decision to recentralize CAO appointments can be explained by two principal factors: the 
declining political fortunes of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government and central 
government's uneasiness at the extent of autonomy granted to local governments under the 1995 
Constitution and the Local Government Act (CAP 243).  Thus scholars challenge the reasons 
advanced by the NRM government for recentralization of CAO appointments, variously described 
'ostensible' and 'supposed', arguing that the NRM government used corruption as a scapegoat to 
achieve its political objectives (Muhumuza, 2008). Skeptics of this anti-corruption strategy argue that 
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corruption cannot be tacked by centralizing the office of the CAO, and that corruption at the local 
government level should be tackled by strengthening the local mechanisms of accountability and 
improving national oversight agencies such as the Office of the Auditor General and the Inspectorate 
of Government (Oloka-Onyango, 2007).  Improving local accountability resonates well with the 
principal-agent frameworks which hold that corruption is a function of monopoly plus discretion less 
accountability (Klitgaard, 1988). CLGF (2007) casts doubt over the potential of recentralization to 
curb corruption by arguing that the CAO with central allegiance would be operating in the same 
corrupt environment.  
Scholars further attribute recentralization of CAO appointments to electoral politics at the national 
level. From 1986 to 2005, the NRM established a defacto one-party system which; its proponents 
called 'no party' or 'movement', but which critical observers aptly noted simply meant that no other 
political party had a role in the governance of the country (Makara, 2009). This period also witnessed 
CAOs performing an additional role of retuning officer on behalf of the Electoral Commission during 
national and local council elections. Quite often, the NRM establishment accused CAOs of being 
'multipartists' prior to the ushering in of 'multipartism' in 2005. In the past, where the NRM lost in 
elections, President Museveni accused CAOs of conniving with the opposition (Awortwi, 2011:368). 
Oloka-Onyango (2007:37) draws a strong link between 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections 
and recentralization of the appointment of the CAO:  
Why the CAO was recentralized was clearly also related to fears around the elections with 
several powerful NRM officials accusing CAOs of being ‘multipartists' and therefore 
lacking the necessary partiality in their role as designated election returning officers. 
This position was reconfirmed when, after the February 2006 elections, President Museveni accused 
CAOs of being sympathizers of opposition political parties and threatened to appoint only those who 
subscribe to NRM government philosophy as CAOs (Awortwi, 2011). Immediately after 2006 
elections, all CAOs were required to apply for their jobs alongside new applicants. Recentralization of 
CAOs was therefore part of a broader scheme by government to minimize the risk of losing to any 
competitor (Awortwi, 2011).  
Steffensen (2006), however, sees the NRM government's recentralization of CAO appointments as a 
symptom of unease with the level of autonomy of local governments, and the wish by central 
government to strengthen control. Following several amendments to local government legislation, 
commentators argued that the NRM [ruling party] had become fearful of its own 'success' in pursuing 
decentralization (JICA, 2008). Local government autonomy was manifested in three powers: power to 
make and enforce regulatory decisions; power to govern a procurement system; and power to manage 
human resources. Recentralization of some elements of local government personnel management, 
including the appointment of CAOs and municipal town clerks, was considered an effective way of 
weakening the autonomy of local governments. In parallel, in 2006 the Local Government Act was 
amended to strip local governments of the power to govern a procurement system, abolishing the 
former local tender boards that were appointed by councils. However, there were accusations that 
Nabaho  Local Government Accountability in Uganda 
 
CJLG November 2013 
24 
these procurement entities had become instruments of cronyism and patronage and were corrupt 
(CLGF, 2007). Tender boards were replaced with contract committees appointed by the CAO and 
eventually approved by the Secretary to the Treasury14. Currently, local governments have no role in 
contract committees and their power to query decisions of the committees is limited. The NRM 
government is also using intergovernmental fiscal transfer arrangements to reduce the autonomy of 
local governments (JICA, 2008), and central government fiscal transfers have been placed under 
central government appointees (CAOs) which undermines decentralization reform (ARD, 2005). All 
these changes support to the assertion by Awortwi (2011:348) that while central government 
leadership finds it expedient to appear to support a decentralization policy, they do not wish to see the 
growth of powerful local institutions.  
One major conclusion from the analysis above is that central government-driven human resource 
management reforms for local governments do not take place in a vacuum; they are shaped by the 
political environment at the national level and the desire by the central government to exercise tight 
control over sub-national governments.  
5. Has recentralization of CAO appointments undermined accountability?  
Accountability, as a concept, has been in the public domain for many years. The concept lends itself to 
many interpretations. Brinkerhoff (2001:2) opines that the essence of accountability is answerability; 
being accountable means having the obligation to answer questions regarding decisions and/or 
actions. Accountability has two important dimensions: answerability and enforcement. Answerability 
refers to the obligation to provide information and explanations concerning decisions and actions 
while enforcement is the ability to oversee actors and apply sanctions when they give unsatisfactory 
answers (Brinkerhoff, 2001:2-5). Recentralization of the CAO has apparently impacted on 
accountability in local governments in two major ways: shift in reporting and allegiance of top 
administrators in districts; and weakening control over the CAO by elected councils. 
Shift in reporting and allegiance   
No servant can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he 
will be loyal to the one and despise the other … (Luke 16:13,NKJV). 
Recentralization has created two masters for the CAO: the district council and central government. 
This has shifted the pattern of reporting for the CAO from being uni-directional to being bi-
directional. Currently, the CAO reports upward to central government and downward to the district 
council. Asked about implications of recentralization on reporting arrangements for top administrators 
in local governments, one respondent said, 'Recentralization [of CAO appointments] has created two 
reporting centres', which has attendant implications for accountability of the highest civil servant in 
                                                            
14   The permanent secretary in charge of finance, planning and economic development 
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district local governments. As one key informant put it, 'The CAO looks to the central government as 
the priority reporting centre'. 
 There was a general consensus among the two elected district chairpersons interviewed that CAOs 
were mostly preoccupied with accountability to central government, which has in turn softened 
accountability in local governments. This finding did not come as a surprise since central government 
wields substantial power over the CAO by virtue of being the appointing, posting and sanctioning 
authority. Practically, the recruiter of the CAO (central government) and a mere recipient of the CAO 
(local government) cannot have the same standing. 
Similarly, there was a general perception among elected district chairpersons and CAOs interviewed 
for this research that two-way reporting had considerably affected the loyalty of the CAOs, who now 
suffer from ‘operational' loyalty to local councils and their ‘career' loyalty to central masters. An 
acting CAO who had served in three local governments after recentralization spoke of how 
challenging it was for the CAO to please both powers. One CAO described the current dilemma of 
CAOs as 'being caught between a rock and a hard place'. The hardest choice a CAO has to make is 
whether his/her loyalty should lean more to the 'local governments with and for which he/she works' 
or to the central government that appoints and deploys him/her to districts. Another CAO likened the 
current predicament of CAOs to "a woman married to two husbands".  
Elected district chairpersons were of the view that CAOs had strategically shifted their allegiance to 
central government. They revealed that some CAOs now conveniently ignore a local council directive 
if this is not in the interest of central government. However, CAOs cannot completely ignore loyalty 
to local governments, since they are assigned to help local governments fulfill their statutory powers. 
This dichotomy reinforces the argument that an integrated personnel system occasions split loyalties 
for senior officials managing decentralized services (Nabaho, 2012). Thus an integrated personnel 
system appears to be the antithesis of decentralization by devolution. One conclusion that stems from 
the above discussion is that in a decentralized context, civil servants tend to owe allegiance to a local 
government they are appointed to serve rather than one in which they are assigned to work by central 
government.  
At a policy level, the findings of this qualitative study on unintended consequences of human resource 
recentralization for employee loyalty should inform the current debate in Uganda on whether to 
recentralize the appointments of health sector staff employed through local governments. The 
Parliamentary Committee on Health (Parliament of Uganda: 2012: 25) has already recommended to 
Parliament that, 
… recruitment and supervision of health workers in lower health centres [district hospitals 
and health centres 2 to 4] should be recentralized to make it possible for the Health 
Service Commission to recruit them instead of the District Service Commissions, which in 
most cases lack the capacity. 
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The committee intends to move a Private Member's Bill to that effect. The findings in this paper, 
suggest that accountability and loyalty concerns should be integral to debates on whether to 
recentralize human resource management for health staff or to maintain the status quo. The debate 
should also be underpinned by scholarly analysis of other local governance systems in Africa that 
attest to perverse effects of central government appointment and posting of civil servants to local 
governments. With reference to Ghana, Awortwi (2011: 367-368) writes, 
Civil servants have no allegiance to the LG [local government] in whose jurisdiction they 
work and they frequently ignore LG policies and priorities, refuse to attend meetings with 
locally elected officials, and generally maintain allegiance to the CG [central 
government]. Locally elected councilors face severe frustrations in the very assembly they 
are supposed to control. 
It is therefore advisable that central government should conduct a thorough evaluation of 
recentralization of CAO appointments on service delivery in local government before recentralizing 
more local government staff. From the perspective of political heads of districts (the two elected 
district officers interviewed), there is anecdotal evidence that recentralization has not achieved much, 
save ensuring job security for CAOs and giving the function a national outlook. As one said, 
'Recentralization has caused more harm than good to local government service delivery'.   
According to elected district officers, its effects have been threefold. First, CAOs are out of their duty 
stations (districts) most of the time since they have to balance performing their official duties and 
attending to their 'non-resident' families − some CAOs were described as 'visitors to districts' and their 
absence as 'a norm rather than an exception'. Quite often, CAOs do not seek permission from elected 
district chairpersons (to whom they are responsible) to be away from work and from districts, and 
chairperson, a former senior civil servant, said that he recently had to issue a warning letter to a CAO 
over rampant absenteeism from the district without permission. The elected district chairpersons 
argued that perennial absence of CAOs affects district operations and partly explains why districts 
return billions of unspent central government transfers to the national treasury at the end of the 
financial year. Re-remittance of central government transfers to the national treasury is not confined to 
the districts in this study, and Kaberamaido district reportedly returned 400 million Uganda shillings 
(150,944 United States dollars)  to the national treasury at the end of 2011/2012 (Onyinge, 2013).  
Second, after being transferred, most CAOs regularly delay to report to their new duty stations which 
has a considerable toll on local government service delivery. Thirdly, when CAOs are transferred, 
they take considerable time to acclimatize to districts. The 'acclimatization phase' has ramifications on 
the performance of sub-national governments. This is exacerbated by the short interval at which 
CAOs are transferred from one district to another either at the volition of the Ministry of Local 
Government or at the request of district local government councils.   
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Limited control by elected officials over CAO 
Recentralization has, without doubt, substantially reduced the control of elected politicians over top 
administrators in local governments. CAOs thought that elected district chairpersons were concerned 
that recentralization deprived them of their powers, and elected leaders affirmed this. Though the 
CAO is responsible to the elected district chairperson and the district council, the chairperson and 
council cannot sanction the CAO, in contrast to the pre-recentralization era, where district councils 
could remove CAOs through DSCs. Under the current legal regime, councils can only recommend 
removal of a CAO by a resolution supported by two-thirds of the council members on four grounds: 
abuse of office, incompetence, misconduct or misbehavior; or physical or mental incapacity.  
Elected district chairpersons were of the view that CAOs now feel they are superior and exhibit 
arrogant tendencies toward councilors and elected district chairpersons, for example absence without 
leave was described by elected chairperson as "CAOs undermining their supervisors". Thus, 
centralization has also rendered councils powerless in dealing with the CAO. The behavior of some 
CAOs towards elected leaders in local governments is a clear manifestation of how laws and policies 
can influence the behavior of actors in formal organizations.  
6.  Conclusion  
It is evident that since 2005, there have been calculated and steady attempts by central government to 
unravel components of Uganda's decentralization. This paper has demonstrated how recentralization 
of CAO appointments has negatively impacted on reporting and accountability in local governments 
at a time when there are renewed calls to strengthen accountability as a key pillar of good governance, 
and there are no proposals for strengthening accountability of CAOs (and the entire local government 
civil service). The remedy for strengthening accountability of civil servants to council is to revert the 
responsibility of appointing CAOs to local governments to ensure that there is no disconnect between 
the principle of decentralization by devolution and the practice of human resource management in 
sub-national governments. Nevertheless, central government should, within the confines of a separate 
personnel system, play a visible role in recruitment of the CAO. Within the proposed devolved 
arrangement, it should be made mandatory for the Public Service Commission, the Ministry of Public 
Service, and Ministry of Local Government to be involved in recruiting the CAO. The same central 
government institutions should be given powers to veto any major disciplinary action administered 
against the CAO by local governments to avoid victimization and unfair disciplinary action. Similarly, 
accountability institutions at national and local level should be strengthened to deal with cases of 
financial mismanagement in local governments. These proposed measures will ensure recruitment of 
suitable CAOs (since recruitment is likely to transcend ethnic and boundary considerations), guard 
against unfair disciplinary action(s) against CAOs, and lessen the motivation of CAOs to breach 
financial laws and policies.  
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Abstract 
Uganda’s Government of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) assumed power in 1986, in an 
environment of political turmoil, and initiated a policy of decentralisation as a way of restoring state 
credibility and deepening democracy. Decentralisation was accordingly legislated under the Local 
Government Act of 1997, as a framework act directing the decentralisation process.  The aim of the 
Act was to enable implementation of decentralisation provisions provided for under Chapter 11 of the 
1995 National Constitution. 
The decentralisation policy in Uganda aimed at improving local democracy, effectiveness, efficiency 
and sustainability in the delivery of essential services country-wide.  Improved service delivery was in 
turn expected to make significant positive impact on people’s quality of life. Unfortunately, the 
implementation of decentralisation appears to have concentrated more on administrative objectives 
as a means of promoting popular democracy and less on service delivery which would have led to 
economic transformation and better lives for the majority of Ugandans, and now new districts are 
being created without corresponding improvements in service delivery.  Surprisingly, this is 
happening in the midst of external praise that decentralisation reform in Uganda is one of the most 
far-reaching local government reform programmes in the developing world. 
The paper explores the role of decentralisation in development and how it can be undermined by 
political factors.  It highlights the development of decentralisation in Uganda, discusses its 
achievements, failure and challenges, and concludes that the decentralisation programme which was 
ambitious and politically driven has had mixed results in terms of enhancing service delivery and 
should be seriously reviewed and strengthened if it is to remain as a role model in Africa. 
Key Words: Decentralisation, development, democratisation and service delivery 
Introduction 
Since the 1980s governments in sub-Saharan Africa have been undergoing economic and institutional 
reform.  Among the many institutional reforms, decentralisation has been instituted to advance 
political democratisation and to promote socio-economic development (Saito, 2002).  Local 
governance is promoted as a structural arrangement through which local people and communities, 
with support from other national, regional and international actors can participate in the fight against 
poverty at close range   (Kauzya, 2003). 
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Kauzya (2005) argues that decentralisation is part of efforts to promote people's participation in 
decision making processes and development activities which in turn promotes good governance.  This 
is based on the premise that decentralised governance provides a structural arrangement and a level 
playing field for stakeholders to promote peace, democracy and development. 
Under the decentralisation policy, service delivery institutions and their governance are decentralised 
in order to improve access to services particularly for the rural poor (Bashaasha et al, 2011).  
Decentralisation therefore transfers administrative and political powers from central to regional or 
sub-national governments.  
Decentralisation of local governance is one of the most ambitious reforms undertaken by Uganda 
since independence in 1962 (Saxena et al, 2010).  Various scholars have praised the Ugandan 
decentralisation reform initiated in 1992 as exceptional among developing countries, in terms of the 
scale and scope of the transfer of power and responsibilities to the local level (Steiner, 2006).  They 
have referred to the decentralisation programme as 'one of the most far-reaching local government 
reform programme in the developing world' (Francis and James, 2003) and as 'one of the most radical 
devolution initiatives of any country at this time' (Mitchinson, 2003). Such praise obviously makes 
Uganda’s decentralisation programme a model for other countries to emulate. 
This paper illustrates the role of decentralisation in development and highlights the development of 
decentralisation in Uganda, including its achievements, failure and challenges.  
The paper concludes that the ambitious and politically-driven decentralisation in Uganda has had 
mixed results in terms of enhancing service delivery and recommends that for Uganda to remain a 
model, the decentralisation programme must be seriously reviewed and strengthened with a view to 
promoting efficient services delivery.   
The decentralisation structure in Uganda 
Uganda’s decentralisation process dates backs to 1987 when the present National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) government took power through an armed civil war which was waged on the basis 
of popular civil strengths. The first step by the (NRM) government in the decentralisation process was 
the enactment of the 1987 Resistance Council Committee’s Statute which legalised Resistance 
Councils (RCs) and gave them powers in their local areas of jurisdiction (Bashaasha, 2011).   
The current decentralisation reform was officially launched in 1992 through a presidential policy 
statement (Steiner, 2006).  It was first enshrined in the Local Government (Resistance Councils) 
Statute 1993 and later in the 1995 Constitution and the Local Governments Act 1997. 
As outlined in Figure 1, the local government systems is formed by a five-tiered structure of local 
councils (LC)  which consists of the Village (LC1), Parish (LC2), Sub-county (LC3), Country (LC4 ) 
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and District (LC5); Ward or Parish (LC2), Municipality (LC4) and the City (LC5) in urban areas.  The 
District and the City are the highest local government levels, while the Sub-county, Town and City 
Division are referred to as lower local government levels. 
Figure 1: Uganda’s five-tier local government administrative system 
 
 Source: Steiner (2006) 
The 1995 Constitution and Local Governments Act 1997 provided for the District to be a unit of 
decentralisation and spelt out the functions devolved to local governments, and the relevant funding 
mechanisms.  The idea was to involve the people in the way they are governed, in decision making, 
identifying problems, setting priorities, planning implementation and monitoring, to ensure better 
utilisation of resources both financial and human, and value for money through participation, 
transparency and accountability and sensitisation. 
The District Local Council (DLC) and the Sub-County Council are established as corporate legal 
entities under the Local Governments Act 1997.  These councils are vested with powers to: 
(i) enact local laws necessary for the effective governance of  the areas within their jurisdiction;  
(ii) ensure accountability and transparency in conducting council business and using council 
funds;  
(iii) ensure effective planning / budgeting to spur development and delivery of public services,  
and  
(iv) monitor the delivery of public service on priority national programmes (Natamba et.al 2010).   
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Devolution in Uganda has therefore been a gradual process with functions being transferred from the 
centre to local bodies.  Central government retained responsibility for national security, planning, 
immigration, foreign affairs and national projects, and all other functions were devolved to local 
institutions (Satane et al,2010).  According to the Local Governments Act 1997 (ss. 96-99) the role of 
the centre vis-a-vis line ministries and the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) is limited to 
coordination, advocacy for local government, inspection, monitoring, technical advice and training 
supervision within respective sectors. 
Perceived merits of decentralisation 
'Decentralisation' refers to the transfer of power over decision-making and implementation to lower 
administrative levels for purposes of improving efficiency and effectiveness (Kiyaga-Nsubuga, 2004).  
Several scholars (Muriisa, 2008; Okidi and Guloba, 2006; Obenga-Odom, 2010) have discussed 
different ways in which decentralisation can be implemented.  These include:  
 deconcentration, whereby powers and responsibilities over defined functions are transferred 
to lower administrative units that are tightly controlled from the centre;  
 delegation, by which lower units may be granted some relative discretion in managing 
defined responsibilities, while still reporting to the centre; 
 devolution, when the lower levels are given substantial control over decision-making and 
implementation, with the centre largely restricted to policy setting, monitoring and 
supervision.  
In the case of devolution the division of powers and responsibilities is defined in a legal framework, 
and the units to which power has been devolved are subjected to control by local beneficiaries.  
Uganda has experienced decentralisation both as a system and process of devolution of power from 
the central to the local authorities (Okidi and Gulaba, 2006). 
Although the motives of decentralisation differ across countries (Bashaasha et al,2011; Naido, 2002) 
the major argument supporting decentralisation in developing countries includes economic and 
political gains.  Naido (2002) states the economic justification for decentralisation as being allocated 
and productive efficiency aimed at improving public service delivery.   Allocative efficiency involves 
better matching of public services to local preferences, whereas productive efficiency involves 
increased accountability, fewer levels of bureaucracy, and better knowledge of local costs.  The 
political justification relates to considerations of local participation, good governance, and 
democratisation. 
Ekipo (2007) and the World Bank (2000) provide a clear and detailed outline of the perceived merits 
of decentralisation which include; 
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 facilitating good governance by empowering the local population to participate in matters 
affecting their lives.  This allows for the local people to be watchdogs and ensure that public 
officials deliver quality goods and services. 
 improving service delivery:  it is argued that the lower tiers of government can deliver 
services such as water, education, sanitation, and health effectively.  At the lower levels of 
government, politicians and public servants are more aware of the needs of their community, 
and aware of the  preferences of local populations.  
 productive efficiency:  this refers to the contention that local governments can produce goods 
and services at lower cost than central governments, and costs of producing goods and 
services will be minimised.  The usual 'middle-man syndrome' and bureaucracy involving 
contract procedures is reduced. 
 improving the efficiency of central government: decentralisation allows central governments 
to concentrate on national and international issues, eg: macroeconomic policies for the entire 
economy, rather than being pre-occupied with service delivery. 
 cost recovery: decentralisation may make it less difficult for government to recover  the costs 
of public services, as services will be more demand-responsive hence increasing the 
household willingness to pay for services that match their demand. 
 fostering competition may result in better public goods at lower prices.  Competition allows 
for a bundles of local public goods to be produced and individuals can reveal their preferences 
for those goods by exercising some form of 'exit' option at the extreme, moving to 
jurisdictions that satisfy their tastes (Azfar-et.al.2005). 
The NRM government went for decentralisation largely to deliver better services to communities.  
The Local Governments Act, 1997, places responsibility for delivery of most services with local 
governments.  The objective of the Act was:  
(i) to give full effect to the decentralisation of functions, powers, responsibilities and services at 
all levels of local government;  
(ii) to insure democratic participation in, and control of decision making by the people concerned;  
(iii) to establish a democratic, political and gender sensitive, administrative set-up in local 
governments;  
(iv) to establish sources of revenue and financial accountability, and  
(v) to provide for elections of local councils (see sec.2 of the Act).   
The latter objective was in line with the national objectives and directive principles enshrined in the 
1995 Constitution which provides that; 
The state shall be guided by the principle of decentralisation and devolution of government 
functions and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct 
their own affairs. 
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Part 2 of the second schedule of the Local Government Act, 1997 gives power to local governments 
(Local governments) to provide education services, medical and health services; undertake 
maintenance and provision of water supplies; construction, maintenance and rehabilitation of roads; 
budget for recurrent and development expenditures as well as collect local revenue. 
Decentralisation policy was therefore aimed at improving local democracy, effectiveness, efficiency 
and sustainability in the delivery of essential services country wide (Klaver, 2009). According to the 
Ministry of  Local Government (MoLG) (2006), the objectives of Uganda’s decentralisation are to: 
 transfer real power to Local governments and reduce the workload of remote, under-
resourced central officials 
 hring political and administrative control over services at the point of delivery in order to 
improve accountability and efficiency. 
 free local managers from central constraints allow them to develop organisational structures 
tailored to local circumstances. 
 improve financial accountability by establishing a clear link between payment of taxes and 
provision of services. 
 improve local council capabilities to plan, finance and manage service delivery to their 
constituents, which was a total reversal of the centralizing tendencies of earlier 
governments. 
 promote local economic development (MoLG Module A, 2003; Klaver, 2009).  Hence as 
observed by Bashaasha et.al (2011) decentralisation in Uganda is based on three interlinked 
aspects; (i) political and legislative empowerment of the people, (ii) fiscal devolution, and 
(iii) control of the administrative machinery by the local councils. 
The transfer of authority for planning, and administration and financial management was central to 
Uganda’s decentralisation process (Okidi and Guloba, 2006), and central government line ministries 
should only be responsible for issuing regulations, policies and advice, benchmarking standards, and 
providing supervisory and inspectorate services to local governments. 
In order to empower local governments to fulfill their responsibilities, they are entitled to levy, 
charge, and collect local taxes and fees and to receive intergovernmental grants.  According to the 
Local Governments Act 1997, local governments are entitled to unconditional grants, conditional 
grants and equalisation grants.  Unconditional grants are intended to fund decentralisation functions as 
shown by the Act, while the conditional grants are supposed to fund national priority programme 
areas.  The equalisation grants are supposed to be given to local governments lagging behind the 
national standard of service delivery.  Furthermore with regard to taxes and fees, district and urban 
local governments are allowed to impose property tax, several forms of non-tax revenue (market dues, 
trading licenses, parking fees, education contributions etc, and until fiscal year 2005 /06 graduated 
personal tax). 
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Ingredients of successful decentralisation 
Decentralisation is often hailed because it brings government closer to its citizens and provides 
opportunities for participation in decision- making.  Achieving this goal, however, depends on a 
variety of conditions (Wong and Scott, 2007) which Ekpo (2007) has referred to as ingredients for 
successful decentralisation.  Before analysing current trends of decentralisation in Uganda, it is 
important to appreciate those conditions or ingredients as follows:   
 full commitment from national and sub-national government and adequate resources.  
Central government must be willing to give control and recognise the importance of sub-
national government in service delivery; 
 an appropriate legislative framework which clearly defines responsibilities and powers of 
sub-national governments, and the expected relationship between central and lower levels of 
government; 
accountability and transparency: decentralisation must be accompanied by checks and balances so that 
there is no abuse of power, as one way of fighting corruption and clientelism; 
 adequate financial and staff resources to support effective decentralisation. Sub-national 
governments must have the legal authority to raise revenue to support expenditure 
requirements.  The fiscal relationship between the centre and lower tiers of government must 
be clearly defined on the basis of equity, fairness and justice. 
 capacity at sub-national government level: xub-national government must have sufficient 
professional and well-trained staff.  Capacity denotes the ability, competency, efficiency of 
sub-national governments to plan, implement, manage and evaluate relevant policies, 
strategies or programs for their jurisdictions. 
This paper will later explore the level at which the above ingredients necessary for the proper 
implementation of decentralisation exist in Uganda.  If there are gaps within the ingredients then 
decentralisation and service delivery at lower levels of government may remain problematic which 
may debar Uganda from being seen as a 'super-implementer' of devolved decentralisation. 
Decentralisation landmarks 
The decentralisation agenda in Uganda has been implemented with an emphasis on institutional 
arrangement and capacity building.  So far, several achievements have been registered with varying 
degree of success across different districts (Bitarabeho, 2003; Okidi and Guloba, 2006; Bashaasha, 
2011).  As observed by Ministry of Local Government (2006), institutionally Uganda has made 
significant progress in the implementation of decentralisation.  First, the legal framework is well 
defined in the Constitution and operationalised by the Local Governments Act of 1997; 
secondpolitical decentralisation has led to regular local elections and limited devolved decision-
making, and third reasonable progress has been made to implement fiscal decentralisation, with 38 % 
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of the national budget being spent through both conditional and non-conditional grants to local 
government (Klaver, 2009). 
According to Emorut (2006) decentralisation has empowered the citizens, heighted their awareness of 
the different custodians of responsibilities, delivered coordinated services, promoted creative local 
resource mobilisation, and increased the responsiveness of public investment to popular demands.  
Okidi and Guloba (2006) argue that the administrative hierarchy in the decentralisation system of 
governance has promoted the development of channels of communication between the population and 
local and central government leaders.  Okidi and Guloba(ibid) suggest that through the local council 
system, local-level political powers (as outlined above) have enabled  citizens to  elect local leaders 
who have come under increasing performance and accountability demands from electorates. 
Although a lot needs to be done, service delivery has improved under decentralisation, particularly 
with respect to the infrastructure for primary education and health care.  In 1997, decentralisation 
coincided with the introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) policy, which provided for 
free primary education for all school-age children, first limited to four children per family, but then 
extended to all children in 2003 (Bashaasha et al 2011).  The UPE policy aimed to expand access, 
enhance equity and increase efficiency in education.  Although the non-completion rate of children in 
UPE schools is now as high as 75% for reasons such as forced early marriages, or family poverty 
leading to child labour (New Vision, 9 April 2010), the policy has enabled some poor children in rural 
areas to access education. Nevertheless, the quality of education in UPE schools still requires 
improvement if the majority of the rural poor are to benefit. 
Health infrastructure has also improved under decentralisation.  When user fees for government health 
facilities were abolished in 2001 (except for private facilities in hospitals), the health system was 
reorganised into a hierarchy that mirrors government structures (Okidi and Gulaba, 2006).  The 
system now comprises national and regional referral hospitals, and Health Centres categorised as level 
IV, III,  II, or I depending on the range of services offered at a given facility level.  The 
operationalisation of this structure required the construction of several new facilities leading to growth 
in the number of health facilities, especially at Health Centre II level.  The staffing and medicine 
stocks at these facilities remains challenge and citizens voice concern as to whether health service 
provision is a priority for the Ugandan Government. 
The challenges 
With limited examples of successful service delivery in Uganda resulting from decentralisation, the 
country still faces a number of major challenges in deepening and institutionalising decentralisation.  
Unless these challenges are addressed, Uganda risks losing its previously status as achieving one of 
the most far-reaching decentralisations in the developing world.  These challenges include: limited 
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funding; inadequate human resources (HR); limited political autonomy and interference by central 
ministries; frequent creation of new districts; gaps in service delivery; corruption and conflicts.  These 
challenges are now discussed in more detail. 
Limited funding 
One of the most critical challenges faced by local governments in Uganda is limited finance due to 
limited sources of local tax revenue and overdependence on grants from central government.  This 
challenge as noted by Bashaasha et al (2011) is of major importance because any shortfall in financial 
resources leads either to non-delivery of services or delivery of sub-standard services and products. 
Traditionally, the main local revenue sources in Uganda have been graduated tax, property tax, 
business licences, and market dues.  Graduated tax contributed over 80% of local revenue for rural 
local governments and about 30 % for urban authorities (MoLG, 2006).  Unfortunately, this source 
was scrapped for political reasons in 2005 as a campaign measure in preparation of the 2006 elections, 
which reduced the autonomy of local governments.  Furthermore, local revenues have been declining 
and the amount of locally raised revenue as a percentage of total local government funding has fallen 
each financial year.  In some local governments, local revenue accounts for only 3% of the total 
budget (MoLG, 2006).  A critical analysis of local government budgets reveals their dependence on 
central government, which makes the districts agents of the central government rather than 
independent local governments as envisaged under Article 176 of the Uganda Constitution, suggesting 
that Uganda is be promoting deconcentration rather than decentralisation. 
On average, about 80% of the central transfers are conditional − ie: earmarked by the centre for the 
provision of specific services leaving local governments little power determines local priorities. The 
remaining 20% of transfers are composed of unconditional and equalisation grants (Entisham et al, 
2006).  In practice the unconditional transfers are mostly used to cover administrative costs, including 
council salaries and allowances, rather than for service delivery. 
To worsen the situation, conditional and unconditional grants from the central government have 
continued to decline.  For example, in 2011/2012 the unconditional grant for all local governments 
decreased from USh 156,944 billion (US$63m) to USh 151,155 billion (US$60.5m) (National Budget 
2011/2012).  Declining revenues and the failure to use unconditional transfers on service provision 
have weakened the accountability of local authorities to service beneficiaries, and threaten the 
autonomous functioning of local governments. 
Inadequate HR capacities 
In addition to the shortage of financial resources, local governments also suffer from a shortage of 
skilled and experienced manpower for both technical staff and politicians (Steiner, 2006).  As 
Onyach-Olaa (2007) has revealed, local governments in Uganda continue to operate at minimal 
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staffing levels, in some instances as low as 9% of the approved establishment.  Furthermore, staffing 
problems are exacerbated by a shortage of equipment and materials.  A study by Azfar et al (2000) 
found that only 17% of health facility respondents reported that all their employees had the necessary 
equipment and resources to do their work.  In remote districts such as Abim, Kalangala, Kabong, 
Buvuma, and Bukwa there are difficulties in recruiting and retaining professional staff such as health 
workers, engineers, planners, or teachers.  A further constraint is the fact that some local governments 
through the politically-oriented District Service Commissions (DSC) appoint staff, on the basis of 
ethnicity or residence rather than merit, which has adverse effects on the quality of service provision 
(Steiner, 2006). 
Politically, the quality of councilors is affected by their level of education.  At the moment, there is no 
minimum education requirement for anyone to hold office as a district councilor, and academic 
qualifications are not part of the eligibility requirements for the office.  There is widespread consensus 
that councilors with very low levels of education fail to express themselves during plenary sessions, 
while some cannot make written contributions (Natamba et.al 2010).  Such low levels of education 
undermines effective debates among councilors with their educated technical staff, and some local 
politicians, have an inferiority complex which has sometimes led to conflicts with technical staff. 
Limited political autonomy and central interference 
Legally and politically, the Local Government Council is responsible for all local government 
functions, including planning, financial accountability and the delivery of public goods and services 
(Natamba et al 2010).  In reality, however, local government political leadership holds no controlling 
authority to direct how funds allocated to the district are utilised. The Chief Administrative Officer 
(CAO) who is the district's accounting officer is appointed by central government and reports directly 
to the Ministry of Local Government.   
Previously, under Article 188 of the Uganda Constitution, the CAO was appointed by the District 
Service Commission (DSC) which arrangement provided reasonable political control to councilors 
over CAOs.  However, in 2005 in the same Constitution (Amendment) Act, No.11 that removed 
presidential term limit, the Uganda Government recentralised the role of the CAO, transferring 
powers of appointment from the DSC to the Public Service Commission based in Kampala.  While the 
government claimed that this change was necessary to remove corrupt CAOs, Green (2008) has 
correctly noted that the control of central government transfers to local governments by central 
government appointees 'cuts at the very heart of the decentralised reform'. In addition, each district 
has a Resident District Commissioner (RDC) who is appointed by the President, and such RDCs have 
always supported the NRM party which has been in power since 1986. Thus the creation of the RDC 
office seems to be an attempt to weaken the District Chairperson, who under Article 183 of the 
Constitution is elected by universal adult suffrage as the political head of the district. More 
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disturbingly, some of the RDC's roles conflict with those of the elected Chairperson, as both are, 
responsible for coordination and monitoring of district services provision. In districts where the 
District Chairpersons belong to the opposition there have been conflicts with RDCs which negatively 
affects the district's development. 
Similarly, in November 2010 the Ugandan Parliament at the request of the Cabinet passed the 
Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) Act which brought the affairs of the Kampala under direct 
supervision of the central government. Previously, Kampala City Council was administered as a 
district under the Local Government Act 1997. According to the KCCA Act, the Town Clerk who was 
formally the highest financial officer in the City was replaced by an Executive Director answerable to 
the Minister for Kampala Capital City Authority. The elected Mayor became the Lord Mayor, a 
largely ceremonial position.  In essence Kampala’s administration was recentralised. 
So despite central government's claim of commitment to decentralisation, line ministries have retained 
substantial power over local policy making (Steiner, 2006). Both the Uganda Constitution of 1995 
and the Local Government Act, 1997, defining the range of services and functions for each level of 
government under decentralisation, with local governments responsible for implementation/delivery 
of basic services including primary health, primary education, water and sanitation, feeder roads, 
agriculture production, planning etc. Yet, the decentralisation programming has left significant 
functions supervised by central line ministries in policy development, capacity development and 
quality assurance.  
In practice the roles of different levels of government in service delivery have not been very clearly 
distinguished which has at times caused policy conflict. Almost all the line ministries have maintained 
an active hand in service delivery, policy formulation and guidance. For example the Ministry of 
Education and Sports (MOES) has appointed engineering assistants in the districts, who certify works 
as a condition for payment for infrastructure built by local governments e.g. through the School 
Facilitation Grant (SFG). Similarly, the Ministry of Works and Transport has set up sub-national 
Technical Support Units or regional workshops which are heavily involved in implementation, which 
weakens the role the local governments. 
Creation of new districts  
Uganda has seen an explosion in the number of districts (Green, 2008) which increased from 33 in 
1986 to 80 in 2007, and 112 in 2012, and, in June 2012, Cabinet approved the creation of another 25 
districts to make a total of 137! While ostensibly been guided by the 1995 Constitution this expansion, 
whose Article 179 permits the government to create new districts 'on the necessity for effective 
administration and the need to bring services closer to the people', it is more likely that the NRM 
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government has used the creation of new districts as a source of patronage in order to continue 
winning elections which undermines decentralisation benefits. 
The increased number of local governments has put immense pressure on service delivery and the 
capacity to manage new administrations (Klaver et al 2009). This has resulted in a decline in the 
number of local government authorities meeting performance-assessment criteria (minimum 
conditions) from 80% in 2006 to 34% in 2008 (MoLG, 2009).  The creation of new local governments 
is seen by the central government as being in tune with the original objectives of decentralisation, but 
unfortunately service delivery in both new and old districts has declined due to lack of financial and 
human capacity, as resourcing has not been increased. As observed by Okidi and Guloba (2006), by 
creating so many political districts, Uganda runs the risk of excessive decentralisation, which could 
contribute to lowering local-level economic growth. 
The creation of 25 new districts makes little economic or financial sense, especially as several new 
districts have failed to raise more than 5% of their total revenue from internal sources. Instead, these 
new districts have become a political bargaining chip that the NRM government uses to reward cadres 
and lure opponents by offering them political jobs that do note enhance service delivery. It would 
possibly make sense to reduce the number of districts and form larger provincial administrative units 
provide greater political oversight, cut administrative costs and allow for unified planning over a 
larger jurisdiction. 
Gaps in service delivery 
While the general objectives of decentralisation were to respond to local needs, existing data show no 
improvement in social services or quality of life for local communities (Jeppsson and Okuonzi, 2000). 
In fact, many indicators have either remained the same or worsened. For example, a large proportion 
of Uganda's population still lives below the poverty line, with 25% living in absolute poverty (UBOS 
2011). Yet improvements in the health sector were expected to deliver better access to health services, 
better quality of health care and, ultimately, a decline in the rate of illness and death (Bashasha et al 
2011). As many people cannot afford private medical services, the government of Uganda 
decentralised free health services to districts and to health sub-districts (health centres). However a 
recent study by ACODE (2010), found numerous problems facing health care provision in the health 
centres, including poor funding of healthcare services, in erratic drug distribution, and minimal 
transparency in the use of drugs and medicines; chronic shortage of trained health workers especially 
at lower tier health centres; lack of appropriate medical equipment; and that funds intended for health 
facilities were used for administrative costs. Consequently, healthcare services remains out of reach of 
the in the rural areas and decentralisation has not led to improved services. 
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In education, since the inception of the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme in 1997, 
enrolment rose from 5.3million children in 1996 to 7.6 million in 2003 (MoES, 2005), but without a 
corresponding increase in infrastructure or staffing. Children in the final classes of UPE often find 
problems in reading and writing which reflects the poor quality of education in the UPE schools, 
which are the majority of schools in many districts. Therefore, enhancing the output and quality of 
education in schools, especially those that serve the poor, is essential for the promotion of pro-poor 
growth in Uganda, and a critical part of multi-dimensional poverty reduction. 
Corruption 
In spite of Uganda initial success in decentralisation, widely heralded by the international community, 
corruption remains widespread at all levels of society and the country faces major challenges 
(Transparency International, 2009).  The survey report of the Inspectorate of Government (2009) 
noted that corruption − in the form of  bribery, financial leakages, conflict of interest, embezzlement, 
false accounting, fraud, influence peddling, and nepotism, theft of public funds or theft of public 
assets − remains at impediment to development and barrier to poverty reduction in Uganda at national 
and local government levels. Public confidence in government officials (politicians and technocrats) is 
severely undermined by regular corruption scandals.  A majority of citizens surveyed in 2005 by a 
regional research firm, Afro Barometer, perceived corruption to be rampant. In addition, 36% of 
respondents to the survey believed that most or all government officials, at central or local level, were 
involved in corruption. In fact it is sometimes believed that decentralisation in Uganda has led to a 
dispersion of corruption, 'redefining the character of corruption relationships from those controlled 
by the centre to those controlled by district – level officials' (Steiner, 2006).  For example during the 
financial year 2009/10 the Office of the Auditor General (2011) conducted a Value for Money Audit 
on seven districts of Apac, Arua, Bundibugyo, Bushenyi, Kamuli, Moroto and Mukono focusing on 
procurement of goods and services during 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10, which revealed numerous 
corruption problems.  
There is no doubt therefore that corruption of public officials in Uganda exacts a tremendous 
economic and social toll on societies. It raises the cost of government and encourages wasteful, 
inefficient projects; it increases cynicism towards politics; it undermines democratic processes and 
civil society’s it diverts scarce resources from worthy projects; it discourages legitimate investors 
while attracting dishonest con artist; and increases economic hardships and fiscal difficulties. One of 
the greatest threats of corruption is a loss of faith in government institutions undermining 
decentralisation objectives. 
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Conclusions 
Indeed, if the Uganda decentralisation project was implemented and functioned provided for in the 
existing legal infrastructure, it should offer much potential for an impact efficient service delivery 
through popular participation and responsive policy. Unfortunately despite the exceptional reform 
efforts, a gulf remains between principles and practice. This paper has identified a number of 
challenges to the implementation of the decentralisation reform, which give reason for concerns about 
whether Uganda can still claim to be a role model for decentralisation. The assessment in this paper 
suggests that Uganda has at best implemented only partial decentralisation, and at worst appears to 
have paid lip service to it. 
Both the Uganda Constitution of 1995 and the Local Governments Act, 1997 provided the legal 
framework and authority to the policy of decentralisation.  The aims were to transfer real power to 
local governments; to bring political and administrative control over services closer to people; to free 
local managers from central government constraints; to improve financial accountability and 
responsibility by establishing a clear link between taxation services provision; and to improve the 
capacity of local councils to plan, finance, and manage services delivery. However, decentralisation of 
finances to local governments continues to be a major challenge in the implementation of 
decentralisation in Uganda. Local governments are still unable to mobilise adequate local financial 
resources more than 15 years after they were formed, and those resources have further been 
constrained by the politically influenced policy decision to remove the graduated tax which previously 
constituted the lion’s share of the locally generated revenues. Strengthening local finances should be a 
core objective of any decentralisation strategy, and it is imperative for central government to continue 
the process of transferring sufficient financial resources to local governments, and for local 
governments to utilise these honestly (without corruption) in areas of greatest priority in their 
jurisdictions. Capacity building in human resources also remains a challenge to Uganda’s 
decentralisation.  
Central government must desist from the temptation of manipulating the decentralisation process to 
suit their patronage interests. The rampant creation of the new districts which are not self-sustaining 
provides good evidence for such manipulation.  Disempowering the District Service Commissions 
from appointing the Chief Administrative Officers is another form of manipulation. 
The Uganda Government now needs to refocus true decentralisation so as to promote national 
development and improved quality of life for the majority of Ugandans. At presently, rural Uganda 
suffers serious inadequacies in infrastructure, social services, and living conditions of the people, 
while economic productivity is low.  More than 85% of Ugandans live in rural areas, and the majority 
of those below the poverty line are the rural poor. A properly constituted and committed decentralised 
system would benefit such people.  Similarly, local governments must strive to eradicate poverty from 
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their jurisdictions, as poverty eradication is fundamental to human development, lays the foundation 
for overall development of society.  Short of that Uganda’s once praised decentralisation reform will 
continue to bring diluted results. 
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Abstract 
In 1997 Local Government Studies published an article (Asquith, 1997) which assessed the 
perceptions of managerial and political elites in eight English local authorities towards change 
management against the background of Conservative Governments' reform agendas. The article 
argued that the authorities could be placed on a continuum depending on their state of organisational 
evolution, with some authorities being better equipped to manage change than others. During 2005 
the authorities were revisited to ascertain how they had adapted to deal with the reforming Blair 
Governments since 1997. What this article shows is that characteristics evidenced in the original work 
in the authority deemed to have evolved the most, were present in those authorities revisited. 
 
Introduction 
This paper revisits work undertaken in the 1990s which examined the role of eight English local 
authority chief executives in implementing and managing change, within the constraints imposed by 
internal managerial and organisational politics and the broader political environment. Extensive 
interviews were conducted with managerial and political elites to ascertain the nature of change 
management in the early 1990s. The findings were reported in Local Government Studies (Asquith, 
1997), along with the results of an extensive employee attitudes survey in the eight authorities 
conducted at the same time (Asquith, 1998). Further, the article adds to the growing body of 
knowledge relating to the changing role of local authority chief executives (c.f. Dahler-Larsen, 2002; 
Morphett, 1990; Morphett, 1993; Morris and Paine, 1995; Mouritzen and Svara, 2002; Norton, 1991; 
Skelcher, 2010a; Skelcher, 2010b). 
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Given that the reforming Labour Governments of Tony Blair had a keen interest in the activities of 
local government, not least to ensure key policies on primary and secondary education − which are the 
responsibility of local government − are delivered, it seemed timely in 2005 to revisit the authorities in 
the original research to ascertain the state of play after eight years of new Labour reform. Access was 
therefore sought to the chief executive within the original sample organisations. Six out of the sample 
agreed to facilitate a meeting. The local authorities can be characterised thus: 
 A radical reforming London borough (L1) very much at the forefront of New Labour thinking. 
One of the first to adopt the 'Directly Elected Mayor' model. The move to the Mayoral model 
was seen as a continuation of the innovative approach to organisation, management and service 
delivery evident during the original fieldwork in 1991. The chief executive here had been a 
chief officer within the authority at the time of the original research and was the second-longest 
serving chief executive in London. Hence the authority had experienced managerial continuity. 
 A London borough (L2) seen by many as the ‘model’ advocated by successive Conservative 
ministers. At the time of the original research it had been engulfed in both managerial and 
political leadership crises. Despite a change of Government, the authority still saw itself as 
being at the cutting edge of developments in local government and had recently been awarded 
the title of ‘Council of the Year’ by its peers. Access in 2005 was provided to the Director of 
Policy who had held a less senior role in the organisation in the early 1990s. 
 A northern metropolitan authority (M1) which in the intervening period between the time of the 
original work and 2005 had undergone a number of internal organisational crises. The chief 
executive in 2005 had held a chief officer post in the organisation during the original research. 
 A shire county (S1) in the midlands which in the early 1990s had to deal with the resignation of 
a reforming chief executive in disgrace and the imprisonment of a reforming Leader of the 
Council. In the intervening period the authority had lost a significant area of land and population 
during local government reorganisation. The chief executive in 2005 had served as a chief 
officer with the authority prior to her appointment, and before that had been a chief officer in 
the northern metropolitan authority (M1). 
 A small shire district (D1) within the county (S1) (above). This chief executive had remained in 
post throughout the time period. At the time of the original research this authority was unusual 
in that all of its councillors were elected as ‘Independents’ and it contained no party ‘Political’ 
members. 
 A south coast city (D2) which at the time of the original work had had a chief executive who 
was unsuccessfully attempting a major change programme. The intervening period had seen a 
new chief executive who had dealt with the authority gaining unitary status by simply ‘bolting’ 
on the newly acquired functions. In 2004 the authority had appointed a chief executive with a 
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distinct remit to radically transform the organisation in order to equip it with the organisational 
capabilities required to meet the challenges posed by the Blairite reform agenda. Less than a 
year later, this chief executive departed the authority after the refusal of elected members to 
accept and endorse the radical change agenda advocated. 
In addition to these six organisations, the two others where access was sought but denied were: 
 A northern metropolitan borough (M2) which following the change in political administration in 
2004 had parted company with the chief executive. The interim/acting chief executive felt 
unable to participate in the research. 
 A midlands shire county (S2) where the chief executive who had been in post since the time of 
the original research was approaching retirement, and declined to participate in the research. 
The original research placed the eight authorities in a typology which categorised the organisations 
according to a number of common characteristics. The placement of each local authority was the result 
of circa 100 interviews with chief executives, chief officers and leading elected members in all eight 
authorities. The authorities were placed in the typology as they exhibited mostly features of that type: 
 Transactional – Introverted bureaucratic organisations which lacked chief executive leadership, 
with power revolving around traditional chief officer/committee chair/councillor relationships. 
 Community Leadership – Unified managerial/political focus on community, yet hindered by 
insular corporate management style. 
 Business Culture – Low appreciation of community, highly commercialised/managerial focus – 
driven solely by the provision of statutory obligations. 
 Entrepreneurial Citizenship – Combination of the managerial/political focus on community 
with a strong emphasis on commercial efficiency and effectiveness (see Table 1). 
    Table 1: Typology of authorities interviewed 
Authority type Transactional 
Community 
Leadership 
Business   
Culture 
Entrepreneurial Citizenship 
Managerial & 
political focus 
Internal –          
rule bound 
External – 
effectiveness 
Internal −  
efficiency 
External  − effectiveness 
Internal   − efficiency 
Managerial 
philosophy 
Bureaucratic/ 
Weberian 
Corporate 
Strategic 
(Commercial) 
Strategic  
(Governance) 
Perception of   
service users 
Recipients Citizens Customers Citizens 
Strategic actor 
support 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Street level    
support 
No No Yes Yes 
Authorities D2;  S1 D1;  M1 L2;  M2;  S2 L1 
   Source: Adapted from Asquith (1997) and (1998) 
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It was previously argued (Asquith 1997) that the types represented a continuum, with each of the 
stages being evolutions on the preceding stage, moving left to right. Hence, the Entrepreneurial 
Citizenship classification, it was argued, was the most advanced organisational type, with one 
authority, L1, actively seeking to demonstrate those characteristics – having previously been classified 
as being a Community Leadership authority.  
There appears to be striking similarity in the characteristics between the Entrepreneurial Citizenship 
authorities and the model local authority espoused in the raft of legislation concerning local 
government passed by the Blair administration, a model described as Enlightened Public Governance 
(Thynne, 2003) or New Public Governance (Osbourne, 2006; 2010). Hence, common themes existed 
around issues of: internal efficiency; external effectiveness and community engagement. These themes 
exhibited themselves in two primary policy thrusts post 1997, namely: democratic renewal and the 
shift from local government to local governance. The latter is the realisation that a local authority has a 
legitimate right to lead its community, yet cannot alone achieve all the objectives it aspires to – it must 
act in partnership with other public sector bodies, the private sector and the not-for-profit sector. 
New Labour: new local government? 
The most striking thing about the interviews conducted in 2005 was the general, if somewhat 
reluctant, agreement about the way in which local government was viewed by central government. 
Whilst no one signed up to the New Labour agenda without some kind of reservation, there was at 
least a grudging respect for what the post 1997 reforms had offered local government. This can be 
contrasted to the so-called ‘dark’ days of the 1980’s and early 1990s when Davis (1988) argued that 
local government was ‘under siege’. Indeed, analysis of the interview transcripts from the early 1990s 
shows the dominance within local government of two key issues. These were: the Community Charge 
or Poll Tax – a single charged imposed upon all adults within a local authorities area, and Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering – the compulsory use of market forces in the provision of some local 
government functions.. One of the 2005 interviewees commented that the combination of the Poll Tax 
and Compulsory Competitive Tendering had in effect placed local government managers in the role of 
service reducers. As one chief executive observed: 
Well I have to say for both in my perspective here, in general it has been very positive because the 
amount of money that is coming to public service and the environment that I have worked in as a senior 
manager has been one way you have been able to develop service since 1997, whereas up to 1997 all we 
did was reduce service 
In contrast, the situation in 2005 meant that they were able to think and plan strategically to develop 
and deliver services for the community. Despite this however, fears still exist as to the extent to which 
local government was being ‘neutered’ and ‘nationalised’ through the continued retention and use of 
instruments such as Council Tax capping – whereby the maximum level of taxation raised by a local 
authority is set centrally by national government – thereby fundamentally undermining a key principle 
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of local democracy. Indeed one chief executive suggested that if the centralisation trend continued he 
would cease to be an employee of the local authority and be on the payroll of Her Majesty’s 
Government, observing on the cumulative effect of the New Labour reforms thus: 
I think services to the public are better, local government is weaker… the role of the managerial 
leader in local government has been elevated… Local political enterprise is being devalued and 
managerial enterprise has been revalued. Government has increasingly declined to talk to local 
political leaders but will talk to local managerial leaders. 
Interesting, this theme is further articulated by Skelcher when he comments that after 12 years of 
Labour Administrations has resulted in: 
Its overall impact on officer-member relationships has been to strengthen the role of the former, at 
the expense of the latter… (2010b: 336) 
It was clear from the 2005 interviewees that there existed a view that central government did not quite 
grasp the diversity inherent within local government, and the stark differences which exist between 
city or urban local government and managing in a rural local authority. There was a clear undercurrent 
which suggested that the post 1997 reform agenda – in particular towards local authority internal 
management arrangements (see below) − had been dominated by organisations such as the New Local 
Government Network, a Blairite local government think tank, whose leading actors come from 
principally urban local authorities. Hence, it was suggested that central government was to some 
extent pursuing a ‘one size fits all’, standardising agenda which was clearly inappropriate to many 
rural local authorities.  
The one policy which was specifically identified for criticism here was the Democratically Elected 
Mayor model of internal organisation, the pursuit of which, it was argued, was the result of the then 
Prime Minister’s interest in American models of management. Whilst this mode of organisation may 
be deemed to be appropriate for urban authorities, it was argued that in thinly populated rural 
authorities there was little interest in the 'Directly Elected Mayor' model. As the chief executive of S1 
wryly commented: 
Blair has, his obsession with choice and privatisation and American way of doing things are very 
very urban models which just do not fit into a rural environment… 
There is no way you will ever get people of S1 shire saying ‘we want an elected Mayor because 
people who live in Town A have one. They wouldn’t have a bloody clue who the elected Mayor 
from Town A was, because it is nearly 80 miles away in the car. I do think the Labour Government 
has been incredibly urban centric. 
Elsewhere within the urban authorities, L2 and M1, support for the 'Directly Elected Mayor' was not 
strong. The perceived concentration of power in one individual was seen as being detrimental to the 
nature of local democracy whereby a council took decisions as a whole. It is the view of the writer 
however, that the managerial and political instability which was evidenced in both L2 and M1 during 
the period 1990-2005 – in contrast to the marked stability in L1 – has resulted in organisations lacking 
both the maturity and confidence needed to successfully operationalise the 'Directly Elected Mayor' 
model to the maximum benefit of the locality. 
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An interesting aside to the whole New Labour agenda arose around the views expressed towards the 
idea of individual choice being advanced by Le Grand (2002) amongst others. Indeed those 
interviewed were very vocal on this issue, taking the government to task over the language chosen to 
describe the individual – citizen, service user, consumer or customer, as being generally irrelevant. 
The general consensus was that the title did not matter – least of all to service recipients, just as long 
as they benefited from timely, effective services which were appropriate to their individual needs. 
What did cause considerable consternation was the pursuit of choice by central government. It was 
consistently argued that as long as service recipients benefited from the timely effective services noted 
above, then choice was an irrelevancy. Further, it was argued that in an urban area, where service 
providers may be numerous, such as schools, within a large rural county where schools may be over 
20 miles apart, the idea of choice was a misnomer. This debate was summarised effectively by one 
interviewee thus: 
I don’t get too carried away with citizen or customer or resident or whatever. The principle is that 
you treat them as king and how you respond with the service, rather than you have this structure 
and service in place and it is up to you guys to find the best way in. 
The general tone of New Labour’s approach to local government was set out in a raft of consultation 
documents published in 1998 by the then Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
and which evolved into the White Paper, Modern Local Government In Touch with the People (DETR, 
1998), which in turn became the Local Government Act 2000. These consultation documents dealt 
with a range of issues affecting local government. A review of the literature generated by the Blair 
agenda vis a vis local government demonstrates a three-pronged approach based around the internal 
management arrangements of local authorities; enhancing performance management regimes and the 
wider issue of local governance not government (Hartley et al, 2002; Newman et al, 2001, Painter et 
al 2003; Wilson, 2005; Wilson and Doig, 2000).   
There was a general agreement amongst those interviewed in 2005 that the New Labour agenda had 
had a generally positive impact upon local government in England. What is interesting is that both 
London Boroughs felt that they had been instrumental in setting this agenda in terms of governance 
and efficiency – despite consistently representing very different party political positions. 
Internal organisational dynamics 
By far the most important changes here relate to the reforms introduced by the Local Government Act 
2000 (Rao, 2003). These reforms offered all local authorities over the size of 85,000 in population the 
choice of one of three systems of political organisation: 
 Leader with a Cabinet – whereby the leader of the largest political grouping on a council 
would form a cabinet of portfolio holders. This model was seen as the one involving the least 
change, and was adopted by over 90% of all local authorities. 
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 Directly Elected Mayor with a Cabinet – whereby a popularly elected mayor would select a 
cabinet from elected councillors. This was the model advocated by Blair Government. However 
it was only adopted by 13 local authorities in total, being later abandoned in two of these. 
 Directly Elected Mayor with a Manager – the most radical model, envisaging the role mayor 
as akin to that of a private sector style chairperson, with the city manager fulfilling the chief 
executive role. This option was abolished in 2007. 
Within the eight sample authorities, seven had chosen the Leader with a Cabinet option – in line with 
over 97% of all local authorities. One of the London Boroughs (L1) had however sought the more 
radical option of the Mayor with a Cabinet. In fact, before the legislation was in place, the Council had 
delegated authority to an Executive Committee led by an appointed Mayor with executive power 
(Asquith, 2008). 
Of those authorities that had adopted the Leader with a Cabinet model, the differing rationales offered 
stark contrasts. In L2 which had been characterised by one of its’ chief officers as being more like a 
‘Hanson than a Marks and Spencer’ (Asquith, 1997), in that it had no all-embracing corporate culture, 
such as Marks and Spencer, rather it functioned as a number of loosely associated departmental 
cultures, similar to that in a holding company such as Hanson plc., with each department driven by 
dominant committee chair/chief officer relationship. However in 2005, it was argued that such 
relationships operated successfully within the 'Leader with a Cabinet' model, which had been 
enthusiastically embraced as a mechanism to ensure that strategic governance was maintained, with 
the reforms providing a ‘corporate glue’, and that the collective nature of Cabinet government would 
serve to prevent aberrant leadership episodes such as that affecting L2 during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Here, it is interesting to note that the chief executive of L1 argued that the 'Leader with a Cabinet' 
model had the potential to create Cabinet fiefdoms similar to those evidenced during times of crises 
within L2 – and as such presented the potential to legitimise the departmentalism exhibited previously 
in L2 and elsewhere. Indeed, such dangers were also voiced in D2, where the chief executive had 
purposefully created a management structure which did not mirror roles and responsibilities of Cabinet 
portfolio holders, attempting to prevent the re-creation of fiefdoms previously evident in the authority. 
A major criticism of the reform agenda was the fact that all the models offered differing degrees of 
power concentration at the expense of the wider group of elected members. In one of the London 
Boroughs this was specifically flagged up as being an issue. Certainly in the past the authority had 
been used as a stepping stone to either national politics or prominence in local government circles. 
However, the feeling was that given the restriction of five to seven high profile positions within the 
organisation as Cabinet Members, this might restrict the flow of people of the right calibre seeking 
election to local government. What was not addressed, however, was the opportunity in the past for 
small number individuals to create semi-autonomous power baronies as the chair of a powerful 
Asquith               English Local Government 
CJLG November 2013 
53 
Council committee – something which had been prevalent in this particular authority. Away from 
London, it was interesting to note that interviewees reported both a drop in the average age of elected 
members and an increase in the calibre of elected councillors. As such it was argued that the quality of 
debate and ultimately the decision-making process had benefited from the post-2000 reforms. 
Elsewhere, in M1, prior to the Local Government Act 2000, the authority recorded over 80 internal 
decision making bodies, which ultimately led to corporate chaos. The restructuring of the decision-
making machinery to fit the 'Leader with a Cabinet' model provided the authority with political and 
managerial coherence and strategic direction. Elsewhere, it was argued that the concept of Cabinet 
responsibility had served to undermine previously strong committee chair/chief officer relationships 
which had effectively derailed attempts to manage the authority strategically. 
The issue of power concentration noted above was not felt to be a cause of concern in L1 where the 
'Directly Elected Mayor with a Cabinet' model had been adopted. It was argued that such a model had 
had a positive impact upon local democratic accountability. The operationalisation of the model in L1 
resulted in there being a single, easily identifiable person directly accountable to the populace. 
However, any power that person had was constrained by both the Cabinet and, of key importance, by 
internal organisational and party political conventions. Certainly it was argued that given the role the 
Directly Elected Mayor has pursued, the net impact has been a marked upturn in both interest and 
involvement in local democracy in the borough, with for the first time, citizens knowing exactly where 
the buck stops – with one identifiable individual rather than a bureaucratic machine:  
I would say also that in the last few years, they take more people back to the councils because they 
know he is making the decision, they know he is the mayor and so the rule form is that the mayor 
makes the decision in the presence of officers who are advising him on professional grounds and 
his cabinet who are advising him about the politics of the issue which is very different from 
virtually every other councils, where the decision is made in the committee or in some 
circumstances is delegated to any one person, the mayor or chief officer, so we are very very 
corporate…(we are) probably more corporate than perhaps some of the mayoral councils would 
be like us ….we are more corporate than anyone you’d find. 
The local election results of 2006 which saw the first re-election campaign in L1 of the Democratically 
Elected Mayor witnessed both an increased level of voter participation and an increased level of 
support for the incumbent. Interestingly, this pattern was also evident in all the Mayoral re-election 
contests held during May 2006. This pattern was again largely replicated in the subsequent round of 
Mayoral elections in 2010. The desire to see the 'Democratically Elected Mayoral' model work has led 
to further innovations in L1 which were designed to increase levels of participation in the democratic 
process amongst the population, away from traditional participatory activities of simply casting a vote 
every four years. The widespread use of Citizens’ Juries and the innovative introduction of a Young 
Persons Mayor have served to encourage additional inputs into the workings of the local authority 
from groups often seen as being socially excluded from the mainstream (Quirk, 2006). 
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The authority (L1) concerned has a history (of over 20 years) of stable political and managerial 
leadership with clearly understood political/managerial boundaries. In the early 1990s a number of 
senior officers (including the then chief executive and the assistant chief executive) had previously 
served elsewhere as elected members. During the fieldwork in 2005, it was suggested by the writer 
that this had been a significant factor in the political/managerial harmony within the organisation, in 
that senior managerial personnel were familiar with the pressures which characterise the world of the 
elected councillor. However, in 2005 the chief executive was adamant that this so-called ‘twin-
tracking’ had not been the primary cause of the political/managerial harmony – it may have helped, 
but was by no means the driver. However, it remains the view of the writer that given the internal 
managerial/political environment within L1, when compared to the other seven authorities in the 
sample, that this represented a positive example of the potential benefits twin tracking offered towards 
the strengthening of managerial and democratic understanding within local government. Given the 
experiences in L1, it may be timely to revisit or revise the Local Government and Housing Act (1989) 
which outlawed twin-tracking. 
The perceived success of the 'Directly Elected Mayor' model within L1 may also be attributed to other 
unique local factors. The Directly Elected Mayor had been one of two very high profile councillors 
who had dominated local politics since the mid-1980s. Indeed his profile was significantly enhanced 
locally by the television programme ‘Town Hall’ which chronicled the machinations within the 
authority for a 12 month period when he was Leader, and by a period when he ceased being a 
councillor, but undertook another high profile activity as chairman of the local hospital board. Hence, 
whilst not on the local authority, he held an equally high profile role in the local community. Such a 
high profile, the chief executive argued, aided the role he now undertakes as Directly Elected Mayor.  
The Mayoral election results of May 2006 added a new dimension to the equation. Whilst the Mayor 
secured re-election with an increased turnout and an increase in the number of votes received, the 
political party he represents lost control of the Council for the first time in over twenty years. 
Interestingly, the Mayor was re-elected again in 2010 with an increased vote and the political party he 
represents also regained control of the authority. One can speculate that the political party was a 
benefactor of the Mayor's profile. 
This ‘public presence’ was demonstrated, in a poll conducted by the borough in 2005, which showed 
that the Directly Elected Mayor enjoyed a higher recognition rating than any of the Members of 
Parliament who represent the borough – 31% compared to 29%. The chief executive attempted to put 
this in perspective when he noted the intensity of local politics in London, with 32 boroughs seeking 
the limelight, all of whom have to compete for publicity with the Mayor of London. This, the chief 
executive suggested, was significantly different from the situation in Middlesbrough or Bedford where 
the Directly Elected Mayor had little competition for the local media spotlight (Asquith, 2008). 
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Hence, in terms of internal authority organisation, the key reforms here have been around the political 
management structure. The century-old traditional committee structure had been abandoned, and in its 
place local authorities were offered three options for change, all of which were designed to modernise 
the decision making process. Whilst the majority of local authorities chose the option of least change, 
the Leader with a Cabinet model, one of the sample authorities had opted for the more radical choice 
of the Mayor with a Cabinet model.  
External organisational dynamics 
The external environment within which local authorities now exist has been dramatically transformed 
since 1997 – all in the name of effectiveness and community engagement – observations made not 
only by all those interviewed for this article and further explored by Skelcher (2010b) . A raft of new 
initiatives have been launched (and dropped), designed to have a positive impact upon the operation of 
local government – all of which it could be argued fall within the remit of so-called ‘Joined-Up-
Government’ (JUG). Whilst many of these new enterprises have met with differing success levels, 
they have not been without their detractors. Indeed Painter et al (2003) noted wryly that local 
government has a bad case of ’initative-itis’ caused by the stream of initiatives coming from various 
central government departments, with Stoker (2002) likening the situation to the national lottery. One 
chief executive commented: 
I think  that the drive to efficiency is over stretched, I think the degree of change and realignment and 
piloting things and then rolling them out before they have evaluated the pilot creates too much change 
and movement that can’t be embedded and are destabilizing ultimately even if the ultimate goals are 
meant to be laudable. 
One major note of warning was expressed by a chief executive who has direct experience of the 
machinery of both local and central government. He argued that an inherent danger of JUG was that 
rather than poorly performing services/organisations ‘upping’ their game to match the best performing 
partners, what could happen is an end result of mass mediocrity rather than public service excellence. 
Whilst there have been attempts to provide co-ordination to these processes under the JUG agenda, 
there is still consternation that central government does not quite understand how and why local 
government operates. Indeed, one 2005 interviewee suggested that in terms of the public sector 
efficiency drive − the so-called Gershon Agenda – central government had much to learn from local 
authorities who after years of voluntary and involuntary competition ran very tight, efficient 
organisations (Gershon, 2004; Quirk, 2005). Gershon sought to identify efficiencies across the public 
sector and to redirect savings towards front-line services. 
Further, it was suggested that for central government to pursue any form of JUG in relation to sub-
national government was a misnomer. Examples cited here related to the often conflicting agendas 
evident within local authority, police and health service organisations operating within one locality – 
with each service being accountable to different central government departments and being funded 
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separately. Indeed, one chief executive spoke of his frustration with such issues, and of how at a 
meeting with civil servants in London, he introduced two senior civil servants who had issued his 
authority contradictory directives – he told them to resolve the issue and let him know the outcome. 
One aspect of the JUG agenda which had been taken to heart was the idea of networking to achieve 
policy goals. Given the holistic view of local governance which now dominates, it was argued that 
without networking and partnership working, it would be impossible for local agencies to deliver 
desirable outcomes. Reasons for adopting such modes of operation differed from authority to 
authority. Within S1, it was argued that given the dispersal of a small population within a large 
geographic area, to expect one agency to deliver all services was nonsense, and that partnership 
operations were an operational necessity not a government fad.  Against this, it is important to note the 
observations of Painter et al (1997) that there was is a risk in partnership formation in that they can be 
time consuming, with the inherent danger that the wrong partnerships may be formed. Indeed, such an 
observation was made by one chief executive: 
Partnership working is another example, who would deny it is a good thing, but we have 
partnerships coming out of our ears, and if we stop talking about how these partnerships link, how 
they work and who is on then, and the agendas and everything, sometimes I think would be more 
effective, so I think the new agenda is flawed, shall I say. 
As such local authorities need a strategic view of their partnering activities, and of the associated 
transaction costs, described by Kumar and van Dissel thus: 
Transaction costs are the costs of managing the interaction while keeping the opportunistic 
behaviour under control so that on-going co-operation between the units can be sustained (1996: 
291) 
What was most striking about the adoption and use of partnerships was how they crossed the political 
divide. By far the two greatest advocates amongst the sample were the two London boroughs. In the 
Conservative led authority the rationale for entering into partnerships was far removed from the 
politically motivated ‘externalising’ mentality which prevailed during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Indeed, it was noted that services externalised during this period had in fact being brought back in 
house to facilitate more effective operations.  
The good governance requirement placed on local government since the implementation of the Local 
Government Act (2000) had made partnership creation a necessity. Here, of specific note was the 
strategic partnership in the field of information and communication technologies, where expertise and 
investment outstripped the resources available in-house to the organisation. Elsewhere, in L1 a radical 
reforming flagship London borough, the local authority had aggressively pursued a policy of focussing 
on strategic service delivery and improvement. This had been achieved via a policy of partnership and 
externalising functions where it did not possess the necessary skills and resources in-house.  Between 
1991 and 2005 the authority transferred over 5,000 of its workforce into partner organisations. 
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Hence, the partnership relationships were driven less by dogma and more by operational realities. 
Indeed another authority in the sample (S1) which in the early 1990s had been positively pursuing an 
agenda to externalise service delivery, was now seeking to use partnership arrangements in service 
areas as a means to regulate market mechanisms. This point is made by one chief executive thus: 
When you came before (in 1991), the council was hell bent on outsourcing everything, I think it 
was outsourced too much, nearly all our care, now we are building our own care homes, and we 
are trying to regulate the market price, because we outsourced absolutely everything, and then 
you’ve got the private sector completely in control of the pricing mechanism for all care. 
Here, local government is mirroring best practice from supply chain management, whereby 
organisations seek external partners to provide expertise in areas of activity and provide stability in 
operating environments (Christopher, 2005). Further, other benefits will also accrue for organisations 
seeking to develop a network stance vis a vis organisational positioning.  The ‘rules of the game’ 
which govern the participation of any organisation within a network can act as a behaviour moderating 
tool. As such Jarillo, again drawing upon supply chain management experience, noted: 
An emphasis on long term relationships is also essential to the development of trust, because it 
makes clear that the relationship itself is considered valuable. Therefore opportunistic behaviour, 
which could cause a severance of the relationship, will be considered less likely. (1988, p.37) 
Alongside the formalised partnership arrangements identified above, there exists a raft of informal 
arrangements whereby local organisations with mutual areas of interest will seek to develop 
relationships with other bodies. Hence, the idea of the local government manager as a ‘networker’ or 
‘boundary spanner’ (Williams, 2002) has emerged over recent years. Such relationships exist outside 
formal ‘business’ frameworks and relationships, and often depend for their existence and development 
on personality and mutual respect rather than power.  
Hence, in examining the networking arenas within the two London boroughs, it was found that in L1, 
the Mayor who, has been a leading light in the activities of the authority for twenty years, is the 
consummate professional networker. In L2, however, the abilities of Leaders present different 
pictures. The Leader in the 1980s adopted a confrontational style, one not conducive to networking. 
This can be contrasted with the Leader in 2005 who was seen nationally as a leading player in local 
government, and locally as being instrumental in bringing strategic partners together on a number of 
issues, whilst providing the authority with an ‘acceptable’ national face. 
Local government now has to conform to an impressive external inspection regime. The inspection 
environment can best be divided into two groupings: voluntary peer review and statutory review − 
with the former being less formal than the latter. The lynchpin to the formal inspection regime was the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA), published each year which ranks authorities 
according to a range of criteria, and awards a star rating accordingly – with four stars being the highest 
accolade. The rationale behind the CPA at the time of its introduction was that authorities judged to be 
‘excellent’ would enjoy greater freedoms to innovate, raise and spend money and be inspected less.  
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There was however some dissatisfaction that these freedoms had not materialised, and that alongside 
the retention of ‘capping’ powers, local government was still paying for the extreme actions of a small 
number of deviant councils. There was further dissatisfaction that the formal inspection regimes did 
not appear to be fully joined up. An example emerged from one authority of a seventeen-person 
inspection team to review a service area with a budget of £400,000, whilst the full blown CPA 
inspection team contained four members to examine corporate expenditure in excess of £300m.  
Within one of the sample authorities which had been hailed as a flagship authority during the 
Conservative era of Prime Ministers' Thatcher and Major, there was a feeling that the incoming 
Labour Government may have been harsher on it than on other local authorities, purely on political 
grounds. Indeed, it was suggested that with the election of New Labour in 1997, the authority had been 
‘cast into the political wilderness’. However, the CPA scores for the authority, which consistently 
rated it as ‘excellent’, allayed these fears. 
There was nevertheless the feeling amongst the interviewees that the peer review processes provided 
an informal sounding board to ascertain ‘where authorities are’ and were useful ‘mock’ examinations 
prior to formal statutory reviews. Indeed one chief executive was seeking to ensure that all chief 
officers and elected members participated in at least one peer review each year. This, it was argued, 
would allow the authority to share its experience as an ‘excellent’ rated council with others, as well as 
seeking out best practice elsewhere to adopt and apply within their own organisation.  
At the time of the 2005 interviews, one authority, L2 was preparing to have an Improvement and 
Development Agency peer review. The authority had successfully argued that the standard review 
mechanism was inappropriate for its circumstances. The authority had successfully argued that rather 
than been reviewed against other English authorities, its peers were in fact international local 
authorities, and that as such it should have a review panel which reflected this. Hence, in addition to 
the English peer reviewers, the inspection team contained a UK based local government chief 
executive with international local authority experience, and the mayor of a major US city.  
Given the status and nature of the local authority, it was argued that only by having such  a review 
could an accurate picture of where it stood alongside its peers be gained. Interestingly, whilst the 
‘standard’ review ran from Monday to Friday, L2 insisted that its population swelled during the 
weekend, only by being under review over the weekend could the reviewers gain a feeling for the 
managerial tasks faced by the organisation. This emphasis on the importance of managing over the 
weekend is in stark contrast to the evidence which emerged from the interviews in the early 1990s 
when it was the accepted view that chief officers and senior elected members would often retire to the 
country for the weekend. 
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Conclusion 
From the interviews conducted in 2005, it was apparent was that local government was enjoying 
something of a renaissance. Local authorities were no longer explicitly seen as the collective whipping 
boy of central government held up as examples of public sector inefficiency. Whilst the evidence does 
not present a uniform picture of acceptance of the reforms post 1997, it was clear that local 
government can no longer be viewed as being ‘under siege’. Rather, where reform was not uniformly 
welcomed, the resistance was far less hostile than that evidenced towards the local governance agenda 
of the Thatcher/Major years. 
The opportunities afforded by central government have been seized by local authorities. Whereas the 
picture offered by Asquith in 1997 of a range of differing positions vis a vis local authority 
organisational development, the 2005 evidence points towards a less diverse picture. The emphasis on 
internal managerial and political efficiency and probity, combined with the need to pursue a wider 
strategic governance role, have combined to push all six authorities revisited towards the 
'Entrepreneurial Citizenship' model. This has resulted in authorities pursuing the legislated agenda 
alongside a number of innovations which are specific to their locality - such as local partnership 
arrangements or democratic modernisation.  
Whereas in the early 1990s innovation could be said to have been the domain of the two London 
boroughs, all six of those interviewed in 2005 indicated that their respective authorities shared a desire 
to drive the change agenda forward to both strengthen local services and the position of local 
democracy. What did remain constant, was the desire of the two London boroughs to continually set 
the pace and direction of change for local government as a whole. Given the success of a number of 
innovations to enhance the democratic process in L1, it will be interesting to see if central government 
seeks to replicate these successes elsewhere in England in the Localism agenda being pursued by the 
Conservative/Liberal coalition elected in 2010. Certainly early evidence regarding the increased 
uptake of the Directly Elected Mayor in the major urban areas has been far from a resounding success. 
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Abstract 
Social accountability is considered as one strategy of deepening Ghana’s decentralised development 
administration. Some attempts have been made to empower local people to demand transparency and 
accountability from the local government system as required by law. The purpose of this paper was to 
assess the effectiveness of these attempts in 14 Metropolitan and Municipal Assembles. The data for 
the analyses were sought through key informant interviews with core Assembly staff, and focus group 
discussions with selected Assembly Members. The analyses revealed that the legal provisions made 
room for social accountability but the weak capacity of Assembly Members in terms of resources, the 
understanding of legislative provisions, 
 and the acceptability of the concept challenged its implementation. It is thus recommended that 
service provision in local communities should have capacity-building components that promote social 
accountability.   
Keywords: Social accountability, local government, district assemblies, Public finance management, 
civil society, Ghana 
Introduction 
The notion of good governance as a necessary condition for sustainable development and poverty 
reduction has gained widespread currency, especially among international organisations and 
industrialised world nations (Punyaratabandhu, 2004, World Bank, 2007). Indeed, good governance 
has become a condition for development assistance from development partners (DP).  
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According to Hallak and Poisson (2006) and Sebudubudu (2010), the notion of good governance has 
several tenets of which transparency and accountability are key. The term 'governance' is defined as:  
 a set of values and principles that underpin state-society relations. This means allowing people, in 
particular the poor and marginalized, to have a say in how they are governed, in how decisions 
are made and implemented, in how diverging opinions are mediated and conflicting interests are 
reconciled in a predictable fashion and in accordance with the rule of law (Lister 2010, 6).   
Accordingly, governments all over the world have introduced a variety of conventional mechanisms, 
also known as horizontal accountability mechanisms – political, fiscal, administrative and legal – to 
engender transparency and accountability in the administration and management of public offices 
(UNDP, 1998; Malerna et al, 2004). Examples of political mechanisms include checks and balances 
offered by government and investigative commissions, auditing and financial accounting; these are 
essential fiscal mechanisms for ensuring transparency and accountability in the administration and 
management of public offices. Administrative mechanisms are evident in public sector codes of 
conduct, rules and procedures, while the legal mechanisms include corruption-control agencies and 
ombudsmen, among others.  
Despite these efforts, the institutionalisation of the conventional mechanisms in the administration of 
public funds has yielded modest results in ensuring accountability and transparency of public office 
holders to the grassroots (World Bank, 2006; Yilmaz et al, 2008). Transparency International (2009) 
attributes the weak checks and balances to the corrupt practices of office holders. The ramifications 
have been the misapplication of public funds, financial malfeasance and lack of sustainability in 
planned interventions resulting in the slow pace of poverty reduction in many developing countries. 
Social accountability has thus emerged as a response to the weaknesses of the conventional 
accountability mechanisms. Accountability is an important building block in social accountability and 
the lack of it can lead to a crisis of legitimacy amongst citizens and their governments (Malena et al, 
2004). Accountability is affected where there are weak checks and balances, lack of separation of 
power and absence of rule of law (World Bank, 2011). 
The World Bank (2006) defined social accountability to mean: 'the broad range of actions and 
mechanisms (beyond voting) that citizens can use to hold the state into account, as well as actions on 
the part of government, civil society, media and other social actors that promote or facilitate these 
efforts' (2006:3). Malerna et al. (2004) also define social accountability as 'an approach towards 
building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e., in which it is ordinary citizens and/or 
civil society organizations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability' (pg. 3). 
From these definitions, social accountability suggests using a ‘bottom-up’ approach to demand 
accountability that is demand-driven, that requires the availability of the structures and laws that 
define people’s rights, and the extent to which they can go in exacting accountability from duty 
bearers. The significance of social accountability relies on providing a common platform on which 
different actors, including communities, private sector (e.g. service providers), civil society 
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organisations, government, media, etc., can work together to ensure local governments respond to the 
needs of the poor. Engaging in social accountability requires having certain skills, which cannot be 
taken for granted or assumed. It requires a conscious effort to build people’s capacity to demand 
accountability and transparency from public office holders.  
Accountability processes are both horizontal and vertical, described by Ackerman (2004) as 'proactive 
process by which public officials inform and justify their plans of action, their behaviour, and results 
and are sanctioned accordingly' in which horizontal processes of accountability involve external 
involvement of another party (2004: 3). In the case of social accountability, ordinary citizens 
contribute to enhance horizontal accountability processes. Social accountability thus has a core 
relationship to sustainable development in supporting good governance and empowerment towards 
poverty reduction. Social accountability should however not be viewed in isolation from the 
conventional horizontal mechanisms to engender accountability, but as complementary in ensuring 
accountability from public office holders, and therefore, an accountability framework that combines 
citizen-led accountability mechanisms and the horizontal ones for achieving more effectiveness.  
According to Malena (2004), the building blocks of social accountability are: 
 Identifying an entry point e.g.: budget allocations or performance of service provider,  
 Building an evidence base through compiling relevant public information which can either be 
supply-side government data or demand-side users' data,  
 Public dissemination of findings through public meetings, events or the media,  
 Building coalitions to initiate collective action, and  
 Advocacy with public officials to bring change. 
The building blocks show that engaging in social accountability requires certain basic skills including 
data collection, analysis and interpretation; budget analysis and interpretation; and advocacy, lobbying 
and negotiation skills, which very often ordinary community members expected to engage in social 
accountability may not have.  
 
Decentralisation and Social Accountability in Ghana 
Ghana introduced decentralisation in 1988 with the ultimate purpose of supporting participatory 
governance and improving service delivery and financial management to facilitate the achievement of 
a rapid socio-economic development (Ohene-Konadu, 2001). The local government structure is 
outlined in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: The Local Government Structure 
 
Source: Introduction to Ghana’s Local Government System, ILGS, 2008 
Emphasis has been on the involvement of communities in efforts to reduce poverty, generate growth 
and ensure central and local government accountability to citizens (NDPC, 2003). The 
decentralisation programme is anchored in six inter-related pillars: political decentralisation; 
administrative decentralisation; fiscal decentralisation; decentralised planning; market 
decentralisation and spatial decentralisation, underpinned by three interrelated strategies of transfer 
of power, competence and means (Cofie-Agamah, 2003; Wold Bank, 2003). The resources which 
accompany the transfer of power and competences from the centre to the Metropolitan, Municipal and 
District Assemblies (MMDAs) must be administered in a transparent and accountable manner. The 
fiscal decentralisation pillar however has not been fully implemented, due to the low capacity of the 
MMDAs to manage newly decentralised funds. 
The World Bank (2003) maintained that Ghana’s decentralisation programme was not fully 
implemented. For decentralisation to reduce poverty, generate growth and ensure accountability there 
must be the full transfer of power, competences and resources to the MMDAs to perform the 
numerous roles enshrined in the Local Government Act 1993, Act 462. This implies the need to ensure 
that the MMDAs have the capacity to manage the funds transferred to them, and that they are 
accountable to both citizens and central government to forestall mismanagement, misapplication and 
financial malfeasance that will inhibit local socio-economic and spatial development.  
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Informed by the necessity to ensure the required competence in the management of public funds, the 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) aimed to embed social 
accountability in the use of public funds at the local level, and to ensure that people who are affected 
by planned interventions have the right and capacity to demand accountability and transparency from 
local politicians and administrators. Active civic engagement in development planning is seen as 
having a kingpin role in sustainable public financial management, a recipe for effective poverty and 
inequality reduction. 
Social accountability in the use of public funds in Ghana is thus underpinned by a legislative 
framework that demands compliance by all actors. Based on this premise, this paper seeks to analyse 
the following questions: 
 Are local actors aware of the rights and responsibilities enshrined in the national constitution 
and Local Government Act 462 to demand accountability from service providers? 
 Do people affected by planned interventions have the capacity to demand accountability and 
transparency from local public office holders and service providers and, if so, is it happening? 
 What is the level of compliance by the MMDAs with legislative provisions that seek to ensure 
prudent financial administration and management at local government level?  
Scope and methodological approach  
This paper investigates the attempts being made by local governments to improve public finance 
management through civic engagement in social accountability. The data are drawn from interviews 
with local government officials in 14 Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies covering nine regions 
of Ghana that benefited from capacity building in social accountability provided by the MLGRD15. 
The Community Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP) emphasised capacity building for 
communities and Area Councils16 to perform their statutory roles in planning and managing 
community-driven initiatives. The CBRDP aimed at resourcing rural communities through local 
government structures to improve their socio-economic status and deepen local participation in 
governance17.   
Two methodological approaches were employed to analyse the issues which address the research 
questions; desk and field studies. The desk study involved a brief review of local government 
legislation and policy, and project documents of the Government of Ghana. Horizontal accountability 
mechanisms reviewed as part of the legislative framework for social accountability in public finance 
                                                            
15 Three people each in 168 of the 216 MMDAs were trained in the use of the social accountability tools. 
16 Area councils are lower level sub-structures of the local governments in Ghana. 
17 The trainees received training in the use of social accountability tools including how to conduct public 
expenditure tracking surveys, the use of citizen report cards and community scorecards, forming local oversight 
committees, conducting public opinion polls, among others. 
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management include the Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462), the National Development Planning 
Systems Act (Act 480), the Public Procurement Act (Act 663), and the Internal Audit Act 2003.  
The field study was undertaken in three Metropolitan Assemblies and 11 Municipal Assemblies18 
(Table 1). Using semi-structured questionnaires, qualitative data were collected from key local 
government stakeholders in the selected Assemblies through key informant interviews and focus 
group discussions (Table 2). Stakeholders included the assemblies’ core staff, Assembly Members 
and Area Council chairpersons. The core staff at the Assemblies includes Chief Executives, 
Coordinating Directors19, Finance Officers, Planning Officers and Engineers.   
                     Table 1: Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies surveyed 
Region Metropolitan/Municipal Assembly 
Greater Accra 
Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 
Ashaiman Municipal Assembly 
Volta Keta Municipal Assembly 
Upper West Wa Municipal Assembly 
Upper East Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly 
Western Secondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly 
Eastern 
Birrim Central Municipal Assembly 
Kwahu West Municipal Assembly  
Central 
Cape Coast Municipal Assembly  
Komenda/Edina/Eguafo/Abirem Municipal Assembly 
Brong Ahafo 
Sunyani Municipal Assembly 
Techiman Municipal Assembly 
Ashanti 
Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly 
Asante Akim North Municipal Assembly  
         Table 2: Number of stakeholders Interviewed 
Stakeholders Interviewed No of stakeholders  Interviewed 
Chief Executive  9 (out of 14) 
Assembly members 28 
Engineers 14 
Planning Officers 14 
Finance Officers 14 
Coordinating Directors  7 (out of 14) 
Area Council Chairpersons 28 
Total Number of Stakeholders Interviewed 114 
A total of 114 of 126 key stakeholders were interviewed, including the principal planning and finance 
officers in all the 14 Assemblies due to their centrality in project and financial management. 
Additionally, there were 8 focus group discussions in four Assemblies where there was evidence of 
on-going or completed projects in which local people were involved. (Plate1). The focus groups 
consisted of members from communities that had benefited from government or other interventions. 
                                                            
18 The local governments in Ghana are referred to as assemblies, with the metropolitan assembly being the 
largest in terms of size, followed by the municipality and then the district assemblies. 
19 The coordinating directors are the administrators that work for the local governments. 
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The following section first discusses core sections of the legislation that promote social accountability 
before discussing the findings from the interviews. 
Legislative provisions in Ghana with social accountability components 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 
The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992, makes provisions for civic engagement in decision-
making including the use of public funds, and stresses the importance of participation, transparency 
and accountability in their administration. The Directive Principle of State Policy 35 (6d) in the 
Constitution decentralises the administrative and financial machinery of government to the local level 
by affording all possible opportunities to the people to participate in decision-making. Furthermore, 
Chapter 24, 240 (2d) requires people in local government service to subject themselves to the control 
of local authorities.  Similarly, Chapter 24, 240 (2e) requires local government authorities to be 
accountable to the local population who should be afforded the opportunity to participate in local 
governance. The social accountability provisions in the Constitution complement a provision that 
requires the Auditor General to audit the accounts of the Assemblies annually and submit its audit 
reports to Parliament. Internal auditors are also in place to ensure that the management of public funds 
complies with provisions in the law. 
Local Government Act (Act 462) 1993 
The Local Government Act (Act 462) of 1993 establishes and regulates the local government system 
in accordance with the Constitution.  Decentralisation is generally expected to promote greater 
transparency, accountability, probity and efficiency in public services provision, and to incorporate 
local needs and conditions, and national objectives for the planning and delivery of public services 
(Keith and McCluskey, 2004).  
The Act makes provisions for effective and efficient management of public funds. Section 10 (sub-
section 3a) of the Local Government Act requires Assemblies to be responsible for the overall 
development of their areas, and to ensure the preparation and submission of their Assembly 
development plans and budgets through the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) to the National 
Development Planning Commission (NDPC) and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(MOFEP). Similarly, Section 11 of the Act makes the Assemblies responsible for the preparation and 
approval of its annual budget. Section 87 (sub-section 2) requires that moneys from the District 
Assembly Common Fund (DACF) received by the Assembly should only be spent on projects in the 
approved development plan. 
Section 120 (sub-sections 2 and 3) of Act 462 requires that every Assembly should have an internal 
audit unit whose head is responsible to the General Assembly. The need for an internal audit is 
stressed by the Internal Audit Act (Article 16a). The head of the Internal Audit is required to audit the 
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Assemblies’ accounts every three months and supply the Presiding Member20 with his/her reports. 
The Auditor General (or an auditor approved by him/her) must audit the Assemblies annually and 
send the reports to the Minister, Parliament and Assembly (Section 121 (sub-section 1)). Section 121 
(sub-section 4) of the Local Government Act mandates Assemblies to consider the audit reports from 
the auditors at their ordinary meetings.  
The Act also states the composition of the Metropolitan/Municipal Assemblies. Section 5 (b) of the 
Act mandates the election of one person from each electoral area by universal adult suffrage in 
accordance with the Electoral Commission’s regulations. Sections 21 (f) and 21 (v) require the 
executive committee (whose membership does not exceed one-third of the total number of Assembly 
Members, elected by the members from among themselves) to monitor and evaluate all policies, 
programmes and projects. Though Members of Parliament (MPs) do not have voting rights, they must 
be present at Assembly meetings. Assembly Members are also on Metropolitan/Municipal Tender 
Boards (Section 39 of Act 462).  
The Assembly Members are required by Section 16 (a - j) to maintain close contact with their 
constituents and to relay Assembly discussions to their constituents for their feedback. Thus, 
constituents are represented in the Assemblies by their elected representatives, and could be said to be 
participating in local governance including financial management because their views are represented.  
National Development Planning (System) Act (Act 480), 1994 
The National Development Planning (System) Act (Act 480) of 1994 defines and regulates planning 
procedures in Ghana. The Act gives project beneficiaries the mandate to participate in the 
identification, selection and prioritisation of their development needs. The rationale is to ensure local 
ownership of planned interventions (Sections 3 and 4), which implies participating in the selection, 
costing and supervision of planned interventions. Sub-district authorities are required to prepare local 
action plans, or sub-district plans, and submit them for approval to the District Planning Authority 
(Section 5, sub-sections 1 and 3) which may be incorporated into the Assemblies’ medium term 
development plans. 
Public Procurement Act (Act 663), 2003 
The Public Procurement Act (Act 663) of 2003 ensures transparency in the use of public funds for 
procurement. The Act seeks to harmonise the processes of procurement in the public sector to ensure 
judicious, economic and efficient use of public resources in public procurement. It also ensures that 
public procurement is carried out in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. 
                                                            
20 The Presiding Member is the corporate head of the Assembly. He calls for Assembly meetings and presides 
over the General Assembly meeting. 
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Section 17 (sub-section 1) of the Act mandates central management agencies, Ministries, Departments 
and Agencies, subvented agencies and others to establish a Tender Committee. The Committee should 
consist of the Director of Finance, a lawyer appointed by the MMDA, one Member of Parliament; and 
three heads of Departments one of whom represents the user department or agency. The Tender 
Committees should ensure transparency in procurement of goods, services or works through public 
funds. 
Section 17 (sub section 2) requires public office holders to ensure that every stage of the procurement 
activity and procedures set out in the Public Procurement Act are followed. They are also required to 
exercise sound judgment in making procurement decisions, and refer any procurement above the 
approval threshold to the appropriate Tender Review Board. Section 20 (d) mandates Assemblies to 
establish Tender Review Boards to oversee public procurement.  
Internal Audit Agency Act (Act 658), 2003 
This Act establishes an Internal Audit Agency as a central agency responsible for the coordination, 
facilitation, monitoring and supervision of internal audit activities within MDAs and MMDAs. The 
overall objective of this Act is to secure quality assurance and application of standards of internal 
audit within these state institutions, and to ensure accountability and transparency of state institutions.  
Article 16 of the Act requires the Assemblies to establish autonomous internal audit units to ensure 
effective and efficient auditing of their accounts. Sub-section 4 of Section 16 of the Internal Audit 
Agency Act (Act 658) of 2003 requires the Internal Auditor to submit audit reports to all stakeholders 
including the Auditor General, the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) and the Assemblies. The 
Assemblies' Audit Report Implementation Committees, established under Section 30 (sub-section 1) 
of the Audit Service Act (Act 584) of 2000 are responsible for implementing the recommendations of 
the internal audit reports. Thus, the Act makes provisions for financial prudence at the Assembly level 
in line with the concept of social accountability. 
Operationalisation of the Legal/Legislative Provisions: fieldwork findings  
Data from the interviews showed that Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies involve beneficiaries 
of planned interventions in project identification, design, implementation, and monitoring and 
evaluation in line with the legal provisions. Assembly Members are involved in budget approval and 
tracking, and are informed through Assembly meetings and Chief Executives’ sessional addresses of 
any DACF, ceded revenue and other transfer payments to the Assemblies by the central government 
or development partners. The funds are used to finance approved development projects and 
programmes with the General Assembly having the right to question any misuse and diversion of 
funds. 
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The Audit Report Implementation Committees receive audit reports from internal auditors which are 
discussed with Assembly Members at assembly meetings. The Audit Report Implementation 
Committee is charged with the responsibility of implementing recommendations in audit reports.  
There are, however some weaknesses in the implementation of this legal provision. The Presiding 
Member of the Assembly has no defined role in the Internal Audit Agency Act (Act 658) of 2003, nor 
in the Public Procurement Act (Act 633) in relation to his/her roles in the assembly. There is an 
ineffective involvement of citizens or the public who are the beneficiaries of the planned interventions 
in the financial management process, and Assembly Members who have to liaise between the central 
administration and constituents complained about low financial and logistical capacity to reach their 
constituents. Thus, contributions at Assembly meetings on effective public financial management 
largely represent the views of the Assembly Members. The Assembly Members indicated that in 
Metropolitan/Municipal Assemblies with dispersed populations and poor accessibility it becomes 
impossible for the Assembly Members to visit communities regularly and to engage them in 
Assembly decisions. It requires for example, hiring vehicles to go to remote areas, perhaps only in the 
dry season when the roads are accessible. Assembly Members are not entitled to transport allowance, 
so travel becomes difficult in municipalities that have rural communities with poor accessibility. 
Thus, providing feedback becomes difficult for some Assembly Members. The legal requirements 
become an additional cost to Assembly Members, which they are not prepared to incur as individuals, 
and the Assemblies do not cover such additional expenses. 
Analyses of the data from the Metropolitan and Municipal Assembly interviews showed that 
Assembly Members play an active role in the local public financial management (PFM), and play 
pivotal roles in preparing and approving Assembly budgets. Furthermore, the General Assembly 
rectifies anomalies in the Assemblies’ accounts identified by both the Auditor-General and Internal 
Auditors. The Assembly Members also ensure that the DACF is used for projects earmarked in 
development plans. Also, the Chief Executives at their sessional address inform Assembly Members 
of the amounts to be transferred to the Assemblies from the DACF. As required by Section 121, all 
the Metropolitan/Municipal Assemblies surveyed publicise their annual statement of accounts, and 
any other report from the Auditor-General, three months after the close of the financial year. In some 
of the Assemblies visited such as Techiman Municipal Assembly, this was pasted on the notice board 
for the information of the general public. 
Nevertheless, there are challenges in terms of skills and resources of Assembly Members, including 
the inability of Assembly Members to give regular feedback to their constituents on Assemblies’ 
proceedings because of limited financial and logistical support from the Assembly/government. 
However, Assembly Members are the elected local representatives of the local people and are 
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expected to serve their interest. Providing feedback to constituents requires having a good means of 
communicating with constituents which is lacking.  
Additionally, the exclusion of Assembly Members from contract awarding limits the Assembly 
Members in demanding accountability from contractors on development projects. This was seen by all 
the Assembly Members interviewed as a critical weakness in their attempt to demand accountability 
from service providers. Thus, active participation of the constituents in the management of the 
Assemblies’ funds is limited by competency, financial and logistic constraints. Election of Assembly 
Members, it was noted from the interviews, is sometimes done without considering the competencies 
of candidates, who may be elected based on their local popularity, generosity or other factors not 
related to their competency in local governance. 
The interviews revealed continued weak capacity of Assembly Members although the situation seems 
to be gradually improving. Of the 21 (out of 28) Coordinating Directors and Planning Officers 
interviewed, 72% of them said very few Assembly Members actually appreciate their roles and 
responsibilities because of their literacy levels. The roles and responsibilities are set out in the 
relevant legal instruments such as the Local Government Act (Act 462), the Constitution and the 
Public Procurement Act (Act 663). This challenge makes it difficult for many of the Assembly 
Members particularly those with only basic level education to critically examine decisions of the 
Assembly. Others are unable to understand the legal provisions that guide them as a result of limited 
background training, such as teachers and informal traders. In addition, the Assemblies have few 
financial resources to train Assembly Members and rely on the limited capacity-building programmes 
of the MLGRD. With these weaknesses Assembly Members are unable to question anomalies, and are 
unable to demand accountability from duty bearers.   
Although the interviews showed that project beneficiaries participate in the identification and 
prioritisation of development projects in line with the guidelines on preparation of the Assemblies’ 
Medium Term Development Plans, this takes place in a very mechanistic manner to meet the 
requirements of the NDPC, with limited time for a rigorous participatory planning process. 
Interviewees also said that most of the sub-administrations are unable to prepare plans for 
incorporation into the Medium Term Development Plans due to weak capacity. For example, within 
Techiman Municipality only four of the 10 Area Councils have prepared their action plans. Similarly, 
in Sunyani Municipal Assembly, only two out of the six Area Councils had prepared action plans. 
Most of the Area Councils which have been able to prepare action plans received training under the 
Community Based Rural Development Project (CBDP), which suggests that local capacity building is 
important in enhancing the work of the Assemblies.  
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Evidence from the interviews also indicated that social accountability can be very effective at the 
community level, and citizen engagement is more effective when people appreciate the concept and 
are able to apply it. Explaining expenditure made by service providers and the challenges they 
encounter is also better appreciated by citizens when they have experience in preparing action plans 
and the principles of social accountability, thereby also making the work easier for service providers 
(Plate 1). Where problems were explained to community members, they were more than happy to 
suggest alternative solutions to help the service providers, as observed in the Asante Akim North 
Municipal Assembly. It was also observed that involvement of citizens in the practice of social 
accountability helped to inform community members about standards for basic community services. 
They were thus able to confront service providers when shoddy work was done. In the Asante Akim 
North Municipal Assembly, for example, women in one community said they confronted the 
contractor working on their culverts because they felt the shoddy job he was doing could become 
death traps for their children who were likely to fall into open culverts. 
Plate 1: Project implemented with the principles of social accountability 
The interviews in Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis showed that through the application of social 
accountability mechanisms community members have seen the successful implementation of 
development projects (Plate 1). It has also helped to improve the relationship between service 
providers (teachers, community health workers, etc.) and beneficiaries. Thus, the application of the 
social accountability concept can be a win-win situation for all parties in ensuring effective public 
finance management if only communities are trained in social accountability and its implications. 
With regards to procurement of goods and services, all the Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies 
studied had Tender Committees in place as prescribed in the Act to oversee procurement of goods, 
services and works for the Assemblies. Procurement plans and their updates are submitted to the 
Tender Committees after budget approval at quarterly intervals.  
However, it was noted that there are still some weaknesses in accountability through the procurement 
process. Contractors are not accountable to Assembly Members who also do not account to their 
electorates in the execution of contracts in their electoral areas, as they are not represented on the 
Tender Committees, especially at the stage of contract award. Their non-representation robs them of 
the details of the contracts (standards and specifications) which would help them to ensure effective 
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monitoring of contracts implementation. This was expressed as a major concern by all the Assembly 
Members interviewed, and this weakness in Assembly procurement practices encourages the service 
providers to deliver shoddy goods and services. In a focus group discussion with community members 
at Asante Akim North Municipal Assembly, one of the participants said: 
the contractor working on our culverts was rude to us when we complained about the shoddy job 
he was doing. He told us we were not the ones who contracted him and therefore had no right to 
question his work and tell him what to do. 
With regards to auditing, all the Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies interviewed had autonomous 
Audit Units. Internal Auditor audits the Assembly accounts every quarter and they submit their 
reports to the RCCs and the Assemblies. The interview results showed that all the Assemblies had 
established Audit Report Implementation Committees with the Presiding Members as the 
chairpersons. The Assemblies are required to justify anomalies reported in the audit reports and where 
the justifications are unreasonable, sanctions are applied to the affected persons.  
However, as noted earlier, due to the low capacities of the Assembly Members, their constituents are 
rarely informed about the outcome of an audit. This limits the accountability of public officers in the 
financial management process to horizontal accountability to the RCC and the Auditor General, and 
no vertical accountability is achieved. Presiding Members also have no defined roles as the chairmen 
of the Audit Report Implementation Committees in the Internal Audit Act (Act 633). 
Challenges to promoting social accountability at local government level 
The attempt to enhance and promote social accountability through citizen involvement to ensure 
transparency and accountability, as is expected of decentralisation, is not without challenges. The 
Constitutional and legal provisions have not been effective due to the low capacity of Assembly 
Members to engage their constituents and provide them with regular feedback from the Assembly and 
solicit their views to take back to the Assemblies. Engaging in social accountability also requires 
skills and practice for experience, which even those who have been trained in it are yet to develop.  
While decentralisation offers anyone the opportunity to participate, Assembly Members require an 
appreciable level of educational, competency and knowledge of the legal instruments and public 
administration to be able to work efficiently in the local government system.  
Accessibility came out as one major constraint that hindered effective participation of community 
members in deliberations on public finances of local interventions. Of the 28 Assembly Members 
interviewed, 89% said that it is expensive to visit all their constituencies especially those in remote 
rural areas. Such communities are therefore cut off from participating effectively in local governance 
matters including monitoring of public finance. 
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It was found that enforcement of the legal provisions could not ensure effective public management. 
Local governments are often unable to enforce legal provisions due to unclear roles of stakeholders, 
lack of cooperation from the law enforcement agencies, little understanding of these provisions, and 
the weak capacity of some of the core assembly staff, community members, Assembly Members and 
other stakeholders at district level. The weak and underdeveloped nature of the sub-assembly 
structures may also inhibit effective use of the legal provisions aimed at preventing financial 
malfeasance in order to reduce poverty and inequality. This situation is also compounded by the weak 
civil society organisations at community level in the 14 Assemblies visited. Though active in urban 
areas, community organisations are sparse at the sub-assembly level and are rarely engaged in 
governance activities. Thus, the further away one moves from the urban centres the weaker the 
activities and effectiveness of civil society that is considered as a key component in the application of 
social accountability mechanisms. The lack of strong civil society organizations in local communities 
to drive the social accountability agenda and to get the concept institutionalized is a major challenge 
for ensuring accountability at the Assemblies. 
Generally, citizens are also ignorant about their role in ensuring local accountability and transparency, 
which became apparent through implementing the CBRDP in the 14 Assemblies. According to some 
of the participants who benefited from capacity building in the CBRDP and had to pilot social 
accountability skills, particularly the use of community score cards at on-going project sites, they 
encountered some antagonism from service providers and had to spend inordinate amount of time 
explaining the positive side of the exercise to the service providers. Thus, social accountability could 
be perceived as witch-hunting or punishment if not well communicated. There is the perception 
among service providers and even some Assembly staff that social accountability is meant to witch-
hunt opponents and hence there is a lack of commitment to the process. This further points to limited 
awareness creation and the need for capacity building at all levels to make decentralisation 
achievable.   
Recommendation and conclusions 
From the discussions above, it can be concluded that while a fairly good horizontal accountability has 
been achieved in Ghana's decentralised administrations, there is weak vertical accountability due to 
various factors including weak sub-structures and weak capacity of those expected to promote social 
accountability. As mentioned earlier, vertical accountability requires external involvement of other 
participants, a role that citizens and civil society organisations are expected to play.  
Social accountability is still fairly new at all local government levels, and therefore awareness about 
this mechanism is new to many, including Assembly staff. The paper shows that only very few people 
benefited from capacity building in this new mechanism of improving public finance management; 
more people need to be aware of the process before the full benefits can be realised and Assemblies 
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will have to invest in the process. However, Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies are complying 
with the legal provisions to ensure prudent financial management but in a mechanistic manner, and 
often excluding lower tier organisations so only the vertical accountability appears to be working. 
Based on the above, it is recommended that any intervention for local communities at the local 
government level should have capacity building for social accountability as a component, to empower 
citizens to play active roles in monitoring interventions and demanding accountability from the 
service providers to ensure efficient public finance management and ultimately, to achieve the goals 
of decentralisation and poverty reduction. 
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Abstract 
The potential of property rate has been least tapped by decentralized governments in Ghana. This 
paper investigates the property rating system in Ghana through a case study of Offinso South 
Municipality (OSM). Questionnaires were used to gather empirical data from property owners in the 
municipality. The paper finds that there is inadequate property tax administration system and high 
public disdain for the property tax in OSM, with a significant association between compliance with 
the property tax and land use regulations in OSM. The paper suggests that the Offinso South 
Municipal Assembly (OSMA) should improve its land use planning system to facilitate voluntary 
compliance with the property tax. OSMA should also address accountability and transparency 
problems in the property tax system in order to increase public confidence in the tax regime. The 
OSMA should also improve on the property tax collection modes by computerising the billing and 
collection processes.   
Keywords: property rate, land use planning, public disdain, Offinso South Municipality, Ghana 
Introduction 
Decentralization is generally expected to promote greater transparency, accountability, probity, and 
efficiency in urban services provision. It is expected to incorporate local needs and conditions and 
national objectives in the planning and delivery of public services (Keith and McCluskey, 2004). 
Efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy concerns are the main drivers of decentralization (McCluskey 
and Bevc, 2007).  Local authorities that facilitate broad based participation in governance, are more 
responsive to local needs and more capable of appropriately addressing local challenges (Baldersheim 
et al., 1995). The autonomy provided by internally generated funds is of extreme importance to the 
well-being of decentralized governments (Livingstone and Charlton, 1998). This is essential for the 
success of any decentralization programme. Fiscal decentralization and local governance lead to the 
realization of improved economic efficiency and accountability in a country (Kelly, 2000). Fiscally a 
decentralized system has the potential of maximising efficiency (Okrah and Boamah, 2013). Fiscal 
autonomy for local governments however, depends on the efficacy of tax instruments at the disposal 
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of local bodies, the growth potential of non-tax revenues and principled inter-governmental transfers 
(Kapoor and Ghosh, 1992). An efficient tax system provides a predictable revenue stream, has a 
limited administrative burden and is fair (Bell, 1999). 
Property rate is the most common, dependable and sustainable source of revenue to local governments 
worldwide. It is one of the most lucrative sources of local government financing (Mou, 1996).  It is 
thus essential for the success of fiscal decentralization and the financing of local infrastructure and 
service delivery.  For instance, it is a key source of revenue for local authorities in most OECD 
countries (Hefferan and Boyd, 2010). Property taxes constitute 100% of local tax revenue in Australia 
and Ireland, 99% in the United Kingdom, 93% in Canada and 72% in the United States (Braid, 2005), 
and the tax forms more than 2% of developed countries GDP (Bahl, 2009).  
Despite the immense contribution of property tax in developed nations, its potential is generally 
under-exploited in developing countries (Lall and Deichmann, 2006). Property tax revenue constitutes 
less than 4% of all tax revenues in developing and transitional countries, and averages 0.42% and 
0.54% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of developing and transitional countries respectively 
(Kaiser, 2005; Bahl, 2009). There are low rates of property tax collections across a sample of 
municipal corporations in India (Rao and Ravindra, 2002). The tax accounts for less than 10% of local 
revenues in the Punjab province of Pakistan (Ellis, et al., 2007). It is about 80% of local government 
revenue in Thailand, but its potential is highly under-exploited (Varanyuwatana, 1999). Property 
taxation raises about 27% of local government tax revenue in 52 municipalities in Latin America (De 
Cesare, 2004). It forms about 22% of total recurrent revenues of local authorities, 1.3% of total 
government tax revenue, and 0.3% of GDP in Kenya (Kelly, 2000).  
Property rate has been employed by various governments of Ghana since the colonial era.  Several 
statutes have been passed for the regulation of property rating in Ghana. These include the Municipal 
Rating (Immovable Property Rate) Regulations (L.I. 212), 1959; the Local Government (Immovable 
Property Rate) Regulations (L.I. 40), 1960; the Local Government (Immovable Property Rate) 
Amendment Regulations (L.I. 348), 1964; the Municipal Rating (Immovable Property Rate) 
Amendment Regulations (L.I. 349), 1964; the Municipal Rating (Immovable Property Rate) 
Amendment Regulations (L.I. 650), 1970; the Immovable Property Rate Amendment Regulations 
(L.I. 1049), 1975; and the Local Government Act (Act 462), 1993. In Ghana, section 94 of Act 462 
makes Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDA) the rating authorities in their areas 
of jurisdiction. The Act 462 has therefore assigned powers of determining, levying and collecting 
property rate to the MMDAs in the country. Section 95 (1) states that: 
A District Assembly (DA) shall make and levy sufficient rates to provide for that part of the total 
estimated expenditure to be incurred by it during the period in respect of which the rate is levied 
and which is to be met out of money raised by rates.  
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Despite this legal backing and the potential of property rates to raise revenue for local development 
and services delivery, the MMDAs have not been able to mobilize property rate effectively and 
efficiently. The result is that the MMDAs in Ghana rely on central government transfers such as the 
District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) as their main source of funds. Since property rates are 
levied only on fixed property in Ghana, it should be relatively easy for the MMDAs to mobilize 
property rates compared to market tolls. Also, the stock and quality of immovable properties continue 
to increase thereby continuously enhancing the revenue potential of property rates. It is therefore an 
irony that the MMDAs should leave such a huge and guaranteed revenue potential untapped and 
rather focus on the DACF. Discussion with rating officials shows that most properties have either not 
been valued or re-valued over a long period of time; local authorities are either unwilling or incapable 
of mobilizing property rates and tax payers are reluctant to pay.  
The contribution of property tax to government revenue is negligible in Ghana; it formed 0.21% of 
decentralized government’s revenue correspondingly in 1997 and 0.19% in 1999, and only 0.03% of 
the country’s’ GDP in 2010 (Kwakye, 2010; Government of Ghana, 2011). Property tax contributed 
10.8% of the total revenue of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) in 2004 and 7.6% in 2005 
(Adem and Kwateng, 2007). Data from the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority (KMA) show that 
property rate raised 5.6% of the KMA’s total revenue in 2006 (Obeng-Odoom, 2010). Available data 
from the Wa Municipal Assembly (WMA) suggest that the WMA was only able to mobilize 58.56% 
of its projected property rate revenue in 2004 and 88.51% in 2008. In the Offinso South Municipality 
(OSM) available data show that the contribution of property rate to local revenue was less than 9% 
over the 2005 to 2009 period. Also, the Offinso South Municipal Assembly (OSMA) was only able to 
realize 24.21%, 75.65% and 71.78% of its projected property rate revenue in 2005, 2006 and 2008 
respectively. Less than 40% of taxable properties in OSM are on OSMA’s tax roll. Both the coverage 
and collection ratios appear low in the OSM. 
Scope and methodology 
The paper investigates the property rate regime in OSM. It solicits the perceptions of property owners 
on the property rate system, and investigates residents’ willingness to pay and their expectations from 
property rate. The paper again examines any possible link between the planning regime and the level 
of compliance to property rate payments. Field data were gathered in the Offinso South Municipality 
through questionnaires. Eight neighbourhoods from the municipality were selected for data collection 
through random sampling. Random sampling was again employed to select fifteen non-exempt 
properties from each of the sampled neighbourhoods. Due to the poor numbering of properties in 
some of the selected neighbourhoods, in five neighbourhoods properties were renumbered to ease the 
data collection exercise. A total of 120 rateable properties were surveyed, and interviews held with 
owners of these properties, as the responsibility for paying property rates in OSM falls on the property 
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owner. Data were obtained from the respondents through questionnaires. The Municipal Budget 
Officer (MBO) and the Chief Revenue Superintendent (CRS) were also interviewed due to their 
knowledge and direct role in property rating. 
The study area  
The study area is the Offinso South Municipality (OSM), located 17 km North-West of Kumasi, the 
second city of Ghana, administrative capital of the Ashanti Region and seat of the Asante Kingdom. 
The municipality has a land area of 1,350km², a population of 138,676, and a population density of 
103 people/km² in 2000 (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), 2005). Individual families own properties 
which are mainly not for sale due to tradition and inheritance is matrilineal. A family consists of both 
the living and the dead of the same maternal lineage. All family properties belong to the dead, the 
living and the unborn. This forms the basis of the general non-disposability of family properties in the 
OSM. The living are obliged to protect property for themselves, the dead and the unborn. The fear of 
ancestral retribution (nsamantoa) generally reinforces the non-disposability of family property 
(Boamah, 2012). 
Property rate and local governance 
Rising demand for municipal services and infrastructure requires the availability of a reliable and 
sustainable stream of income for decentralized governments. Urbanization and decentralization have 
created the need for local governments to improve local revenue mobilization in order to enhance 
local infrastructure and services provision (Ellis et al., 2007).  
The taxation of real estate property is the most progressive and assured way of raising stable, 
predictable and sufficient revenue stream for local authorities and facilitating fiscal decentralization 
(McCluskey et al, 2003). Property tax is also politically visible, and economically efficient (Qing and 
Guo, 2006; Monkam, 2011). It is neutral on its influence on tax payers' economic decisions and 
therefore constitutes an efficient means for local government units to mobilize revenue (Trasberg, 
2004), and one of the best local taxes owing to the immovability of the tax base (Bird and Slack, 
2002). The tax is well-suited for local governments to generate revenue for the financing of their 
infrastructure investments and the provision of municipal services (Keith, 1993; Kelly, 1998; Lall and 
Deichmann, 2006). Property tax is also least affected by short-term income and economic dynamics 
since properties exhibit long-term asset values appreciation.  
Taxation of property helps to reduce the dependence of decentralized governments on central 
government funding, and is an important means for realising fiscal empowerment of local 
governments (Mathur, et. al. 2009). Property tax possesses the potential to impact positively on the 
fiscal autonomy of local authorities (McCluskey and Bevc, 2007). The tax strikes a balance between 
economic efficiency and fairness and hence much more acceptable to the local electorates (Davis et 
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al, 2004). Property tax is an ideal tax for local governments in low-income countries since it serves as 
benefit levy, is progressive in its distribution of the tax burden, and has significant revenue-raising 
potential (Bahl, 2009). In addition, its ability to mobilize revenue for local authorities has immense 
potential as a tool for land and urban development policies (Kapoor and Ghosh, 1992). It is imposed 
for the purpose of mobilizing revenue for government, public purposes, infrastructure, municipal 
services, or land use planning (Needham, 2000). It is therefore an important component of local 
government finances in many nations. 
The property tax system in most developing countries has several challenges. This may be the 
consequence of poor tax administration and policy. For instance, in most African countries, central 
governments hesitate to transfer property tax policy and administrative authority to local governments 
and are uninterested in the promotion of property tax reform (Kelly, 2000). The limited buoyancy of 
property taxation in developing and transitional countries may arguably be due to an under-developed 
fiscal decentralization regime (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). Property tax has been ineffective 
in low-income and transition countries partly because of legal exemptions, under-valuation, and low 
coverage ratios (Bahl, 2009). For example, the physical, financial and human resource capacity 
required for effective property taxation is a major challenge in east and southern African nations (Bird 
and Rodriguez, 1999; and Franzsen, 2002). The availability of professional valuers is central for the 
success of property rating.  Despite the central role of property assessment to the success of any 
property rating regime professional expertise are generally lacking in most developing countries. 
Property taxation in the Offinso South Municipality 
The results of the field survey are presented in this section, with discussion of issues such as 
compliance rates, the role of land use planning, respondents’ perceptions of rating officials, 
willingness to comply, and residents’ expectations. 
Compliance with property rating in OSM 
The compliance rate with property taxation appears low in OSM. Table 1 (Panel A) indicates that 
42.5% of the respondents did not pay property rates. A very high incidence of non-compliance will 
make the property tax less buoyant, (McCluskey et al, 2003). This appears to be the case in OSM. A 
non-compliance rate of 43% suggested by the data is extremely high. This has been complicated by 
the lack of enforcement against non-compliance partly because of political or bureaucratic 
interference, which undermines the efficiency of the tax collection system and enforcement against 
non-compliance (McCluskey et al, 2003; Lall and Deichmann, 2006). As one rating official said:  
There is extreme interference in the prosecution of defaulters. There is complete lack of 
commitment on the part of the administration to implement enforcement decisions.  
Large scale violations of property tax regulations as observed in OSM, however, make enforcement 
against non-compliance such as prosecution or seizures of property socially and politically imprudent. 
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For enforcement to be successful its associated social and political cost should be minimal; this 
requires that the degree of non-compliance should be reasonably low.  
         Table 1: Compliance with Property Taxation in OSM  
Panel A: Compliance to Property Rate Payment (%) 
Paid Property Rate Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Yes 69 57.5 57.5 
No 51 42.5 100 
Total 120 100  
Panel B: Demand Notice 
Received Demand 
Notice 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Yes 62 51.7 51.7 
No 58 48.3 100 
Total 120 100  
Panel C: Compliance to Demand Notice 
Honoured Notice Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Yes 47 75.8 75.8 
No 15 24.2 100 
Total 62 100  
        Source: Author’s Data, 2012 
Table 1 (Panel B) suggests that 51.7% of the respondents received a property rate demand notice from 
OSMA, indicating low coverage. Also, Panel C (Table 1) shows that 24.2% of the respondents who 
received a property-rate demand notice from OSMA did not honour it, suggesting a low collection 
rate. The data show that out of the 57.5% of the respondents who paid the property rate only 68.1% 
were on OSM’s valuation list and were thus issued a demand notice by the rating authority. The 
remaining 31.9% of the respondents either paid voluntarily or were prompted by OSMA’s mobile 
property rate collectors. The data show that low coverage and collection ratios are partly responsible 
for the low property rate yield in the OSM. 
Land use planning and property rating in OSM 
Act 465 establishes the MMDAs as the planning and rating authorities of their jurisdictions. OSMA is 
thus the rating and planning authority in OSM. The Act makes it mandatory to obtain a building 
permit for all development (new developments, extensions to existing properties and change of use). 
Public discontent with the planning system is high, leading to large scale violations of the land use 
regulations in OSM (Boamah et al., 2012; Boamah, 2013). The evidence in this paper suggests that 
the violations of land use regulations appear to be linked to compliance with property rating. Table 2 
indicates a statistically significant relationship between property rate payments and compliance with 
land use regulations in OSM (Chi-square 6.54, P-value 0.011).  The data indicate that the respondents 
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who applied for building permits for their properties are more likely to pay property rates (75.6% 
compared to 59.8% for all respondents) and those who did not apply for building permits are more 
likely not to obey property rating regulations (48.7% in relation to 40.2% for all respondents). The 
Table further shows a statistically significant association between issuance of demand notice and the 
planning status of the property (Chi-square 9.87, P-value 0.002). Owners of approved properties are 
most likely to be issued property rate demand notice from OSMA whilst owners of unapproved 
properties are most likely not to receive one. The property owners may not be held responsible for 
defaulting property tax if they have not been billed. OSMA is thus largely to be blamed for the low 
property rate yield in OSM.  
 Table 2: Permit Applications and Property Rating in OSM 
  Applied for Permit (%) Pearson Chi-square 
 Yes No Total  
Paid Property 
Rate 
Yes 75.6  51.3 59.8 6.54 
0.011** 
 
No 24.4  48.7  40.2 
Total 100 100 100 
Received 
Demand Notice 
Yes 77.9  45.5  55.9 9.87 
0.002** 
 
No 22.1  54.5  44.1 
Total 100 100 100 
 Source: Author’s Data, 2012, ** p-value. 
 
The significant association between the compliance rates for the property tax and the land use 
regulations may be due to general public disdain and lack of confidence in both the rating and 
planning systems in OSM. It is also possible that owners of unapproved properties may be afraid that 
by paying property tax they may be noticed and sanctioned for non-compliance with the land use 
regulations. This however, appears less likely since properties are very conspicuous and it does not 
require special effort to identify unauthorised properties. Also, enforcement against breach of land use 
regulations is virtually non-existent in OSM (Boamah, 2013). It appears that OSMA has not been able 
to capture the large number of unapproved properties in OSM on its valuation list, as evidenced by 
OSMA’s inability to issue property rate demand notice to the owners of such buildings. 
The relation between the planning system and property rating may be due to the degree of informality 
in the municipality. It is important to note however, that unapproved properties are generally of high 
quality and are located on approved residential areas and building lots. Land allocation is done by the 
Offinso Traditional Council (OTC) based on OSMA's approved land use plan. Developers are, 
however, expected to seek planning consent from the OSMA, but most developers ignore this after 
receiving land, leading to large numbers of unapproved properties in planned areas of OSM. Thus the 
significant positive correlation (Pearson 0.336, p-value 0.010) between the compliance rates for the 
land use and property tax regulations may be due to public disdain for both systems. 
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Perceptions of property tax payers about the attitudes of rating officials  
As shown in Table 3, there is also a statistically significant association between tax payers’ 
perceptions of rating officials and compliance (Chi-square 9.24, P-value 0.002). The respondents who 
have positive perceptions about the attitudes of rating officials are more likely to recommend 
compliance to other property owners (94.5% relative to 89.4% of all  respondents) whilst tax payers’ 
who hold negative perceptions about rating officials are more likely not to recommend compliance to 
other property owners (36.4% compared to 10.6% of all respondents). This shows that tax payers’ 
who are satisfied with the attitudes of the rating officials are likely to honour future property rate 
demands and also encourage other property owners to pay. Similarly, the respondents who are 
dissatisfied are more likely not to honour future property rate obligations and also discourage others 
from property rate payments. This kind of ripple effect may be partly responsible for the large scale 
non-compliance with property taxation in OSM.   
         Table 3: Perceptions on Official Attitudes and Recommendations 
 
 Perceptions on Official Attitude (%) 
Pearson Chi-
square 
 Positive Negative Total  
Recommend 
Payment 
Yes 94.5 63.6 89.4 9.24 
0.002** 
 
No 5.5  36.4  10.6 
Total 100 100 100 
         Source: Author’s Construct, 2012, ** p-value 
 
Public dislike for the imposition of property rate 
The data indicate that 58% of property owners agree with the imposition of property rate in OSMA 
and 42% disagree.  Although, the proportion of the respondents supporting the property tax is higher 
than those with contempt for it, the 42% of the property owners who objected to the imposition of the 
tax is relatively high, which may partly explain the lack of buoyancy of property rate revenue in 
OSM. About 61.7% of respondents who dislike the property rate cite the misuse of property rate 
revenue and the absence of basic infrastructure and services in OSM, giving little justification for the 
property rate. The remaining 38.3% of respondents disliking the property tax mentioned socio-cultural 
reasons such as indigenous land rights as the reason.   
        Table 4: Agreement with Property Taxation and Neighbourhood Development 
Awareness  Agree to Property Taxation (%) Pearson Chi-
square 
 Yes No Total  
Benefited from 
Property Rate 
Yes 83.3  16.7  100 8.23 
0.004** 
 
No 50.6  49.4  100 
Total 57.8 42.2 100 
         Source: Author’s Construct, 2012, ** p-value. 
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Table 4 shows a statistically significant relationship (Chi-square 8.2, P-value 0.004) between 
respondents' support for the property tax and its perceived benefits, as those who have benefited from 
property tax investments in their communities generally support its imposition (83.3% relative to 
57.8% for all respondents). Those who perceive that their neighbourhoods have not gained from the 
property tax are more likely to hold the tax in contempt (49.4% relative to 42.2% of respondents). 
Table 5 indicates that respondents who are unopposed to the property tax are more likely to pay 
(67.7% compared to 61.3% of all respondents), and those who oppose the property tax are more likely 
not to pay (47.8% relative to 38.7% of all respondents). The result indicates that public disdain for the 
property tax regime has had negative impact on the buoyancy of property tax revenue in OSM.  
          Table 5: Agreement with Property Taxation and Compliance 
Awareness 
 Agree to Property Taxation (%) Pearson Chi-
square  Yes No Total 
Paid Property 
Rate 
Yes 67.7 52.2 61.3 2.73 
0.098** 
 
No 32.3 47.8 38.7 
Total 100 100 100 
Honored 
Demand Notice 
Yes 85.3 67.9 77.4 2.67 
0.102** 
 
No 14.7 32.1 22.6 
Total 100 100 100 
         Source: Author’s Construct, 2012, ** p-value. 
 
Respondents expectations from the property tax 
The relatively high public disdain for the property tax in OSM may be due to unmet public 
expectations. Table 6 indicates that 25%, 10%, 27.5% and 8.3% of the respondents expect OSMA to 
invest property tax revenue in general infrastructure and service delivery, education, urban roads and 
utility provision.  
             Table 6: Respondents Expectations from Property Taxation 
Reason Frequency 
Percentag
e 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
General Infrastructure and Service 
provision* 
30 25 25 
Education 12 10 35 
Urban Roads 33 27.5 62.5 
Utility 10 8.3 70.8 
Proper Waste Management 4 3.3 74.1 
Public Toilets 16 13.3 87.4 
Security 1 0.8 88.2 
Markets 2 1.7 89.9 
No Response 12 10 100 
Total 120 100  
             Source: Author’s Construct, 2012. * Respondents could select more than one option (e.g. education and utility). 
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Visible evidence in the municipality shows that facilities are generally inadequate. Educational 
infrastructure is limited and some schools have been maintained for forty years. Urban roads are 
lacking and some neighbourhoods are without access roads. Households’ access to piped water and 
electricity and is also limited in some neighbourhoods. Public disdain for the property tax and the 
limited buoyancy of property tax revenue may also due to these unsatisfied public expectations. 
Policy implications of the findings 
High non-compliance rates, lack of enforcement against compliance, general public disdain, and 
negative perceptions about rating officials all seem to have contributed to low property tax yield in 
OSM. The data indicate that the respondents who are dissatisfied with the municipal authority’s 
disbursement of the property tax revenue are less likely to pay the property tax and are even more 
likely to discourage others from paying. Due to the extended nature of the family system and strong 
socio-cultural relationships amongst property owners in OSM, the ripple effect of public contempt on 
voluntary compliance could be severe. It is thus important for OSMA to be transparent in the use of 
the property rate, making reasonable investments in urban infrastructure such as education and access 
roads which may have the potential to encourage voluntary compliance, as the field data suggest that a 
major constraint to the success of the property tax in OSM is the widespread perception that proceeds 
are misused and not invested in community services. Public confidence in the tax system is essential 
for the success of property taxation (Bahl, 2009). OSMA should purge the property tax of perceived 
corruption and negative official attitudes, which has the potential to encourage compliance, and 
reduce the social and political cost of enforcement.  
The field data also suggest a strong association between the planning system and property tax in 
OSM. Property owners who complied with the planning system or are satisfied with the planning 
system are more likely to comply voluntarily with the property tax. This link between the planning 
system and the property tax may be due to public contempt for both systems, or to socio-cultural 
factors perhaps because a property that is formal in one aspect is likely to be formal in others. Efforts 
at improving the land use planning system may thus yield dividends for the property tax system, so it 
may be important for OSMA to address the inherent problems in its land use planning regulations. We 
argue that developers who successfully secure building permits with few hurdles tend to have 
confidence in the municipal authority and subsequently comply with the authority’s property rate 
regulations. An improved land use planning system will also make it easier for OSMA track new 
developments and update its valuation list regularly. Improving the land use planning system will also 
reduce the degree of informal development; encourage compliance with the property tax; enhance the 
coverage and collection rates, and thus increase the yields to OSM. 
Comprehensive reforms of the property tax regime incorporating property data collection and 
valuation, tax assessment and collection, and enforcement against non-compliance are needed in 
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OSM, but administrative, regulatory, and technical shortfalls may undermine efficiency of the 
property-tax collection system and enforcement against non-compliance (Lall and Deichmann, 2006). 
Thus it may be appropriate for OSMA to employ GIS techniques and a tax-mapping system in 
property identification to capture all properties within its jurisdiction, both taxable and non-taxable, 
on the tax roll. A high coverage ratio is a prerequisite for successful mobilization of the property rate.  
However, OSMA has no qualified valuation professionals in-house though trained and certified 
valuers are not scarce in Ghana. What is needed is an efficient state institutional framework to utilize 
their expertise in ensuring efficient property-rate administration in the country. OSMA staff indicated 
that they lack legal powers to recruit rating officers directly, but have to get approval from the head of 
the Civil Service of Ghana or the Local Government Secretariat, and the municipality has not been 
successful in securing such an approval.  
The lack of qualified professionals to manage the property tax regime is a major obstacle to 
optimising property tax revenue in OSM. It is thus important for central government to remove the 
bureaucratic obstacles for decentralized governments in recruiting valuation professionals to enhance 
the property tax administration and maximize property rate revenue in the country. It is equally 
important for OSMA to strengthen the property tax administration system in the municipality. A weak 
system for administering property tax may lead to an inequitable distribution of the tax burden and 
surge public disdain against it (Monkam, 2011). An improved administration is essential for the 
buoyancy of property tax revenue (Kelly, 2000), and is vital to ensure that all properties within the 
authority's jurisdiction are captured on the tax roll, so that there is adequate valuation, accurate tax 
assessment, adequate collection and enforcement.  
Conclusion 
The study clearly shows that an inadequate property tax administration system, inadequate personnel, 
increased public contempt and perceived corruption have undermined the property tax system in 
OSM. Limited coverage of the tax base, inaccurate valuations, and inadequate enforcement and 
collection are partly responsible for poor collection rates, and it may be difficult for OSMA to justify 
the payment of the property rate without improving services and infrastructure in the municipality. It 
is recommended that OSMA strengthens the enforcement of property tax collections, expands the 
coverage ratio, regularly updates the valuation list, and computerises the billing and collection process 
in order to improve property rate mobilization in OSM. OSMA should also remove bottlenecks in its 
land use planning system since compliance with this is likely to translate to compliance with the 
property tax. OSMA should further ensure accountability and transparency in the property tax 
administration system in the municipality. 
  
Boamah                                         Property rating in Offinso South Municipality, Ghana 
CJLG November 2013 
88 
References 
Adem, M. N. and Kwateng, O. A. (2007) Review of Real Property Tax Administration in Ghana, Master of 
Science Thesis, Number 381, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management, Royal Institute of 
Technology, Stockholm, Sweden. 
Bahl, R. (2009) Property Tax Reform in Developing and Transition Countries, Fiscal Reform and Economic 
Governance Project, United States Agency for International Development. 
Bahl, R., and Martinez-Vazquez, J.  (2008) The Determinants of Revenue Performance in Roy Bahl, Jorge 
Martinez-Vazquez and Joan Youngman, (ed) Making the Property Tax Work: Experiences in Developing and 
Transitional Countries, Cambridge MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
Baldersheim, H., Illner, M., Offerdal, A., Rose, L. and Swianiewicz, P. (1995) Local Democracy and the 
Process of Transformation in East-Central Europe, Oxford:Westview Press,  
Bell, M. (1999) An Optimal Property Tax: Concepts and Practices, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Bird, R. and Rodriguez, E.R. (1999) Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation. International Experience and the 
Case of the Philippines, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 19, 299-319. 
Bird, R. and Slack, E. (2002) Land and property taxation around the world: a review, Journal of Property Tax 
Assessment and Administration, 7(3)31-80. 
Boamah, N.A. (2013). Land use controls and residential land values in the Offinso South municipality, Ghana. 
Land Use Policy (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2012.12.016 
Boamah, N. A. (2012) Housing for the vulnerable in the Offinso South Municipality of Ghana. Housing, Care 
and Support, 15(3) 140-147. 
Boamah, N. A., Gyimah, C., and Nelson, J.K.B. (2012) Challenges to the Enforcement of Development 
Controls in the Wa municipality, Habitat International. 36 (1) 136-142. 
Braid, R. M. (2005)  Tax Competition, Tax Exporting and Higher-Government Choice of Tax Instruments for 
Local Governments, Journal of Public Economics,. 89, pp. 1789-1821. 
Davis, P.T., McCluskey, WJ and Lim, Lay Cheng (2004) “Residential Property Taxation: A Capital Value 
Banding Approach”, Journal of Property Tax Assessment and Administration. 1 (3) 51-64. 
De Cesare, C. M. (2004) General Characteristics of Property Tax Systems in Latin America Paper presented at 
7th International conference on Optimizing Property Tax Systems in Latin American, Guadalajara, Jalisco, 
Mexico. 
Ellis, P.; Mihaly, K.; and Lee, A. G.  (2007) Property Taxes in the Large Cities of Punjab Province, Pakistan, 
Journal of Property Tax Assessment and Administration, 4(2) 31-51. 
Franzsen, R.C.D. (2002) An Overview of Property Taxation in Southern and East Africa: Problem Areas and 
Possible Lessons, paper presented at the International Property Tax Institute (IPTI) and Ministry of Finance, 
Czech Republic Workshop on Property Taxation in Transition, Prague, Czech Republic. 
Ghana Statistical Service (2005). 2000 Population and Housing Census, Ashanti Regional Analysis. Accra: 
GSS. 
Government of Ghana (2011) Budget Statement. Accra, GoG. 
Hefferan, M. J. and Boyd. T. (2010) Property taxation and mass appraisal valuations in Australia-adapting to a 
new environment, Property Management, 28 ( 3) 149-162. 
Kaiser, K. (2005) Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Pakistan-Structural challenges for the 2001 devolution. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Kapoor, R. M. and Ghosh, P. K., (1992)  Composite Area Linked System for Property Tax Reform in India,    
Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies, Vol. 4, pp. 209-225. 
Keith, S. (1993) Property Tax in Anglophone Africa: A Practical Manual, World Bank Technical Paper Number 
209, Washington, DC, United States. 
Keith, S. and McCluskey, W. (2004) Decentralization and Rural Property Taxation. FAO Land Tenure Studies. 
FAO: Rome 
Boamah                                         Property rating in Offinso South Municipality, Ghana 
CJLG November 2013 
89 
Kelly, R. (1998) Designing Property Tax Reform Strategies in Developing Countries: An Analytical Framework 
Applied to Kenya, Harvard Institute for International Development, Working Paper Series, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States, pp 1-31. 
Kelly, R. (2000) Designing a Property Tax Reform Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analytical Framework 
Applied to Kenya, Public Budgeting and Finance; Winter, 2000. 
Kwakye, J. K. (2010) Overcoming Africa’s Addiction to Foreign Aid:  A Look at Some Financial Engineering 
to Mobilize Other Resources, Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Monograph No. 32: 2010. 
Lall, S. V. and Deichmann, U. (2006) Fiscal and Distributional Implications of Property Tax Reforms in Indian 
Cities, Working Paper No. 39 April 2006, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. 
Livingstone, I. and Charlton, R. (1998) Raising local authority district revenues through directtaxation in a low-
income developing country: evaluating Uganda’s GPT, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 18: 499-
517. 
Mathur, O. P., Bahl, R., Thakur, D., and Rajadhyasksha, N. (2009) Urban Property Tax Potential in India, New 
Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. 
McCluskey, W. J. and Bevc, I. (2007) Fiscal decentralization in the Republic of Slovenia: an opportunity for the 
property tax, Property Management, 25(4), 2007 pp. 400-419. 
McCluskey, W., Franzsen, R., Johnstone, T., and Johnstone, D. (2003) Property Tax Reform: the Experience of 
Tanzania, Our Common Estate, July 2003. 
Monkam, N.  F. (2011) Property Taxation in Senegal: Legislation and Practice, Journal of Property Tax 
Assessment and Administration, 8(3) 41-60. 
Mou, C. (1996) Major Property Tax Issues in Africa, PropertyTax in Eastern and Southern Africa: Challenges & 
Lessons Learned, Working Paper, No.2, Harare Zimbabwe: Municipal Development Programme, 4-9. 
Needham, B., (2000) Land Taxation, Development Charges, and the Effects on Land-Use, Journal of Property 
Research, 17(3) 241-257. 
Obeng-Odoom, F. (2010) Is Decentralisation in Ghana pro-poor? Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance, 
Is. 6: July 2010. 
Okrah, M. and Boamah, N. A. (2013) Deepening Representative Democracy through Fiscal Decentralisation: Is 
Ghana Ready for Composite Budgeting?, AFRREV IJAH, Vol.2 (2), pp. 73-90. 
Qing, Z. and Guo, X. J.  (2006) The Modernization of Real Estate Taxation in China, Journal of Property Tax 
Assessment and Administration, 3(4) 5-12. 
Rao, U.A.V and A. Ravindra, (2002) Reforming the Property Tax. New Delhi: UNDP. 
Trasberg, V. (2004) Property and land taxation in the Baltic States, Journal of Property Tax Assessment and 
Administration, 1 (2): 31-43. 
Varanyuwatana, S. (1999) Property Tax in Thailand in William McCluskey (ed), Property Tax: An International 
Comparative Review, Aldershot: Ashgate pp. 148-163. 
 
RESEARCH & EVALUATION 
CJLG November 2013 
90 
Looking Back, Moving Forward: Towards Improving 
Local Governments’ Performance in Ghana 
Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 
Issue 13/14: November 2013 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg 
 
Hamza Bukari Zakaria 
University of Manchester, UK 
Email:hamza.bukarizakaria@manchester.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
This paper, based on a desk study, adopts a path-dependent perspective to explore how local 
government authorities in Ghana have attempted to institutionalise performance management at the 
organisational level. It questions the existing performance diagnostic framework that is used to assess 
local government authorities by arguing that any attempt to consolidate the prevailing ‘performance 
assessment regime’ ought to re-examine previous government initiatives that had in-built mechanisms 
for assessing local government performance. The prevailing system, despite its attempt to empower 
local authorities further promotes central government manipulation of local government 
administration. The paper concludes that performance assessment of local governments in Ghana will 
remain ineffective until local government councils genuinely serve local communities and their 
citizens by achieving goals and objectives that are consistent with the needs and aspirations of the 
latter rather than relying on annual performance assessments designed to ignore the opinions of 
citizens. 
Keywords: Ghana, performance assessment, path dependency, decentralisation, districts 
Introduction 
Interest in the performance of public sector organisations has an enduring reputation in the disciplines 
of Public Administration and Public Management. Sufficient attention has thus been drawn to the 
potential role of performance management in modernising public organisations under public sector 
reform initiatives (Sotirakou and Zeppou 2006). Growing interests in the formulation and 
implementation of performance management policies in response to  demands for accountability in 
developed countries has inspired developing and transitional countries to consider similar attempts to 
strengthen their own public organisations (OECD 1997;Sanderson 2001). In many jurisdictions, 
performance evaluation has become a standard framework designed to encourage goal-driven 
performance by tracking successes and or failures of organisational strategies and overall performance 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992; 2000).  
However, considerable controversy over the determination of performance in the public sector has 
affected how the concept is understood, analysed and researched. There are many concerns about its 
ambiguity, multi-dimensionality and complexity, yet its popularity in contemporary public 
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management discourse suggests that organisational performance will remain contested and 
evolutionary due to the nature of the public sector (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008; de Bruijn 2002; 
Talbot 2010; Thomas 2006), as organisations in the public sector, including local government 
authorities, will continue to strive towards achieving multiple goals, many of which  are vague, 
unstable, controversial and sometimes conflicting; creating room for multi-faceted and subjective 
interpretations of performance (Halligan et al. 2010).  
For this reason, any systemic assessment of local government performance should broadly capture 
real and perceived concerns and interests of multiple stakeholders since any discussion of 
performance is susceptible to divergent and sometimes conflicting perspectives (de Bruijn 2002: 7; 
Thomas 2006). Acknowledging these concerns is crucial particularly when local government 
authorities seek to use performance management systems to fulfil widening gaps in the demand for 
effective service delivery. Conversely, a growing number of studies point to a paradox of 
performance, whereby organisations that promote development fail to utilise performance 
management systems as instruments for service improvement (de LancerJulnes and Holzer 
2001;Lawton et al. 2000; Meyer 2002). Inspired by these assertions, this paper contributes to the on-
going debate by looking at local government performance assessment interventions in Ghana and 
highlighting the importance of integrating citizens’ opinions into performance assessments.  
To accomplish this objective, the paper is structured as follows. The next section examines the context 
of local government performance and explores the theoretical literature on path dependency which is 
used to discuss the trajectory of local governments’ performance assessment practices in Ghana. It 
then poses a rhetorical question to ascertain whether local government authorities are on the path 
towards performance improvement. The last section raises some practical concerns based on lessons 
from performance assessments, followed by a conclusion.   
The context of local government performance in Ghana 
In Ghana, previous attempts to facilitate organisational change aimed at entrusting power to people at 
the local level woefully failed to provide workable improvements to public administration (Songsore 
2011;Ayee 1996). This did not however dissuade the military government of the Provisional National 
Defence Council (PNDC) (1981-1993) from promoting decentralisation as a strategy for improving 
government’s response to public demands, promoting service delivery and empowering citizens to 
participate in decision making (Asante and Ayee 2008; Crook 1994). Although the current local 
government system owes its existence to the PNDC, some experts observed that decentralisation of 
power was a condition demanded by the World Bank and the IMF (Oquaye 1995). This condition 
served a dual purpose because its fulfilment was a prerequisite for the government to receive funds 
under the economic recovery programme during the 1980s and a means of mitigating legitimacy 
crises that characterise military regimes (Crook 1994; Ayee 1997). Political and economic 
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liberalisation became a key eligibility criterion used by western donors’ to push African dictators, 
including JJ Rawlings, the chairman of the PNDC, on the path of ‘good governance’ in exchange for 
financial aid. Consequently, the military government increased the number of local governments from 
65 to 110 to demonstrate its commitment to citizens’ participation in governance. Rawlings declared 
that ‘Ghana inherited a distorted concept of democracy which concentrated authority solely at the top 
so that each one of us, individually or collectively, owed everything to the politicians and bureaucrats 
in Accra. The time has come to give primacy to the local level in the evolution of democracy’ 
(Rawlings 1988).  
During that period, certain powers and responsibilities were transferred from central government to 
lower levels of government including civil servants operating at the local level (Oquaye 1995). 
Economically, the economy of Ghana witnessed a turnaround from a decline towards growth, as a 
result of policy initiatives undertaken under the economic recovery and structural adjustment 
programme. Songsore (2011: 168) reports that real GDP grew at an average of 5% per year while the 
rate of inflation fell from 123% in 1983 to 40% in 1984 and further to 10% in 1985. Local 
government reforms, downsizing of the public sector and reduction in government expenditure 
contributed to these achievements but in retrospect, it is unclear why the PNDC military government 
naïvely considered the new decentralised local government system as an experiment without realising 
that it would later become the backbone of public administration in Ghana.  
Local governments in Ghana are classified on the basis of population size as Metropolitan, Municipal 
and District Assemblies (MMDAs) even though structures that support local government 
administration at the sub-national level exist in three distinct vertical layers (Figure 1). The first level 
comprises Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) in each of the 10 administrative regions, entrusted 
with roles that affect local governance even though the regional administrations do not have the 
powers of local government authorities. At the sub-regional level, there are 6 Metropolitan 
Assemblies, 49 Municipal Assemblies and 161 District Assemblies. These Assemblies make up the 
second tier, and operate on the principle of decentralisation aimed at deepening participatory 
democracy; coordinating local economic development; addressing national poverty reduction 
objectives, and recently contributing towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(Satterthwaite 2005; Alam and Koranteng 2011). Below the Assemblies are Sub-metropolitan 
Councils, Urban, Town and Zonal Councils and Unit Committees at the lowest level. Unfortunately, 
Unit Committees have lost their relevance, and do not exist in many jurisdictions (Songsore 2011). 
This has intensified calls for their abolition (Ahwoi 2010). For instance, during local level elections in 
2010, there were supposed to be about 16,000 Unit Committees throughout the country but their 
formation and composition continue to be an enigma. The diagram below depicts the hierarchical 
structure of Ghana’s local government system. 
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Figure 1: Structure of local government system in Ghana showing central-local relations (Source: author, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite concerns about the limited impact of sub national structures, interests in the performance of 
local government authorities continue to be driven by constitutional mandates that empower them to 
facilitate the country’s development from a bottom-up perspective. Chapter 20, Article 240 of the 
Constitution of Ghana unequivocally states that ‘Ghana shall have a system of local government and 
administration which shall, as far as practicable, be decentralised’. This constitutional provision is 
reinforced by the local Government Act (Act 462) which further defines the powers, scope and 
functional responsibilities of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies, which must perform 
deliberative, legislative and executive functions, obliged to exercise political and administrative 
authority to provide guidance, give direction to, and supervise other administrative authorities to 
manage development in the district.  
According to the Local Government Act (Act 462), 1993, Assemblies in Ghana:  
a) are responsible for the overall development of the district and shall, through the Regional 
Coordinating Council, ensure the preparation and submission for approval of: 
− district development plans to the National Development Planning Commission, and 
− the district budget for approved plans to the Minister responsible for Finance; 
b) shall formulate and execute plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilisation of 
the resources necessary for the overall development of the district; 
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c) shall promote and support productive activity and social development in the district and 
remove any obstacles to initiative and development; 
d) shall initiate programmes for the development of basic infrastructure and provide municipal 
works and services in the district; 
e) are responsible for the development, improvement and management of human settlements and 
the environment in the district; 
f) are responsible for the maintenance of security and public safety in the district; and  
g) shall ensure ready access to Courts in the district for the promotion of justice. 
However, scholarly assessments of local government performance have presented mixed results. In 
two separate case studies, Crook (1994) and Ayee (1996) examined changes in administrative 
performance under the new dispensation of democratic decentralisation. Crook (1994) defined 
performance as output effectiveness, responsiveness and process acceptability, and found that 
development output increased marginally when democratic decentralisation was introduced in Ghana 
even though it failed to respond to citizen’s demands. Ayee (1996) focused mainly on the 
government’s core objectives of promoting participation, effectiveness and accountability found that 
local governance generated a sense of voluntarism as it encouraged a culture of ‘self-help’ which 
inspired residents of local communities to take charge of their own development particularly when 
local governments provided school buildings, electricity, water facilities and roads. After two decades 
of decentralisation, Ayee and Crooks’ description of local government success remains relevant; 
especially when the performance of local government authorities continues to fall short of citizens’ 
expectations despite the expansion of powers and resources for Assemblies to boost their 
performance.  
There are numerous reasons why many citizens are not enthused about local government 
performance. At the heart of this discontent is the composition of local government councils. For 
example, 70% of Assembly Members (councillors) are elected by universal suffrage every four years 
with no affiliation to a political party, whilst the remaining 30% are appointed by the President. A 
Chief Executive (mayor) is then nominated by the President, who only assumes office after obtaining 
two-thirds majority votes of all the Assembly Members, present and voting (Ahwoi 2010). The 
nomination of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (mayors) by the President 
deprives citizens of the privilege of determining their leader, and this manipulative dominance of the 
centre over local governments is inimical to local democracy, transparency and accountability in local 
areas (Ayee and Dickovick 2010; Crook 1994). As political heads, Chief Executives may be 
influenced by partisan interests even though local governments are supposed to be non-partisan 
(Songsore 2011). Furthermore, the 30% of Assembly appointments awarded by the President, 
contrary to the original purpose of equipping local government authorities with skilled and 
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experienced people, are now used to reward political party loyalists without recourse to competence 
and professional experience (Ayee and Dickovick 2010). 
Another reason why local government is considered unimpressive is the inability to provide essential 
services (Awortwi and Helmsing 2007). To address this problem, a District Assembly Common Fund 
(DACF) was established to provide financial resources to all local governments (Danquah et al 2013), 
from a pool fund originally set at 5% of total government budget until 2007 when it was increased to 
7.5% (Figure 2). Fiscal transfers from the DACF are made to local governments in quarterly 
instalments to enable them carry out their planned activities. Nonetheless, significant obstacles 
remain. 
Despite the increase in DACF disbursements depicted in Figure 2, local governments have not been 
able to mobilise sufficient Internally Generated Funds (IGF) to supplement those received from the 
DACF. There are reports that IGF ranges between 18-30% of local government revenue even in peak 
times  (Ayee and Dickovick 2010; Osei-Akoto et al. 2007). Few if any local government authorities 
can survive  
                 Figure 2: The DACF disbursement trend from 1994- 2012 
 
                 Source: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 2012. 
without the DACF because IGF revenue has no promise of making them financially self-sufficient. 
Many local governments, especially those in rural areas, lack sound economic and commercial tax 
bases, thereby limiting their sources of revenue.  
 
Limited tax opportunities caused by narrow tax nets and ineffective revenue collection mechanisms 
raise questions as to whether the economic potential of local governments is sufficiently explored. 
The ineffectiveness of sub-district structures, especially urban, zonal and town councils also 
contributes to low revenue mobilisation. Even where sub-district structures carry out revenue 
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mobilisation roles delegated to them by parent Assemblies, serious leakages of cash into private 
pockets occur (Ahwoi 2010; Ayee and Dickovick 2010). It is therefore not surprising that the Auditor 
General’s report, which is prepared annually to cover government ministries, departments and 
agencies for the Public Accounts’ Committee of Parliament, has often raised queries about activities 
that border on dishonesty, financial mismanagement, or corruption and about the prevalence of 
administrative cultures that undermine the performance of local governments and development 
agendas. Apart from placing more emphasis on effective leadership and integrity which are crucial 
values for managing local governments, punitive measures against people and organisations who 
misappropriate funds meant for local government authorities leaves much to be desired.  
Path dependency: a conceptual overview 
Although path dependency as a concept emerged from literature on market-centred economics and 
sociology, organisational researchers have often borrowed it to examine the evolution of 
organisational systems. To Mahoney, ‘path dependence characterises specifically historical 
sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have 
deterministic properties’ (Mahoney 2000: 507). In this study, path dependency is used metaphorically 
to analyse administrative practices that may have some historic significance. The underlying thesis of 
path dependency in organisations suggests that ‘history matters’, which implies that organisations are 
carriers of history (David, 1990) and that the essence of history is neither intermittent nor occasional, 
but remains significant at all times (Sygow & Schreyo 2009). 
Path dependency is built on a number of underlying premises, e.g.: that the timing and sequencing of 
events matter in policy development; that similar conditions can produce a range of events, and that 
policy streams or social outcomes may result from relatively ‘small’ and sometimes unconnected 
events (Pierson 2000). It is believed that when certain initiatives are set in motion, it becomes difficult 
for them to be reversed, and that political developments, including policy initiatives are often 
punctuated by critical moments or junctures which tend to shape the contours of social life (Collier 
and Collier 1991; Pierson 2000). Nevertheless, there are several opinions on how policy initiatives in 
organisations are initiated, sustained and eventually become path dependent. Thelen (1999) for 
instance critiqued path-dependent adherents for failing to specify the mechanisms that translate 
critical junctures into lasting institutional legacies. To Peters et al (2005), normative institutionalism 
can explain how values might be sustained, even though such values might only be held by top level 
management without being shared across different hierarchies within an institution. 
Mahoney (2000) observed that scholars have often studied two main strands of path dependent 
sequencing, self-reinforcing sequences and reactive sequences. Self-reinforcing sequences symbolise 
chains of events that systematically form and reproduce a long-term institutional pattern. It is believed 
that organisational actions including policy directives produce self-reinforcing sequences when they 
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exhibit what economists call ‘increasing returns’ (Pierson 2000) and ‘positive feedback’ (Thelen 
1999) obtained through learning and continuous practice. Increasing returns implies that once an 
institutional practice is adopted, it is expected to deliver increasing benefits when it is uninterrupted. 
By implication, it becomes more difficult over time to transform the prevailing pattern or select other 
options even if these would have been more efficient (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000). To Thelen 
(1999), when political organisations find themselves on a particular path, the benefits anticipated by 
policy makers, interest groups, and other players increase while the costs of shifting to another 
alternative increases. She attributes path dependency to institutional stickiness in processing inputs 
into outputs, and cognitive stickiness to decision makers by suggesting that when external pressure is 
mounted on institutions to change, it may be too late for them to adjust particularly when major 
punctuations have already occurred. Transposing this argument to the Ghanaian context, it is 
suggested that decentralisation reforms initiated in 1988 showed signs of both ‘institutional and 
cognitive stickiness’ even though policy makers saw the reforms as an experiment rather than making 
evidence-based adjustments to produce an effective local government system.    
Reactive sequences are described as chains of events that are temporarily but causally connected 
(Mahoney 2000). They are described as 'reactive' on the basis that each event within the sequence is 
both linked and reacts to previous events such that each step in the sequence is dually ‘dependent’ on 
previous and future steps. Analysis that focuses on this type of sequencing considers the final 
outcome in the chain of events as an important reference largely because the whole spectrum of 
events is considered as a path leading up to this end. 
Another important contribution is the systematic analysis of Sydow and Koch (2009), who proposed 
three chronological steps for examining organisational path dependency that emphasises the 
reproduction of self-reinforcing dynamics. The authors suggest that singular historical events can set 
off self-reinforcing processes which could result in ‘organisational lock-in’. Thus, all the three phases 
are governed by dependent causal linkages, but also exert different effects on organisational actions 
and decision making (Pierson 2000).  
In Sydow and Koch’s analysis, the first step known as the pre-formation phase consists of a repertoire 
of options that define plausible scopes of action. While Mahoney (2000:511) suggests that the effect 
of a choice of action when selected at this stage is uncertain, Sydow and Koch agree with Pierson 
(2000) that irrespective of the wide range of options in this phase, a policy choice may emerge from a 
small event that unintentionally sets off a self-reinforcing process. These noticeable moments or shifts 
that resonate in a self-reinforcing process are the critical junctures (Collier and Collier 1991) which 
indicate the end of the pre-formation phase. 
The second phase, known as the formation phase, represents a stage where the pattern of dominant 
action eventually emerges and shows signs of irreversibility. With time, the scope of policy options 
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narrows, making it difficult to reverse the preferred choice. This signifies the evolution of a path. The 
last phase is referred to as the lock-in phase, and stands out as the stage where alternative options are 
further narrowed, eventually resulting in the institutionalisation of organisational norms, practices or 
policies. Thus practices, policies and values become fixed to a known path that is believed to be 
linked to an aspired goal. At this stage, one particular policy choice becomes predominant and 
flexibility can be severely compromised.   
Collier and Collier (1991) highlight the reproduction of institutional legacies associated with critical 
junctures and the duration of such legacies. They compared how legacies were created and reproduced 
in Mexico and Brazil. By analysing labour relations, they showed how the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party; Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), a left-wing party in Mexico, used state resources to 
establish its hegemony over labour at all levels, producing a legacy of labour relations based on 
patronage such that working class people who felt they owed their jobs to the PRI also felt responsible 
for sustaining that legacy. This form of labour inclusion directly contrasted with Brazil where labour 
relations were suppressive and intimidating; reproducing a legacy of labour alienation and exclusion. 
Some critical junctures produce stable regimes whereas others tend to be obstructive in nature (Collier 
and Collier 1991: 34). 
As Thelen (1999) noted it is thus important for researchers to identify the factors (events and 
processes) that undermine legacies. In Collier and Collier's study (1991), the friendly space offered to 
labour in Mexico, even though it became poisoned with patronage, encourages acceptance and 
institutionalisation of government employment policy, contrary to Brazil where no such space gained 
the commitment of labour. Yet, even though the critical junctures literature has relevance for the 
analysis of policy evolution, timing, and chronology at national and supra-national (macro) levels, it 
tends to overlook local level factors that could be instrumental in sustaining legacies. By referring to 
the implementation of decentralisation reforms in Ghana, it can be argued that successive 
governments have responded differently to critical junctures. Central government has persistently 
used local governments to mobilise support for political gains rather than strengthening local 
government authorities to promote socioeconomic development. Despite the re-establishment of 
democratic and constitutional governance in 1992, central government still appoints Chief Executives 
(mayors) for local government authorities. This is a serious drawback because their unelected status 
weakens mechanisms for transparency and downward accountability which has severe repercussions 
for local government performance. 
The trail of MMDA performance assessment: design or accident? 
Two recent applications of path-dependent analysis in Ghana illuminate the evolution and 
punctuations in policy formulation that shape the structure of government machinery. One deals with 
civil service and central management agencies whilst the other focuses on decentralisation (Awortwi 
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2011; Ohemeng and Anebo 2012). Although the studies are laudable in navigating the historic path of 
public sector reforms in Ghana, they delved little into the performance of local government authorities 
− the gap this paper fills.  
There is no doubt that local governance was given a new lease of life in 1988 when the new local 
government law, PNDCL 207 was passed. This was significant because intermittent political 
instabilities triggered by military coups had disabled the implementation of any meaningful public 
sector reform (Ayee, 1997). The promulgation of PNDCL 207 was followed by the demarcation of 
geographic boundaries that increased the number of local government authorities from 65 to 110. 
From 1982 when the PNDC government declared its vision of decentralisation in an 11-point 
decentralisation programme (Mohan 1996) to 1993 when the Local Government Act (Act 462), 1993, 
was enacted under the 1992 Constitution, there was still no holistic examination of the performance of 
local government authorities, despite their long existence. None of the possible methods of assessing 
the performance of local governments had ever been fully utilised. The Ministry of Local Government 
and Rural Development (MLGRD) and the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) on 
behalf of central government only seek to monitor the formulation and implementation of local 
governments’ Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs) as a way of assessing performance. 
Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) have also monitored the planning processes of local 
governments for almost two decades, but the effectiveness of these evaluations on local government 
performance remains an open question.  
Today, the normative practice of assessing local government performance is practically embedded in 
the relationship between the central government in Accra and local government authorities in the 10 
regions of Ghana. The unequal nature of that relationship inevitably undermines the Assemblies’ 
autonomy, given that their plans, programmes and projects must correspond with national 
development priorities set by central government, defined by the National Development Planning 
Commission which is part of the executive arm of government. As the agency responsible for 
advising the president on matters of development planning, policy and strategy, the NDPC is enjoined 
by the National Development Planning [Systems] Act, (1994) Act 480 to coordinate the performance 
of local government authorities. This legislation laid the path for implementing a nationwide 
decentralised planning system that is monitored at the regional level by the RCCs and coordinated and 
supervised at the centre by the NDPC.  
Within the past two decades of the Commissions’ existence, it has developed four different national 
development strategies each of which has attempted to achieve the same objective of development in 
Ghana. The first national development strategy under the current decentralisation system was the 
Ghana Vision 2020, which aimed to transform Ghana into a middle income country by the year 2020. 
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Unfortunately, it was truncated in 2001 when the NPP (New Patriotic Party) replaced the NDC 
(National Democratic Congress) after the 2000 election.  
The replacement national development plan was the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) 
published in 2003; its main goal was ‘to ensure sustainable equitable growth, accelerated poverty 
reduction and the protection of the vulnerable and excluded within a decentralised, democratic 
environment’ (NDPC 2003:30). This was replaced in 2005 by the Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (GPRS II), which sought to accelerate economic growth and achieve the status of a middle-
income country within the planning period. After the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, 
the NDC assumed office again, and formulated a new national development framework known as the 
Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) to advance its ‘better Ghana Agenda’. 
These ‘agenda-setting’ strategies are implemented by Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) 
at the national level, RCCs at the regional level and the Metropolitan, Municipal and District 
Assemblies at the local level, and thus the GSGDA (2010 to 2013) represents the first phase of a 
coordinated programme which: 
forms the basis for the preparation of development plans and annual budgets at the sector and 
district levels throughout the country(Government of Ghana 2010) 
While central government considers nationwide implementation of the national development plan as a 
means of achieving government priorities, this encumbrance deprives local government of 
concentrating on local development challenges. The MMDAs' development plans and operational 
activities are expected to reflect the objectives of national development policy, and the 10 RCCs play 
a crucial role in making this happen. They monitor the utilisation of funds allocated to local 
government authorities by central government; review and co-ordinate public services and monitor, 
co-ordinate and evaluate the performance of local governments in the regions. These tasks are 
expected to be accomplished through regular and periodic visits to local government areas where on-
going projects are monitored. However, nationally set targets have become difficult for local 
governments to meet because targets are broad, generic and macro in nature. Instead of taking the 
contexts of different local governments into consideration, the current GSGDA considers oil and gas 
exploration as one of its key focal areas although few local governments are endowed with oil and gas 
resources. In addition, while RCCs undertake performance monitoring of local governments such 
inspections often target physical infrastructure projects such as school building, health facilities, 
feeder roads, sanitation and electrification projects. This reduces the notion of development to the 
availability of physical infrastructure, but the RCCs seem to have no alternative in reviewing, 
harmonising and forwarding performance progress reports of all local governments in their regions to 
the NDPC.  
While this practice is the institutionalised mechanism by which local government performance has 
been evaluated for two decades, it not evident that it has actually improved the performance of local 
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governments in Ghana. The effectiveness of monitoring and evaluating local governments’ 
performance by the RCCs is constrained by persistent lack of funds for regular monitoring. Apart 
from depending entirely on central government transfers, the RCCs’ lack of power to generate 
revenue coupled with the erratic and irregular grant disbursement further worsens their predicament. 
What seems puzzling is the inability of the NDPC to differentiate ‘star’ performers from ‘poor’ 
performers although the RCCs have monitored local governments for two decades. Assuming the 
NDPC could make such a distinction, there is no incentive to motivate any hypothetical ‘star’ 
performers, nor would the NDPC be able to sanction local governments that performed poorly or 
flouted the NDPC’s guidelines. In spite of increases in the volume and scope of financial resources 
available to local governments, most of them continued to perform their core functions rather 
unsatisfactorily (Crook 1994; Ayee 1997). A critical juncture was therefore reached in the mid-2000s 
which required politicians and policy makers to react to find alternative ways of assessing local 
government performance, which coincided with the period when the DACF, the largest grant to local 
governments, was increased from 5% to about 7.5% of total government revenue, leading donor 
agencies to lobby central government to demand value for money and exact accountability from local 
governments in the utilisation of funds. 
Are local governments en route to performance improvement? 
In 2008, the Government of Ghana introduced an initiative to improve the performance of local 
governments, particularly with respect to efficiency, accountability, and the provision of basic 
essential services. Central to this initiative is a Performance Based Grant (PBG), known as the District 
Development Facility (DDF).  
The DDF is a fund established by the Government of Ghana supported by the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the German 
Development Bank (KFW) and the French Development Agency (AFD). The DDF makes funds 
available to local governments that comply with rules, regulations and policies linked to the 
performance of their mandates. This has become a vital source of additional funds for them to plan, 
undertake or implement development projects and programmes. However, Assemblies only receive 
funds from the DDF after their performance had been assessed by consultants to the Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), using performance indicators embodied in a 
diagnostic instrument, the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT). This tool also 
identifies capacity gaps that impede the Assemblies performance to justify why some local 
governments may need capacity-building support.  
The assessment, is conducted annually, and is intended to ensure that local governments comply with 
existing legal and regulatory frameworks linked to the administration of their areas. As a result, the 
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evaluation criteria are largely driven by statutory obligations and functional responsibilities assigned 
to the Assemblies by the Local Government Act (Act 462), 1993, and other local governance statutes. 
Thus the performance indicators are derived from the core functions of local government authorities 
which capture a variety of internal organisational processes, but are less effective in monitoring 
service delivery (output/outcome) variables.  
Meanwhile, the link between FOAT and the DDF is fundamental to understanding how the 
performance of local government authorities is assessed, and the basis on which financial reward is 
given. Since this mechanism was the first of its kind introduced to benchmark local government 
performance in Ghana, its implementation can be described as experimental. This has led to revisions 
of the formulae and key performance indicators to reflect current local government needs. The 
evaluation tool is structured around two sets of indicators classified as Minimum Conditions (MCs) 
and Performance Measures (PMs). In parallel, allocation of funds under the DDF is categorised into 
three components: a basic grant consisting of 20% of the total amount of funds in a given fiscal year, 
a 68% performance grant and a 12% capacity building grant.  
In 2011, the Ministry of Local Government with the support of the World Bank used the existing 
assessment template to launch a new project known as the Local Government Capacity Support 
Project (LG-CSP). An Urban Development Grant (UDG) was introduced as part of this project to 
provide financial incentives to urban local governments based on their performance. The grant is 
intended to support local governments in urban areas deal with contemporary challenges of 
urbanisations including urban poverty and growing infrastructure needs.  
During the annual assessments, local governments that obtain higher scores by fulfilling most of the 
minimum condition indicators and performance measures receive more financial reward than their 
counterparts. The minimum conditions involve a set of issues local governments must meet in order to 
access the basic grant under the DDF, which focus on: 
 Development planning 
 Financial  management and accounting 
 Public procurement 
 Implementation capacity and  
 The general functioning of the local government authority 
Fulfilling the minimum conditions means that local governments must demonstrate: 
 the existence of functional district planning and coordinating units;  
 availability of financial statements and audit reports devoid of adverse comments, and the 
preparation of procurement plans (Government of Ghana 2012); 
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 that at least three General Assembly (council) meetings have been held within the year under 
review;  
 the formulation of Medium Term Development Plans and annual action plans, and 
 must submit progress reports that reflect the implementation of development plans to RCCs 
(for harmonisation).  
Unlike the minimum conditions, performance measures are structured into nine thematic areas that 
local governments must fulfil in order to qualify for performance grants under the DDF. Apart from 
these performance indicators, Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies are further assessed for the 
UDG using five main indicators. Each indicator is assigned a weighted value based on which 
performance scores are awarded during the assessment. Table 1 shows performance measures and 
maximum weight used in the FOAT and the urban development grant. 
 
Table 1: Weights of performance measures in FOAT and UDG  
Source: MLGRD: DDF Operational Manual (2012)  
 
The table above categorises performance measures that qualify local governments for DDF funds and 
the UDG. While these measures highlight key areas upon which local governments are assessed to 
determine whether they qualify for performance-based grants, those that are unable to qualify are 
provided with a CBG (Capacity Building Grant) so 12% of the DDF fund is set aside as capacity-
building grant payable to local governments that do not qualify for any of the other grants. Local 
governments that receive the capacity-building grant are required to train staff in specific areas that 
were identified during the assessment. The identification of capacity gaps is followed by training 
programmes proposed by the assessment teams to the Ministry of Local Government for approval. 
From these trainings, local s officials are expected to equip enhance their performance in subsequent 
assessments.  
Perhaps to demonstrate its commitment and ownership of the local government performance 
assessment initiative, the Government of Ghana has been the highest contributor to DDF funds. 
However, it is quite obvious especially after the creation of new local government authorities that the 
 Performance measures in the  FOAT Maximum 
score 
Performance measures 
under UDG 
Maximum 
score 
1 Management and organisation  10 Budgeting  15 
2 Transparency, openness and Accountability  12 Reporting and auditing  15 
3 Planning system  16 Asset management  20 
4 Human resource management  7 Revenue management  35 
5 Relationship with sub-structures  6 Social accountability  15 
6 Financial management and auditing  16 Total  100 
7 Fiscal capacity 15   
8 Procurement  12   
9 Environmental sanitation management  6   
 Total  100   
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Government of Ghana would have faced serious implementation difficulties without the financial 
support and technical assistance of the four DDF development partners, and other donors may soon be 
contributing to the DDF.  The quest to continue supporting the initiative can be traced to potential 
gains made by Assemblies that have benefited from the fund; for example, out of a total of 138 
Assemblies that were evaluated in 2008, 50 of them fulfilled all the minimum conditions whilst 88 
Assemblies failed. This means than majority of the Assemblies were only eligible for the CBG (12% 
of DDF); depriving them of the performance grant (68% of DDF) that could have been invested to 
improve infrastructure in local communities. Figure 3 below indicates scheduled contributions made 
by the Government of Ghana and development partners to the DDF so far. 
      Figure 3: Contributions to the DDF, 2009 - 2012 
 
     Source (AfD, 2013). 
After the first DDF funding round, local governments used the capacity building grant to train their 
staff, and in the second round only 37 local governments failed to fulfil the minimum conditions, 
despite the creation of 32 new districts. It is obvious that the DDF seeks to reduce local governments’ 
over-dependence on what has become an overburdened and unpredictable DACF. 
The additional funds received by local government authorities under the DDF vary, ranging from 
US$ 31.9 million disbursed in 2008; US$ 56.4 million in 2009; $44,495,300 in 2010; to 
US$ 135,564,800 in 2011 respectively. The most recent performance assessment was completed in 
the last quarter of 2012, and performance scores are yet to be published. Despite these assessments, 
there is still no database to affirm whether local governments have used the additional funds to 
improve service delivery. Furthermore, one wonders whether the regulations are not just another 
means by which central government uses bureaucratic procedures to control local government 
authorities rather than addressing the most pertinent interest of local governments which is serving 
local communities.  
AFD CIDA DANIDA KfW GoG
2009 3.1 6.5 5.3 9.3 10
2010 6.25 13 7.9 9.3 16
2011 6.25 15 11.4 8.75 20
2012 3.15 17.5 13.2 8.75 20
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Missing links and forgotten factors: towards a people-centred approach 
The paper highlights various initiatives by successive governments to promote local government 
performance. It is however obvious that none of these initiatives was created by local government 
authorities themselves. It is therefore not surprising that ordinary citizens in local communities, who 
are arguably more suitable to determine the performance of their local government councils, do not 
have a voice in assessing local governments’ performance. However, would have thought that due to 
divergent perspectives of what constitutes organisational performance, a more balanced or multi-
dimensional approach should have been adopted to embrace other key aspects of performance 
assessment.  
This argument is laid on the foundation that citizens’ perceptions form a crucial part in how 
governments perform. For many people, appreciating local government performance will depend on 
the extent to which political promises as well as pledges of development are fulfilled in terms of the 
quantity and quality of government output, and whether outcomes such as value for money and citizen 
satisfaction are guaranteed (Yang and Rho 2007), which has given impetus to the use of citizen 
surveys in assessing government performance (Behn 2003).  
Measurement of satisfaction data provides feedback to government because the concerns of citizens 
can be used to hold governments accountable to the public (Wholey and Hatry 1992; Roch and Poister 
2006). A notable example is the Afro-barometer which uses surveys to mobilise public opinion about 
government performance. Another commendable initiative is the district oversight committee concept 
that was introduced by the Governing Council of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (GC-APRM) in 
Ghana. Members of these committees represent different interests groups who receive hands-on 
training to undertake satisfaction surveys. This helps them to elicit popular opinion about local 
government performance based on the four key themes of the APRM (Democracy and Good Political 
Governance; Economic Governance and Management; Corporate Governance and Socio-economic 
Development). Such surveys are capable of equipping local governments with information that clarify 
public aspirations and expectations which the former could use to sharpen their processes, policies 
and programmes to improve the quality of services (Howard 2010). Perceptions about citizen’s 
satisfaction can serve as indicators for determining the publics’ trust in government and can possibly 
be used as a proxy measure of good governance (Bouckaert and van de Walle 2003; Yang and Holzer 
2006).  
Conclusion  
Clearly, the decentralised local government experiment that started two decades ago in Ghana has 
come to stay. Thus local government authorities will forever be expected to perform their 
constitutionally mandated tasks effectively and efficiently, but local government autonomy is 
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compromised by central-local government relations that continue to shape national policies and local 
agendas, leaving local government to fulfil dual objectives of satisfying both local communities and 
central government. In reality, the implementation of policies has been evolutionary, sometimes 
resulting in punctuations and critical junctures that call for ways of improving the system. The 
collaboration between the Government of Ghana and development partners to improve local 
government performance has sound objectives but raises questions over whether mechanisms are in 
place to maximise their developmental impact. Performance-based grants have significantly supported 
local governments in providing basic social infrastructure and building the capacity of local 
government employees to enhance their performance. Yet, from a path-dependent perspective, the 
performance of local government authorities did not take centre stage at the onset of local government 
reforms because the government was interested in meeting conditions for donor assistance rather than 
building and strengthening local institutions. For this reason, assessing the performance of local 
government in a systemic manner seems to have been an afterthought that focuses on administrative 
procedures rather than the core business of serving local communities. Even though central-local 
government interactions promote some performance monitoring of local government authorities, the 
practice whereby Regional Coordinating Councils collate and forward local government plans and 
performance reviews to the centre leaves much to be desired. It is unclear why the experimental 
attitude towards local government reforms neither embedded nor institutionalised citizen-led 
performance assessment into the new local government system.  
We concur that fixing institutional fault lines in the operation of local government authorities is a 
potential entry-point in order to identify alternatives that might improve the developmental role of sub 
national governments (de Visser 2009). Whilst the existence of fault lines may not imply that a 
particular policy initiative is inherently ineffective, analysing them could help to address operational 
bottlenecks that inhibit the success of development policies, which is crucial in Ghana where local 
government performance is a priority amongst ordinary people, donor agencies and central 
government. A balanced and consensual approach in the assessment of local government performance 
is important. Des and Robinson (1984) suggests that for organisational performance to be clarified 
and made easier, performance assessment mechanisms must create consensus amongst relevant 
stakeholders over what performance entails. This suggestion is however not easy to implement 
because the scope of local government performance is broad and embroiled in serious political 
discourses that makes it difficult to agree on what performance entails (Brewer and Selden 2000). To 
Boyne (2002), judging local government performance in terms of outputs, efficiency, effectiveness, 
responsiveness, or other democratic outcomes would be driven by the interests of whoever is 
evaluating performance, reinforcing the subjectivity in how performance is sometimes perceived. 
Hence, portraying local government performance assessments in Ghana as an objective process may 
be illusive especially when it fails to integrate citizens' opinions.  
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Abstract 
The paper examines capacity building in Zimbabwe’s Rural District Councils (RDCs) from 1994 to 
2001 and the resultant erosion of capacity during Zimbabwe’s protracted political and economic 
crisis that followed. It is prudent to ask whether there was ‘capacity building’ or ‘capacity erosion’. 
The paper establishes that the capacity building was piecemeal and that there was no genuine desire 
to build capacity, but that Councils embarked on these programmes to access the funding that came 
with the programmes. 
In some cases, the design of the Rural District Councils’ Capacity Building Programme (RDCCBP) 
was too rigid, derailed by the central government’s half-hearted attempts towards decentralisation, 
and failed to allow RDCs to learn-by-doing. Because of Zimbabwe’s politico-economic crisis, 
national level politicians were peremptory in their demands for better RDC results and an 
opportunity to learn was lost. The plethora of other rural development projects coupled with the 
project-based approach of the RDCCBP condemned capacity building efforts to the rigidities of 
projects and programmes, yet capacity building is better perceived as a continuous process with 
experiential learning. The paper concludes by arguing that capacity building efforts in RDCs were 
largely unsuccessful, and were derailed by the ‘Zimbabwe crisis’; the result can only be described as 
‘capacity building that never was’. Internal efforts by RDCs to build their own capacity are more 
sustainable than efforts prompted by the ‘carrot and stick’ approach of external actors, such as 
central government (in a bid to ‘hive off’ responsibilities) and funding agencies. 
Key words: Rural District Council, capacity building, learning-by-doing, Zimbabwe. 
Introduction 
Local governments should have adequate resources – financial, human, and infrastructure – 
proportionate to their legislative mandates. Capacity building (CB) has been deployed to remedy 
deficits in resources. CB is thus a sine qua non condition for sustainable development. CB is not just 
about training people or strengthening organisations but also requires engagement with complex and 
rather intangible aspects of governance such as norms, values, political culture, social capital and 
incentives for change (ECDPM, 2003). 
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In view of the political and economic crisis that gripped Zimbabwe (from 1999) during the 
implementation of the Rural District Councils’ Capacity Building Programme RDCCBP,  this paper is 
a critical reflection that examines the (RDCCBP). This can be described as 'capacity building that 
never was'. The gains of the programme were eroded by the protracted political-economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe. The RDCCBP was too rigid, derailed by the central government’s half-hearted attempts 
towards decentralisation, and failed to allow RDCs to learn-by-doing. Because of Zimbabwe’s 
politico-economic crisis, national level politicians were peremptory in their demands for better RDC 
results and an opportunity to learn was lost. The study of CB in Zimbabwe helps to enhance 
institutional memory for the benefit of the various institutions and the wider public. Zimbabwe also 
provides a significant example tool for other developing countries who may find themselves in a 
similar situation, and for the donor community in developing countries.  
The paper sketches the theoretical contours of capacity through the lenses of Zimbabwe’s RDCs and 
acknowledges that Zimbabwe has a history and development trajectory that fits a number of countries. 
There are many constraints to capacity building – broadly classified as exogenous and endogenous. 
Exogenous factors were external to the RDCs, and included, for example, the significant effects of 
amalgamation, and political and economic decline. Endogenous factors were those inherent in the 
RDCCBP design, for example, treating RDCs as homogenous entities and expecting numerous 
projects to be implemented at the same time. This paper will focus on constraints that arose as a result 
of the political-economic crisis. The paper proffers lessons of experience for international 
development and cooperation. 
Theoretical overview of capacity building 
CB means different things to different people. For purposes of this paper, CB is taken to mean a 
‘conscious’ effort to strengthen and improve the abilities of staff members and organisations to 
perform tasks in a more efficient, effective and sustainable manner (Peltenburg 1996: 9). Honadle 
(1981: 577) defined CB as the ability of people and institutions to do what was required of them. She 
also noted the drawback of this definition as it fails to define what is to be built. Others view CB as 
referring to improvements in the ability of public sector organisations, either singly or in co-operation 
with other agencies, to perform appropriate tasks defined by necessity, history or situation (Grindle 
and Hilderbrand 1995: 445). In the case of the Rural District Councils (RDCs) in Zimbabwe, 
appropriate tasks also refers to legislative mandates – ie: the duties and responsibilities imposed by 
the RDC Act (Chapter 29: 13) (GoZ 1988). 
CB has been at the centre of development efforts for the last six decades. Pieterse (2002: 1) argued 
that this was fuelled by similar international discourses that valorise the local as a site of strategic 
defence against powerful globalising currents and as the frontline in the war against poverty. Within 
the realm of economic development, CB also received renewed interest because of the experiences of 
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policy prescriptions under structural adjustment in the 1980s. In ‘rolling back the state’, Lemon 
(2002: 21) observed that central governments passed on the cost of providing public goods and 
services to local government without sufficient adjustments of either state fiscal transfers to local 
levels or the revenue raising powers of local government.  
Honadle (2001: 81) contended that the concept of institutional capacity was not static. She contrasted 
it with physical capacity in the sense of being able to measure the potential of a vessel to hold a 
defined amount of liquid, or a computer to store so many bits of data. Institutional capacity changes 
over time and space, as Zimbabwe illustrates clearly. 
With Zimbabwe’s decay, the notion that capacity is neither constant nor static is reinforced. 
Furthermore, the idea of a ‘learning curve’, automatically makes capacity a moving target (Honadle 
2001: 81). 
Land (2000), Kaplan (1999, 2001 and 2003) and Postma (2003: 81) argue that CB is a slippery and 
elusive concept, which remains rather obscure and used interchangeably with similar concepts such as 
‘institution building’, ‘capacity development’ and ‘institutional development’. GTZ (1999: 3) advised 
that CB must take place on three levels: individual; institutional and organisational; and the overall 
institutional system level (legal, political, economic and administrative frameworks).  
Peltenburg (1996: 9); Olowu (1998:1) and Grindle (1997: 5) viewed capacity, as the ability to perform 
appropriate tasks and fulfil roles effectively, efficiently and sustainably. 
Franks (1999: 52) argued that capacity was defined as the overall ability of the individual/group to 
perform their responsibilities. He went on to highlight that it was possible to imagine an organisation 
that had a capable staff, yet did not have the capacity to perform its functions because it was either 
grossly understaffed or because the policy framework did not allow satisfactory performance. Grindle 
and Hilderbrand (1995: 443) concurred and noted that organisations and trained individuals do not 
perform in a vacuum, and that their ability to carry out assigned responsibilities is a function of the 
broader context within which they operate. Capacity depends on the presence of viable institutions, 
leadership and vision, financial and material resources, skilled human resources, and effective work 
practices – systems, procedures and appropriate incentives (ECDPM, 1998). Land (2000) argues that 
capacity deficits or weaknesses in local government could rarely be attributed to a single cause.  
Dimensions of capacity 
Grindle (1997) put forward five dimensions of capacity.21 These dimensions discuss capacity with 
regards to central government departments and ministries. Kaplan (1999 and 2003) argued that 
                                                            
21
The five dimensions are: the action environment; the institutional context; the task network; the organisation; and the 
human resources. aspect. For purposes of this paper, these are not further explored. 
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‘features of organisational life’ (ie: context and conceptual framework; vision; strategy; culture; 
structure; skills; and material resources) incorporate a panorama of factors that affect the ability of 
organisations to achieve specified goals. The dimensions are interactive and dynamic and hence 
Kaplan’s framework is more useful. 
Land (2000: 3) observed that increasingly it was accepted that CB programmes were more successful 
and were more likely to be sustainable when they responded to an internal initiative, and when they 
were supported through a process approach, and not through single one-time events. Issues of 
ownership, commitment and leadership are central to this notion of capacity as a process. Kaplan 
(1999: 22 and 2003: 323) advised that: 
While every organisation may share similar features, nevertheless, each organisation is unique 
both in itself and in terms of its stage of development and this uniqueness demands unique, 
singular and specifically different responses. While the model may adequately describe the 
elements of organisational capacity and even order of their acquisition, it cannot predict or 
determine organisational processes, which are complex, ambiguous and often contradictory’.  
Indeed in some countries, performance problems diagnosed at the organisational or individual level 
may be deeply embedded in economic, social and political deficiencies, and efforts to improve 
performance must focus primarily on these conditions. On a cautionary note, Grindle and Hilderbrand 
(1995) highlighted that while the importance of the broader contextual setting for organisational and 
individual activities may seem obvious, a large number of CB initiatives were designed without 
considering this.  
Grindle (1997: 6) prefers the terms capacity development or capacity strengthening to signal that the 
task was one of strengthening existing capacity rather than constructing mew capacity. Morgan (1997: 
iii) noted that CB could refer to either processes or outcomes, meaning both efforts to improve 
organisational performance and/or improvements to practices developed. CB is not an end in itself but 
a means to an end.  
The CB approach thus has two components – the demand side and supply side. The demand side 
consists of the organisation(s) and the staff whose capacities need to be strengthened, while the supply 
side encompasses all organisations undertaking efforts to build capacity (Peltenburg 1996: 11).  
Key constraints to effective CB 
The road to CB (especially for local governments) is winding − Postma (2003: 81) compared it to a 
river which meandered with the contours of the topography. Institutional weaknesses are rarely 
merely technical problems: as Corkery et al (1998: 543) argued they generally reflect systemic 
problems related to politics and culture, as well as management capacity and performance, and thus it 
is critical to analyse why weaknesses exist, as administrative capacities cannot be strengthened unless 
the political, social, economic and cultural contexts are understood. A number of problems or 
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limitations could be encountered. These could include lack of vision, political interference, 
organisation and human resources development problems (Peltenburg 1996: 13).  
Peltenburg (1996: 13) argued that, in highly politicised environments, the planning and/or 
implementation of CB interventions may be affected. On donor funded projects, there may be political 
interests on both donor and receiving sides geared to short-term gains. 
Teskey and Hooper (1999: 7) advanced the notion that there was insufficient incentive to build 
capacity at the political level. They believed that politicians would naturally tend to support 
programmes which increase their electoral popularity, eg: building schools, laying roads, providing 
drugs to health centres, because politicians needed to be re-elected every five years so gain more 
electoral support for policies which yield short-term results. 
Olowu (1998: 10) argued that the erosion of public servants' salaries in Africa over the years has 
resulted in a depressed incentive system22, with the ‘take home’23 of many officials barely sufficient 
for one week’s existence. Thus civil servants seek to hold more than one income-earning activity or 
job, thereby reducing commitment to the main one. At the same time remuneration for skilled contract 
staff is high which dampens the morale of low-paid public servants.  
The Zimbabwe crisis 
Since 1999, Zimbabwe has gone through a very rough period, both politically and economically, The 
'Zimbabwe crisis' has been well documented and affected all spheres of life for many Zimbabweans. 
Bond and Manyanya (2003) discussed ‘Zimbabwe’s plunge’ at great length, tracking the country's 
economic development from pre-independence to the crisis period since 1999. In discussing 
‘Zimbabwe’s unfinished business’, Hammar et al. (2003) also chronicled the background to the 
economic development downturns and the socio-political meltdown (see also Nhema, 2002; 
Sachikonye, 2002 and 2011). The political crisis triggered related crises – food security, a fuel crisis, 
and the rule of law, − which escalated to such unprecedented levels that service delivery dropped into 
the abyss. Zimbabwe’s local authorities were reeling as they failed to deliver essential services; 
infrastructure broke down, qualified and experienced personnel absconded in large numbers − joining 
the private sector or emigrating to the diaspora. Some areas went on for long periods without essential 
services, and doctors and industrial workers were on strike (Musekiwa et al, 2013; NewZimbabwe 
2009). Meanwhile the Zimbabwean dollar entered into a state of hyperinflation – Kadzere (2008); 
Jongwe (2008) and BBC (2008) cited the inflation rate at 231 million per cent. This high inflation rate 
culminated in a de facto abandonment of the currency and replacement with the US dollar made 
official in early 2009. 
                                                            
22
Mentz (1997) talked of a civil service demoralized, underpaid, bloated and thriving on venal activities – instead of wages. 
23As seen in many posters in the RDCs visited – ‘my take home is not enough to take me home.’ 
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Since 2000, elected members in the RDCs were no longer the preserve of Zimbabwe African National 
Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and were increasingly being dominated by the opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In 2008, an attempt to end the crisis, a power-sharing 
agreement between the rival political leaders – Robert Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirayi and Arthur 
Mutambara was brokered by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. The Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) and its attendant but somewhat shaky Government of National Unity (GNU) 
provided a transition to normalcy and managed to stabilise the country. 
Hammar et al (2003: 39) argued that 'the reality for many RDCs was that they were assuming their 
authority at a moment of national economic decline, reduction in public sector spending and growing 
popular discontent with the government in general'. Over time, there was increasing pressure on the 
RDCs to generate local revenue for their own administration and local development activities, placing 
severe strains on them and in some cases bringing them into direct and often outright competition and 
conflict with their constituents. There was also growing unease about the question of authority itself, 
and local political tensions mushroomed as ZANU-PF's hegemony waned and it feared losing its grip 
on long dominated RDCs. 
Essentially, the RDCCBP did not manage to build the capacity of RDCs to plan and manage their own 
development programmes on a sustainable basis because the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) 
ignored some critical elements of CB. In line with ECDPM (2003: 1) it can be argued that: 
Development cannot be achieved by throwing money, projects and external know-how at 
problems. It is the product of each country’s historical and cultural circumstances and involves 
fundamental societal transformation. 
Grindle and Hilderbrand (1995: 443) similarly observed that a large number of CB activities had 
produced meagre results and that the investment had not paid off in terms of improved organisational 
and individual performance. The work on which this paper is based set out to test the hypothesis that 
capacity building efforts need to deal with these intangible complex issues, such as norms, values, 
political and organisational culture, social capital and incentives for change. 
Methodology 
There are 60 RDCs in Zimbabwe, and the study sampled eight RDCs from four (of the eight) 
provinces: Mashonaland Central, Manicaland, Midlands and Matebeleland South for a good 
geographical representation.24 The study examined one suspended council, or so-called laggard, in 
each province and one of those said to be doing well (progressive).25 It also considered the 
amalgamation mix in 1993 (i.e. how many Rural Councils and District Councils amalgamated to 
                                                            
24
This paper draws from a doctoral research that examined critically the performance of rural local authorities in Zimbabwe 
over a period of ten years (from 1993 to 2003). The performance of local authorities had been progressively declining. 
Money, equipment and other resources were made available through the Rural District Councils Capacity Building 
Programme (RDCCBP) and other donor-funded programmes to salvage the RDCs, but the downward trend still persisted. 
Was there a willingness to build lasting capacity or it was being driven by donor conditionality? 
25Councillors were suspended by the MLGNH. The ‘progressive’ ones were also appraised by the same ministry. 
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make up the RDC) and political history and affiliation (pro- or anti- ZANU-PF) (Mandiyanike, 2009). 
The research included semi-structured face to face interviews with key informants - local government 
practitioners (chief executive officers, a permanent secretary, council chairpersons, RDC heads of departments, 
and District Administrators), and examination of official records and documentation. Primary data 
included field study observations and reflections on personal experiences of key informants26. 
Anecdotal evidence was also drawn from the author’s experience as a local government practitioner.  
An overview of local government in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is a unitary state with three major levels of governance – central, provincial and local 
government.27 Local government is split into two – Urban Councils established under the Urban 
Councils’ Act (Chapter 29: 15) 1995 (as amended), and rural/farming areas established under the 
Rural District Councils Act (Chapter 29:13) 1988. The discussion will focus on RDCs. Mutizwa-
Mangiza (1991) and Mandiyanike (2013) contend that until independence in 1980, local government 
in Zimbabwe was divided racially, based on the principle of ‘separate development’, a Rhodesian28 
formulation of apartheid. Rural Councils were relatively autonomous, and catered for white settlers in 
commercial farming areas. The small non-viable District Councils were primarily instruments of 
administering the subject race in the villages. This arrangement existed for almost five decades and in 
1993, these Local Government Units (LGUs) were amalgamated to form Rural District Councils 
(Mandiyanike, 2009). In 1993, government removed the District Administrator (DA) from being the Chief 
Executive Officer of the District Council29. The DA remained an influential advisor to council, implementer, 
government regulator, and monitor. Amalgamation was a political decision meant to remove one of the 
last vestiges of colonial rule – the de-racialisation of local government – which took place under the 
Rural District Councils Act No.8, passed in 1988 but not implemented until July 1993 (Matyszak, 
2010). The transition to the new dispensation was fraught with resistance from the respective 
contenders and haggling among members of staff. The five-year delay in effecting the provisions of 
the RDC Act was testimony to the complexity of the exercise that sought to unify two very different 
institutions at different levels of sophistication, intended for different purposes (Mandiyanike, 2009). 
In addition, traditional Chiefs played an increasingly partisan role as allies of ZANU-PF during the 
crisis, although their official role is administered by a separate Act (Traditional Leaders’ Act) and 
beyond the purview of this paper. 
Following the amalgamation of Rural and District Councils in 1993, the GoZ, with external 
assistance, sought to improve the operations of RDCs. The justification given for the CB programmes 
was that RDC lacked the skills and resources to shoulder these added responsibilities. The challenge 
                                                            
26 See Mandiyanike 2009 for a detailed methodological discussion 
27There has been a tendency to mix national/sub-national levels of governance with central/local government. In Zimbabwe, 
the Provincial Councils Act (Chapter 29:11) significantly changed the misnomer of ‘two levels of governance’.  
28
Rhodesia – colonial name for Zimbabwe 
29 The Rural District Councils had to employ their own Chief Executive Officers. 
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to the GoZ was thus to tailor CB of RDCs with access to resources. In turn, these efforts at the local 
level, would feed into national consensus building so that the transfer of central responsibilities and 
resources would lead to more equitable and sustained development. 
Prior to the implementation of the CB programme, the Strategic Plan for Capacity Building (Plan 
Afric, 1994: 6) acknowledged that the process of building the capacity of the RDCs was complex and 
long-term, and that t RDCs were at different starting points in a fluid and challenging environment.  
The Strategic Plan (Plan Afric, 1994: 20) warned that there was nothing more damaging to the morale 
of the RDCs than to give them new responsibilities without the means to perform them., The objective 
of the RDCCB programme was to develop the capacity of all RDCs to plan, implement and manage 
their own District Development Programmes and delivery of essential services, within the 
government’s overall decentralisation programme. The RDCCB programme had three components: 
institutional development, capital development and human resources development (HRD). 
Rural local government in Zimbabwe – during the crisis 
The outcome reflects the systemic nature of the problems faced and the superficial changes made by 
RDCs and other actors in addressing the problems highlighted.  
Decentralisation-centralisation nexus 
With regard to decentralisation, government officials were skating around the debate. The Ministry of 
Local Government and National Housing (MLGNH) expounded 13 principles on decentralisation as a 
roadmap on the way forward. However, it was oversimplistic to assume that ministries and 
departments would release responsibilities to RDCs or be directed by RDCs. When the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was introduced in 1991, most civil servants were set for 
retrenchment, which they went to great lengths to resist. Parties to the decentralisation initiative 
glorified it by day and savagely resisted it by night. MLGNH as the parent ministry for local 
authorities and was seen as becoming ‘the mother of all ministries’ and decentralisation became a 
‘talk show’ rather than a genuine attempt to improve service delivery. GoZ Hansard, volume 27 (63): 
6687 of 8 May 2001, conceded that ‘whilst the government has a sound decentralisation policy, the 
implementation aspect leaves a lot to be desired’.  
Thus attempts at decentralisation were half-hearted, which rather than 'premature decentralisation’, 
can instead be seen as pseudo-decentralisation. This bureau-pathology and a murky legislative 
framework, resulted in too much ministerial control and duplication of institutions and authorities, 
which impacted negatively on RDCs. Several papers, including an address by the permanent secretary 
in the MLGNH, identified two hundred cases where the MLGNH could intervene in RDC activities 
without hindrance. We are yet to see the changes brought about by the new constitution. 
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Coming to grips with amalgamation 
There are issues that the authorities and RDCs seemed to ignore, namely influential people and the 
political environment. For example, MLGNH has default powers to suspend RDCs and councillors (as 
will be discussed in detail hereunder). Indicators used for suspension were skewed and subject to the 
whims of the powers that-be through the wanton use of the default power.  
Amalgamation was a surgical process that conjoined two distinct bodies, and deep-seated problems 
inherited at amalgamation were either underestimated, or simply ignored. The most discernible 
problems were divided loyalties on the part of staff, different working and cultural practices, party 
affiliation and, most significantly, divergent educational and economic circumstances. At 
amalgamation, members of staff were the ‘eyes and ears’ of their councillors from former councils. 
This evoked a strong sense of patron-clientelism and cliques/fiefs as councillors hoped to get the truth 
from their ‘own employees’.30 Before amalgamation, many Rural Council councillors had relatively 
informal ways of conducting council business, for example with resolutions agreed at the country 
club, and consultations with commercial farmers. In many cases, council officials were not privy to 
these discussions but acted on the decisions. At amalgamation, the District councillors were used to 
formal minuted decisions that authorised action. The councillors were cautious in ‘covering their 
backs’.  Councillors from the former Rural Councils were irked by this ‘red tape’ but were met with 
hostility from their District Council counterparts. Council debates following amalgamation often 
discussed procedural issues rather than substantive developmental issues.  
There were also differences in the educational and economic circumstances of the councillors. There 
is a general superiority or inferiority complex in Zimbabwe, based on a person's fluency in English. 
Many councillors from the former District Councils were peasant farmers and spoke little English. 
Whilst the white councillors from the former Rural councils were often no better educated, they could 
speak English fluently and occupied large tracts of land (a clear symbol of wealth). Economically, 
most councillors from the former Rural Councils were commercial farmers and relatively well off, 
whilst the district councillors were peasant farmers and/or teachers or civil servants. Collapsing or 
these wide divergences was almost impossible. One former District Administrator (DA) remarked, 
'amalgamation was nothing but putting unit tax into the same pot [as the rural resources]'.  
Staffing levels within RDCs 
Most RDCs lost a lot of qualified staff during the political and economic crisis31. In Gokwe RDC, war 
veterans32 ‘dismissed’ some officials and forcibly removed them from office. Officials from Gokwe 
RDC and McGregor (2002) gave detailed accounts of how the forced removals were effected with 
                                                            
30In Guruve council in 1994, councillors from amalgamating Mvurwi rural council demanded the presence of a particular 
roads supervisor in meetings, whom they constantly asked whether what other officers said (from Guruve council) was true. 
31 See Mandiyanike (2013) for an analysis of staff turnover during this period 
32 Ostensibly former combatants of the 1970s guerrilla war who formed the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans 
Association (ZNLWVA) after independence, which led the invasions of commercial farms during the crisis 
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impunity. In these debacles, no handover- was conducted and the war veterans took files with them 
for ‘investigation’ and /or ‘archiving’. These files have never been recovered, nor was anyone brought 
to book about these disappearances (Mandiyanike, 2009). War veterans disrupted operations in some 
RDCs for purely political ends to punish political opponents. In Gokwe South RDC war veterans went 
on to demand a quota for all council positions, and travel/subsistence allowances for coming to 
council. It seems that once people have tasted violence, the tendency to use it again for whatever 
purpose cannot be undermined or ruled out. 
Homogeneity-heterogeneity divide 
The RDCCBP treated all the RDCs as homogeneous entities, irrespective of their different socio-
political and geophysical conditions. In spite of the common legal framework, RDCs differ quite 
significantly and have to be treated as such. It is worth noting that during the formative stages of 
RDCCBP, the Strategic Plan for Capacity Building (1994) acknowledged that CB of RDCs was 
complex and long-term, and that RDCs were at different starting points and had varied resource bases. 
The Strategic Plan for Capacity Building (Plan Afric, 1994 6) cautioned that: 
Capacity building should not be constrained with a rigid framework. There is need for a flexible 
approach, which takes into account the different starting points of the RDCs and allows for the 
maximum participation of the various interested parties especially RDCs themselves. 
Smoke (2000: 3) complained that decentralisation programmes tend to treat all local governments as 
if they were similar in capacity and needs, and to devolve too many new responsibilities to the weak 
local governments. With the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) gnawing at the 
roots of central government operations in Zimbabwe, there were strong calls for change in local 
government, and RDCCBP was considered a palliative measure to reduce the increased pressure on 
RDCs. Within this environment, Smoke (2000) cautioned that there was a perceived urgency to 
reform, so careful planning was foregone. As one facilitator aptly summed it up, ‘there was so much 
movement but no motion’. Smoke (2000: 3) advised that: 
It is necessary to build commitment and capacity for local governments to assume greater 
responsibility on behalf of their constituents …decentralisation reforms should be progressively 
phased in with incentives such that it is clear to local governments what they have to achieve 
before they will be assigned additional responsibilities. 
Furthermore, due to the crisis, a significant amount of donor support was abruptly withdrawn from 
government activities. In winding up the initial phase of RDCCBP in 2000, 19 RDCs were to be given 
continued support, but the government stayed with the ‘good’ councils and ignored the ‘bad’ ones. 
Possibly, this was a subjective justification to show the donor community that the MLGNH was 
willing to run with the donor agenda. Thus, the ministry, through the hawk eye of the Provincial 
Administrator (PA), looked at ‘good’ Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), chairpersons, finance 
committees ‘dzine chimiro’ (decent finance committees) or a combination of these, considering 
councillors’ performance, commitment, and the openness to change of CEOs and key staff.  
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Project planning and management – RDCs biting off more than they could chew 
All the RDCs prepared the strategic plan following insistence by the RDCCBP that these were 
essential to qualify for District Development Grants (DDGs) and District Development Loans (DDLs) 
(the DDG manual stipulated that only projects on the strategic plan would be considered for funding). 
On a visit to the sampled RDCs, it was amazing to see how quickly these plans could be pulled out to 
show a prospective funder. However, one respondent lamented that: 
It is a pity that we spend so much time and effort producing these documents, but there is no 
commitment in following them. The macro-economic environment we are operating in makes it 
impossible to operationalise such wishful activities. 
The GoZ, for its own political expedience, even introduced programmes such as the Rural 
Development Fund (to be implemented by RDCs) that ran parallel to the RDCCBP. A majority of the 
RDCs are members of Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE) Association, which also had the Natural Resources Management Programme (NRMP 
II) running the same time as RDCCBP. As one interviewee said, 
RDCs had too much on their plates and could not make the most out of this window of opportunity. 
An opportunity to maximise the learning was lost.  
The resulting plethora of rural development projects managed by the RDCs had different reporting 
and implementing requirements. Instead of improving their performance, RDCs were busy ‘visiting’ 
the different funding agencies and trying to impress them. As political pressure intensified, RDCs 
focussed their attention on irrelevant but politically sensitive projects to appease politicians. Sadly, 
this was done at the expense of much-needed services for deprived communities. 
Two officers at Umzingwane RDC, in a joint interview admitted that  
We use these development plans to suit the various donor preferences; if another donor were to 
come and indicate the type of projects they prefer to fund we would go along with that. 
During RDCCBP, the training component commenced late, was uncoordinated and the District 
Training Teams and Provincial Training Teams were not sufficiently functional. The funding came to 
an abrupt end before the RDCs realised it. Thus Healy (2001: 310) observed that training in the RDCs 
was seen as a series of events – workshops, seminars and study visits − rather than a process of 
developing knowledge and skills of RDC employees to meet changing circumstances. Inevitably, 
people would engage in workshops as a substitute for work and also for the attendant per diem. In a 
similar vein, one government official argued that: 
Due to budgetary constraints, some sector ministries were willing to co-operate with the RDC if it 
provided the requisite material, chiefly, travel and subsistence allowance and transport. ......  
Approaches and procedures of various programmes gave rise to some confusion within project 
departments (of RDCs); support to RDC development is very often dependent on whether 
incentives like subsistence allowance are provided and (that) sector ministry staff were still hiding 
behind arguments that their key result areas took precedence over RDC business. 
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Budgeting 
A budget is allocative in nature but constrained by environmental conditions and overarching political 
and fiscal objectives. Caiden and Wildavsky (1980: 66) argued that: 
Budgeters in low-income countries often do not know where they stand with respect to basic 
features of national financial life; their estimates of income may be way off; their estimates of 
expenditure may be even more inaccurate. 
The scenario that Caiden and Wildavsky (1980) paint neatly fits Zimbabwe. The GoZ encountered 
similar problems in preparing and implementing its budgets. RDCs, as microcosms of the centre, bear 
the brunt of these economic ills.     
Under the RDC Act, budgets are prepared by the RDC and approved by the minister. Annex 2 of 
paper by MLGNH (2003) highlighted the problem of overbearing ministerial control, and as the 
minister must approve borrowing, the markets and banks are closed off from determining the 
creditworthiness of RDCs. CEOs and finance officers argued that 'the onerous task of approving 
budgets and borrowing powers took a long time. As a result, RDCs lacked confidence to take the 
initiative. Similarly the private sector was scared of any business with councils'. Budgeting was one 
process but what happened in practice was sometimes very different. Officers indicated that 'the 
expenditure pattern was very difficult to predict especially with inflation skyrocketing'33. Thus, there 
was always provision for supplementary estimates, so that 'the budget became a series of patches'.34 
Gokwe South RDC admitted that the forced temporary closure of offices by war veterans in 2001 had 
an adverse effect on the operations of all RDC departments. 'Revenue collection was retarded, the use 
of the 2001 budget was suspended and then the 2000 budget was used … The RDC collected far much 
below than what it estimated to collect during the same period'. Most RDCs admitted that due to 
economic hardships, most farmers paying unit tax were designated for resettlement, thus drastically 
reducing expected revenue by 50%. 
Pressure for change among disparate actors 
In the RDCCB programme the pressure for change was placed squarely on the shoulders of the CEO. 
In a private company this is feasible, but in the public sector, especially in RDCs, the CEO is neither 
the locus nor focus of decision-making. Many other actors call the shots, including the RDC 
councillors, the DA/Minister, other politicians such as the provincial governor, leading ZANU-PF 
leaders from national to village level, Members of Parliament, war veterans, and anyone else person 
with political connections. Within this multifarious array of actors, the CEO is unable to act as a key 
change agent as assumed by RDCCBP.   
 
                                                            
33Reaching an all time high of 231 million per cent as previously discussed. 
34Resonating with Caiden and Wildavsky (1980, p.66)’s assertion 
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Characteristics of ‘laggards’ and ‘progressives’ 
The terms laggards and progressives were coined by the Provincial Support Teams (PSTs) and the 
Provincial Administrators (PAs), and were evident in the terminology used in the selection of the 19 
RDCs who remained in the CB programme, including ‘commitment to change’, ‘progressive 
chairman and CEO’. It is notable that the laggards shared some common features, including: 
a) a high turnover of CEOs which deprived them of continuity in top leadership; 
b) Turmoil in these RDCs leading to their closure in some cases.  
c) Difficulties in obtaining data, as officials had been dismissed or resigned, war veterans had 
ravaged the offices and ‘archived’ off some records, or records could just not be found. 
The opposite was true for the progressives. The progressives were characterised by some form of 
stability. Being progressive was also a result of the personal or impersonal relations between the PA, 
the RDC chairman and/or the CEO.  Cordial relations attracted better scores and vice versa. 
(Over)Politicised local government 
In Zimbabwe’s RDCs, a number of cultural traits emerged. Among the majority of councillors, there 
was a strong partisan belief that the ZANU-PF and government were inseparable. Councillors having 
come into office on a ZANU-PF ticket owed unquestioning allegiance to the party, although others, 
especially white councillors who came in as independent candidates, had an oppositional mentality.   
Some council meetings were held to accommodate ZANU-PF party affairs, as most councillors also 
held party positions. There were instances when council vehicles were being used primarily for 
ZANU-PF business, and when the party attempted to hijack council business. For example, in Bindura 
and Chirumhanzi RDCs party officials made it mandatory that proposed budgets should be discussed 
at party meetings before coming to Council. In one instance, Bindura councillors defied a party order 
not to discuss the budget at a meeting. They argued that adequate notice had been given to all the 
stakeholders. Conversely, Chirumhanzi RDC pandered to the dictates of senior ZANU-PF officials, 
and a full Council meeting was adjourned so that the party officials could examine the proposed 
budget before the Council resolved. This scenario was quite common within most RDCs.  
On the staff side, most of the new CEOs after amalgamation had participated in the liberation struggle 
and were being repaid by the offer of top posts. In some RDCs, (Gokwe South, Mutasa and Gwanda), 
some members of staff occupied senior positions in ZANU-PF to the extent of being ‘untouchable’ in 
cases of breaching council procedures. In these cases, controversial disciplinary procedures ensued. 
Because of the emotive manner in which council decisions were made, officers were summarily 
dismissed and RDCs lost these cases at the labour courts. Some of these members of staff went on to 
contest Council elections and in the most interesting scenario, one came back as a Council chairman 
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in Gokwe South RDC. This development had far-reaching consequences for the RDCs, as the politics-
administration dichotomy became blurred and political considerations got an upper hand.  
Suspensions and non-suspensions – Mazowe, Mutasa and Gokwe South RDCs 
Under Section 157 of the RDC Act, Chapter 29:13, the Minister of Local Government may suspend a 
councillor or a council if he/she has reasonable grounds of suspecting improper behaviour, and a 
number of RDCs were suspended. From the eight sample RDCs, Mazowe RDC was suspended in 
1999 for alleged mismanagement and maladministration, but everyone interviewed acknowledged that 
there were other unstated reasons. People argued that the Mazowe RDC chairman had defied a party 
order by standing against the party choice in the election at the beginning of the new council in 1998. 
A ZANU-PF party caucus meeting was held just before the official council meeting. The provincial 
party leadership35 ‘proposed’ the ‘party choice’. In the council meeting it was supposed to be a matter 
of formally nominating the person and immediately closing nominations. Procedurally, the DA, as the 
presiding officer, would ask for more nominations, if any. However, in the actual council meeting, 
another nomination of the incumbent chairman was proposed and seconded. A vote was held and the 
party choice lost.  Officials from Mazowe RDC indicated that: 
the incoming council chairman, having frustrated and embarrassed the provincial leadership, 
assumed office with considerable ill-feelings and hostility, in spite of having been democratically 
elected by his fellow councillors.  
The allegations of mismanagement at Mazowe RDC found fertile ground and the minister came down 
heavily on the council. When councillors were suspended, they were asked to make individual 
submissions/responses on the allegations.36 This rendered them compliant and they were reinstated 
but the chairman was dismissed.37 Such action (the dismissal of the chairman) was an anathema to the 
democratic process. John Nkomo38 (1998), addressing the suspended Guruve RDC, indicated that 
councillors had a collective responsibility over the decisions/resolutions made by council. In light of 
that, why then hold the council chairman vicariously liable for the collective misdeeds of the council? 
Thus, the chairman’s ability to avoid suspension depended on his whimsical idiosyncrasies and 
political clout rather than formal legal instruments.  
In the case of Mutasa and Gokwe South RDCs, the MLGNH levelled allegations of mismanagement 
against the councils. However, the councils survived suspensions because they were in good standing 
with their provincial political leadership. When the Minister of Local Government went to Gokwe 
South RDC (late 1999) to meet the Council before advising them of the suspension, his attention was 
drawn to the challenges of administering the urban wards of Gokwe Centre and that this had caused a 
                                                            
35The Provincial Governor was the ZANU (PF) provincial chairperson. 
36Similar tactics of individual submissions to the Minister were also used in the Guruve RDC case.  
37This applies to the other RDCs (not in the sample) that were suspended.  
38The former Minister of Local Government Rural and Urban Development who suspended most Councils in post-
independent Zimbabwe.  
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furore39 with the communities. At the meeting with the Council, the minister’s attention was swayed 
to look at the possibility of according Gokwe Centre town status (though this was never on the 
agenda). The minister ended up setting up a commission to oversee the establishment of Gokwe 
Town, but according to Council officials  
the commission died a natural death and was quietly and conveniently buried in the administrative 
machinery. 
Gokwe South RDC was ‘invaded’ by war veterans on 5 February 2001 and forced to close 
temporarily. A group of war veterans thronged the council offices with drums, chanting liberation 
songs, and forcibly removed all council employees citing a number of allegations. The onslaught by 
war veterans on RDCs has been described as ‘a national curse: the tragedy of government by war 
veterans’ (McGregor 2002; Hammar 2005: 2). This meant that the war veterans could act with 
impunity. Thus, in the case of Zimbabwe’s RDCs the ‘suspendable indicators’ (reasons used by the 
minister to suspend councils) were a function of the councillors’ political muscle or lack of it and the 
patrons behind them. 
In all the examples of council suspension (and even war veteran disruptions), the District 
Administrators (DAs) participated in the commissions of enquiry set up to investigate the allegations 
and made the recommendations that led to suspensions and/or dismissal of chairpersons and Councils. 
Thus DAs became commissioners, running the council on behalf of the Minister of Local 
Government. In case of suspended CEOs, the DAs were also appointed as acting CEOs.  This scenario 
casts doubt on the neutrality or impartiality of the DA. The DAs played the part of police, prosecutor, 
jury, judge and jailer. This is in direct contravention of the tenets of natural justice, particularly the 
nemo judex in sua causa rule (no person may be a judge in his own cause). 
Whither amalgamation, decentralisation and CB? 
The discussion has illustrated the problems that beset RDCs. The performance problems diagnosed 
within RDCs were deeply embedded in the volatile economic, social and political context. Political 
support for stable independent systems is an essential prerequisite to efforts to build capacity (Grindle 
and Hilderbrand, 1995: 43) but this was never done in the RDCCBP.  
By concentrating on the observable factors, RDCCBP merely generated superficial shifts whilst 
leaving the underlying problems intact. RDCs participated in the programme for the incentives 
attached to the programme and CB was ‘hopelessly confused as a funding hoop where cosmetic 
changes were made to secure funding and authentic change became elusive’ (James 2000: 2). When 
the programme came to an abrupt end, RDCs reverted to their old habits. They diverted their attention 
to new sources of funding; whatever traces of RDCCBP left were fortuitous. However, some RDCs 
                                                            
39It was alleged that councillors and staff were heavily involved in residential and business stands scams. Minutes seen 
showed that some individuals had illegally allocated themselves stands. 
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had their own internally generated organisational improvements which they have continued, for 
example, Bindura RDC’s ‘in search of excellence’ management meetings and Umzingwane RDC 
computerisation efforts.  
Recommendations: critical factors for success 
As RDCs, the parent Ministry and interested stakeholders contemplate on how to strengthen the 
capacity of RDCs, the following recommendations need to be seriously considered.  
1. Providing a sound constitutional basis for LG. The provisions in the new Constitution 
approved in May 2013 provide a litmus test for GoZ’s commitment to decentralisation. 
2. Decentralisation is not a panacea and GoZ should heed Ayee’s (1996: 49) advice to reject the 
romantic view of decentralisation. The GoZ should be very clear on what exactly they want to 
decentralise and ensure an acceptable level of preparedness by the RDCs who will assume the 
new functions. Honadle (2001: 85) talked of dual errors − the error of devolving programmes 
where there is not enough local capacity, and the mistake of keeping programmes centralised 
when there is local capacity that could be readily developed. For example, MLGNH could 
consider awarding stars/points to RDCs, similar to ‘beacon councils’ in the United Kingdom.  
3. Labour relations in RDCs should be streamlined. The Minister of Local Government and 
his/her staff need to be clear about the laws governing the dismissal of staff before they can 
proffer advice to RDCs, which hitherto, has been misleading or inept, as DAs and their staff 
have (ill)advised RDCs on the basis of public service regulations that should not be used for 
RDC staff.  
4. In the event of an RDC or CEO being suspended, the DA or any member of his/her staff 
should not become commissioner or Acting CEO. This tends to obliterate their 
supervisory/watchdog role as they would have assumed the role of police, investigator, 
prosecutor, judge and jury, which is untenable for sound administrative practice. Fairness and 
impartiality is essential. The RDC Act empowers the Minister of Local Government to 
appoint the DA and Assistant, but also any civil servant to be a commissioner or Acting CEO. 
Thus the DA will be able to supervise the new CEO or commissioner without fear or favour. 
5. For the smooth implementation of projects, that there needs to be broad and generally agreed 
methods of funding and project implementation for rural development projects. A round table 
conference between all the funding agencies (local and international) together with RDCs and 
the GoZ, should pave the way for the minimum conditions and guidelines for project planning 
and management. This ‘development bible’ will allow RDCs to familiarise themselves with 
the basic conditions from across the spectrum of funding agencies. Consequently, RDCs 
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would not need to acclimatise to different and confusing arrangements for the different 
funders. 
An ability to formulate policies is a critical function of any local government. The capacity to do so, 
becomes particularly important in the aftermath of crises such as those experienced in Zimbabwe’s 
RDCs. A strong recovery from the devastation of the politico-economic tsunami that took place in 
Zimbabwe is necessary. 
Conclusion 
CB can work if the determinants of capacity are taken into account. RDCs failed to plan, implement 
and manage their own development programmes and maintain essential services on a sustainable basis 
as a result of the political-economic tsunami. CB is unlikely to flourish in such extreme contexts. The 
paper identified a number of issues that stifled CB efforts, viz, design of the RDCCBP, and political, 
legal and economic factors. The economic and governance crisis that engulfed Zimbabwe had a 
negative bearing on the efforts that RDCs were making to improve their operations. The CB efforts 
undertaken in an era of crisis can be characterised as ‘capacity that never was’. As the political and 
economic situation improved, the Government of National Unity ushered an aura of normalcy.  
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Abtract 
This paper examines the problem of integrating traditional rulers into the contemporary local 
government system in Nigeria with a view of resolving the problems arising from the 
tradition/modernity nexus in the present scheme. Two basic questions guided this work. The first 
relates to the relevance of indigenous traditional institutions to the challenges of contemporary 
democratic processes. The second relates to whether traditional modes of thought, behaviour and 
institutions constitute resources or impediments to the projects of modernisation and development. 
This paper concludes that the goal of modernisation is to generate rapid increase in social wealth and 
its driving force is economic development; and where traditional institutions are able to contribute 
positively to this goal, their input should not be jettisoned. 
  
Key words: traditional authority systems, traditional rulers (Emirs, Obas), cultural revivalism, 
antimodern. 
 
Introduction 
For centuries before the advent of British rule, governance in different parts of present-day Nigeria 
was synonymous with traditional institutions and their rulers. Local administration generally centered 
on the traditional ruler who was considered the repository of religious, legislative, executive and 
judicial functions, with a few exceptions (e.g.: in the south-east amongst Ibo communities) (Afigbo 
1972). In effect, the traditional ruler formed the nucleus of governance. One striking fact is that the 
geographical spheres of authority of these traditional rulers were essentially localised and no 
traditional ruler ever had jurisdiction over the entire geographical area of modern Nigeria. Partly on 
account of this historical background, the tendency has been to view and analyse the developments 
taking place in traditional institutions in the country more in relation to local government as opposed 
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to the country’s governmental system at large.  The role of traditional rulers in local government 
administration has been changing over the years.  From a position where they were chief executives 
of their localities, they now serve as advisers in the contemporary local government system. This has 
created a problem in the relationship between traditional rulers and elected local government actors. 
The focus of this paper is to examine the problem of integrating traditional rulers into the 
contemporary local government system in Nigeria and discern a pathway to resolving the challenge.  
This paper is based on secondary data and relied on national and international literature, and review of 
relevant legislation and constitutional provisions. The paper is structured into six sections. The first 
section introduces the subject of traditional authorities. The second examines various perspectives on 
the relevance of indigenous African traditional institutions in the context of the challenges of 
contemporary democratic process. The third section traces the contours of the changing role of 
traditional rulers in local government in Nigeria. The fourth section examines the emergent local 
government system in Nigeria and the problems of harmonious co-existence between traditional 
authorities and elected local government actors. The final sections explore options for resolving the 
tradition/modernity nexus in Nigeria are addresses in the fifth section, and draw conclusions from the 
analysis. 
Laying out the turf 
The nexus between the traditional and modern has been a central theme of postcolonial African 
philosophy. African philosophers have examined this theme from many angles, yet two questions 
have become the focus of ongoing debate. The first relates to the relevance of indigenous African 
traditional institutions to the challenges of contemporary democratic process. The question relates to 
whether traditional modes of thought, behaviour, and institutions constitute resources or impediments 
to development and modernisation in Africa (Ciaffa 2008).  
The discussion of such questions reveals a conflict between two broad perspectives. The first 
perspective relates to cultural revivalism. This perspective assumes a reverential attitude toward 
African cultural heritage. In Gyekye’s view, the key to addressing contemporary problems effectively 
lies in reclaiming and revitalizing indigenous traditions that have been degraded and suppressed in the 
wake of colonialism (Gyekye 1997:233). He argued that colonialism violently disrupted African 
cultural traditions and imposed, with varying degrees of success, European forms of thought and 
social organisation on colonised peoples. Having achieved political independence, postcolonial 
Africans must now pursue a more decisive liberation, a decolonisation of African minds and societies. 
Revivalists are often skeptical of calls for development and modernisation, viewing them as veiled 
calls for the continued imposition of European cultural norms, but it is important to realize that they 
do not typically view their own project as anti-modern. For revivalists, the key point is that genuine 
modernisation in Africa can only be realised through the revitalisation of African cultural norms. 
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The second perspective is predicated on the assumption that the revivalist project is misguided and ill-
suited to the challenges of contemporary Africa. Proponents of this school of thought argue that 
cultural revivalism diverts attention from pressing political issues, such as authoritarian oppression, 
technological backwardness and class exploitation (Eze 1997). The most extreme form of this view, 
suggests that Africans must make a clean break with the pre-modern past in order to address the most 
urgent demands of the present (Hountondji, 1996:48). Modernisation, for them, requires a orientation 
commensurate with the problems of the present, and not an attempt to resurrect ideas from societies of 
the distant past. 
Basically, modernisation is a sign of progress and an ideal to be pursued. In examining the debate 
between cultural revivalism and its critics, the key question is: do indigenous traditions and traditional 
institutions enhance or impede the processes of scientific and political modernisation? It is from this 
context that this paper examines the role of traditional authorities in the contemporary local 
government system in Nigeria. 
Traditional authority systems and traditional rulers in Nigeria 
It is difficult to provide a universally accepted definition of a traditional system of authority in Nigeria 
because of the diversity in the political and administrative components of traditional systems in 
different parts of the country. This difficulty notwithstanding, traditional systems of authority may be 
defined as the indigenous polity which existed before the advent of the colonialists (Adewumi & 
Egwurube 1985:20). 
The responsibility for giving appropriate definition as to who is a traditional ruler is primarily that of 
the State Governments.  There are no fundamental variations in the definitions contained in the 
Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Law of the various State Governments (Onoja 2007; Emordi & Osiki 
2008). Based on the review of various of State laws, Ola and Tonwe (2009:174) argue that a 
'traditional ruler' may be defined as ‘the traditional head of an ethnic group or clan who is the holder 
of the highest primary executive authority in an indigenous polity, or who has been appointed to the 
positioning accordance with the customs and tradition of the area concerned by instrument or order 
of the state government, and whose title is recognised as a traditional ruler title by the Government of 
the State’. 
Traditional rulers and local government in Nigeria: changing roles  
The role of traditional rulers in relation to local government has been changing over the years.  In 
tracing the contours of the role of traditional rulers in local government in Nigeria, three distinct 
geographical regions are discernible, the north, the south-west and the south-east.  
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In the pre-colonial era, a close examination of the established traditional institutions and their rulers 
reveals that in the task of governance, the traditional rulers had to shape appropriate policies, order 
priorities and generate revenue to meet the needs of their communities in the exercise of these 
functions.  In the North, the Emir could be referred to as a strong executive participator in local 
administration with few restraints on his executive powers.  In the South-West, beside the Oba (or 
king), there were other power blocks or centers such as the body of king makers, the town council and 
powerful secret societies whose input in shaping the local administration acted as checks on the  Oba's 
power, so the Oba can be regarded as a weak executive participator in local administration 
(Oguntomisin 1996).  In the South-East, the indigenous political system reveals a great deal of 
popular participation and was highly decentralised and fragmented with authority being exercised at 
different levels, from the household level to the village level with an absence of centralised executive 
authority. In all, the traditional ruler was an embodiment of local administration (Ola & Tonwe 2009). 
With the advent of colonialism, the British colonial administrators recognised the strategic and 
influential position occupied by traditional rulers in the country. The colonial administrators had a 
number of problems, including limited British personnel, and limited finance to run the country, as 
British colonial policy was to generate cost of running colonies and managing the volatile law and 
order situations from the colonies themselves. Largely for these reasons, the colonialists avoided 
attempting any drastic reforms of the indigenous local administration (Adesoji 2010). Instead, the 
British colonial administration took steps to put in place a system of indirect rule, as a convenient 
strategy to govern the people through their traditional institutions and rulers while ensuring close 
guidance by British Administrators. In this way, the allegiance of the people was secured via their 
traditional rulers (Ola 1983:24). In effect, there was a clear attempt by the colonial government to 
consolidate the role of traditional rulers as chief executives of their localities, and this was extended to 
areas where traditional rulers had not hitherto held this power. 
One of the features of indirect rule and native authority system was that nationalists were not 
encouraged to serve in the local councils. The traditional rulers were in firm control of their local 
councils and they tended to be despotic and authoritarian in performing their functions which were 
essentially maintenance of law and order, and enforcement of tax policies of the British colonial 
government. By mid-1940s however, political parties in the country had begun to assert themselves.  
Nationalists were forceful in demanding adequate representation in government affairs, while at the 
same time pressing for self-rule.  They contended that the existing Native Authority System was 
incompatible with modern secular and democratic tenets of local government. About this time too, the 
British government was re-appraising its strategy of governance at the local level with the aim of 
evolving a system of democratic and efficient local government. An official report, presented to the 
British Parliament in July 1949, stated that the objective of the new system was the encouragement of 
local political interest and building of efficient and democratic local government as a cardinal feature 
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of the British policy in Africa (Uchendu 1965). It was recognised that political progress of the 
territories was dependent on the development of responsible local government, that without sound 
local government a democratic political system at the center was not possible, and that if social 
services were to be expanded they must be operated by an efficient organ of local government directly 
representative of the people (Orewa & Adewumi 1983).  
The South-East of the country presented the most fertile ground to implement the British 
Government's new policy as the traditional societal setting was highly atomised, and there were few 
despotic or authoritarian traditional rulers. The Eastern Region took the historic step of abolishing the 
Native Authority System and replacing it with the Local Government Ordinance, 1950. The 
Ordinance provided for largely elected councils, with non-elected members not expected to exceed 
25%.  The Chairmen of the councils were to be elected from amongst the elected councilors (Orewa 
and Adewumi 1983).  
In the Western Region, the Western Region Local Government Law 1952 was promulgated to replace 
the old Native Authority System.  The law provided for local councils to consist of both elected and 
traditional members, with traditional membership not exceeding a quarter of its total membership.  
The law further provides that, recognised chiefs (i.e.: traditional rulers) could be appointed president 
of the councils, but did not assign them any specific role, and as such they were ceremonial 
presidents. To further ensure that traditional rulers were excluded from active participation in local 
government, the Local Government Law was amended so that no traditional ruler appointed as 
president of the council could also be appointed chairman of the council (Atanda 1970). 
In the Northern Region, the old Native Authority Ordinance was replaced by the Native Authority 
Law 1954. The law provided for a number of operational frameworks including Chief-in-Council, 
Chief-and-Council and Federated Native Authorities. In the Chief-in-Council arrangement, the Emir 
had the power to veto council decisions, provided that he informed the governor whenever he did so. 
In the Chief-and-Council arrangement, the law provided that the Emir could not act contrary to the 
decision of the Council. However, because in the Northern Region, Islam has been established so long 
and so firmly that its practice has become inter-twined with those of traditional political authority – a 
type of Theocracy; it was difficult to discern any difference in power of the Emirs between the Chief-
in-Council and Chief–and-Council arrangements. Federated Native Authorities were also set up to 
cater for communities not directly under the Emirates. In many cases, dissimilar communities in terms 
of history and tradition were grouped together under this arrangement, coupled with shaky headship 
arrangement, the internal harmony and effectiveness of most of the Federated Native Authorities left 
much to be desired (Ekong 1985). 
The emphasis of the 1950s was the democratisation of the local government system in the country, 
and the historical climb-down meant that, for traditional authorities in the South-East and South-West 
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of the country, democratisation meant the loss of their executive role for a participatory role in the 
affairs of local government.  The extent to which traditional rulers were involved in the decision 
making process at the local level during this period depended on how much influence individual 
traditional rulers wielded in the eyes of the political actors at this level.  In the North, the introduction 
of the Chief-in-Council and Chief-and-Council did not succeed in taking away the executive powers 
of the Emirs, who still local executive functions (Last 1999). 
Before Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the contention by a cross-section of nationalists that the 
institution of traditional rulership was in direct conflict with democratic ideals as the system was 
personalised had gained considerable momentum.  After independence, the political elites continued 
to try to reduce the influence of traditional rulers in local decision-making.  From 1960 to 1966, when 
the military seized power, the democratisation effort in Eastern and Western Regions had a significant 
adverse effect on influence of traditional rulers in local decision-making. In most parts of the 
Northern Region, however, the Emirs were still in control of their Councils as the democratisation 
effort appeared to be neutralised by their overwhelming influence.  By January 15, 1966 when the 
military seized power, the extent of influence of traditional rulers was greatly influenced by which 
side of the political fence they faced (Orewa & Adewumi 1983). 
The assumption of political power by the military in 1966 had substantial implications for to role of 
traditional rulers in local government.  In the Northern States between 1966 and 1972 
Customary/Native Courts were taken over by state governments, and Prisons and Police were taken 
over by the Federal Government.  The nomenclature of Native Authority was dropped and the 
existing Native Authorities balkanised into independent local government units, but the Emirs were 
still influential in the decision-making process at the local level. New provisions were introduced for 
election of two-thirds of the membership of the Local Government Councils. In Western states 
(including the Mid-west), before 1966, the role of traditional rulers in local government had been 
essentially ceremonial.  The situation was the same in parts of the Eastern States where traditional 
rulership still existed (Ola & Tonwe 2009).  
At the terminal phase of the Mohammed/Obasanjo military regime which ended in 1979, the Federal 
Military Government in consultation with State Governments attempted to institute a uniform role for 
traditional rulers throughout the country through the 1976 Local Government Reform.  Traditional 
rulers were insulated from politics and formally assigned advisory roles in local decision-making 
through Traditional/Emirate Councils (GLGR 1976).  The advice of the traditional rulers is not 
binding on the elected local government councilors.  
The strongest opposition to these reforms came from the traditional rulers in the Northern Nigera, 
where traditional rulers still played a significant role in the decision making process at the local level, 
so the effect of the uniform advisory role was obviously more significant.  For the traditional rulers in 
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the South-West and South-East of the country, their being assigned advisory role by the 1976 Reform 
was only stating in 'black and white’ what had been their role for well over a decade (Uchendu 1965).  
Thus, it appears that the problem of traditional rulers is more of a Northern problem where the 
existence of dual authority structure, the traditional and the secular is very pronounced.  In the country 
at large, however, the crux of the problem lies with the degree of decision-making prominence which 
the government gives to dynastic traditional rulers in the context of a gradually evolving local 
government system directed at popular representation, citizen participation and mobilisation, and their 
role as informed observers and ceremonial participants in matters of local government (Adewumi & 
Egwurube 1985:31). 
After the inception of the 1979 Constitution, traditional rulers were very critical that the constitution 
did not mention their role in local government.  Traditional rulers, particularly those in the North, 
were far from being contented with the advisory/ceremonial role assigned to them.  The degree of 
prominence in local decision-making that traditional rulers could be given by democratically elected 
local government councils guaranteed by the Constitution was the subject of heated debates during the 
Second Republic from 1979-1983 (Gboyega 1987).  These debates did not quite concretise before the 
military seized power again in December, 1983. 
Perhaps in response to the call by traditional rulers for constitutional recognition of their role in local 
government, the 1989 Constitution spelt out the functions of a Traditional Council at local 
government level.  Critically speaking, this development cannot be regarded as an enhancement of 
their role in local government affairs, as the 1999 Constitution does not specify the functions of 
traditional authorities. The on-going effort of the Nigerian Senate to fashion a constitutional role for 
traditional rulers in is timely and in the right direction (Vanguard 2012:13). 
Emergent local government system: persistence of co-existence  
Having catalogued the historical antecedents that frame the present status of traditional rulers in the 
country, the next important area of examination is the extent to which traditional authorities and local 
governments co-exist in contemporary Nigerian local government. 
Under the 1999 Constitution, it is obvious that local governments should play a leading role in the 
emergent order, as traditional rulers are still vital to the attainment of economic progress and political 
stability at the local level. The continued relevance of traditional authorities to the local government 
system in contemporary Nigeria as Egwurube (1985:34) rightly noted may be attributed to the 
following reasons.  First, participant political culture among the majority the citizens, especially in 
rural areas is still dormant.  Second, traditional authorities are still legitimate in the eyes many people. 
Third, attempts to institutionalise alternative local leadership structures in modern, stable and elected 
local government institutions, that would eventually receive the overall acceptance of the citizenry, 
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have largely failed.  Thus institutions which essentially have a local base must complement the efforts 
of each other for effective governance at the local level. 
To ensure that this is achieved, efforts have been made to state the working relationship between 
traditional authorities and local government in the country.  In spite of this, there are frictions, and the 
peaceful co-existence between both institutions is very much in doubt. Two major reasons are given. 
First, traditional rulers, especially those who were very powerful in the past, are disillusioned with the 
present political arrangement, which assigns them only nominal advisory roles in local government 
affairs.  A number of traditional rulers have expressed their concern in seminars and conferences on 
traditional authorities and local government relations.  Prominent traditional rulers such as the Oba of 
Benin and the Alafin of Oyo have vehemently expressed their dissatisfaction with how traditional 
institutions and their rulers have been relegated to the background over the years (Amadi 2007). 
Unsurprisingly, concerted efforts by traditional rulers to enhance their role in the local government 
and macro-political affairs have pre-occupied them more than anything else. This posture has greatly 
affected their interest in and contribution to the effectiveness of local government under the present 
dispensation.  
Second, there is a great deal of insensitivity amongst modern elected local government councillors to 
the ego of tradition rulers.  Even though they are assigned advisory roles, relevant provisions are not 
fully respected. Legislation in the former Bendel Sate (now transferred to the replacement Edo and 
Delta States) specifies the role of traditional councils at local government level − Section 47 of Part 
VIII of the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Edict, 1979 specifies the following functions:  
a) Formulation of general proposals by way of advice to the Local Government or to all local 
governments in the area. 
b) Harmonisation and co-ordination of development plans of such local governments by joint 
discussions and advice. 
c) To assist in the maintenance of law and order (Bendel State of Nigeria, 1979). 
Under the same Edict, the Secretary to the local government is also required to furnish the President 
of the Traditional Council with copies of all meeting minutes of the Local Government Council, 
copies of all agendas, memoranda and other documents and information as would enable the President 
to be fully conversant with proceedings of the Local Government Councils.  The President also has 
the privilege of inspecting all books, including minute books of the Local Government Council or 
Councils where there are two or more local government councils under his jurisdiction, to enable him 
obtain sufficient information for full discharge of the functions conferred on him under the Edict. 
The traditional rulers have complained on many occasions that, because the role envisaged for them 
under the Edict is advisory, local government administrators see the implementation of these 
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provisions as inconsequential and an unnecessary burden. This situation has further alienated 
traditional rulers from the activities of local governments, with varying results. Some traditional rulers 
have cited shabby treatment by elected local government functionaries as justification for their 
lukewarm attitude in performing their advisory role in their local government areas (Amadi 2007). In 
addition, modern local government actors themselves seem to portray any role of traditional rulers in 
governance as an unnecessary burden.  This is all the more disturbing as a huge amount of public 
money is spent by state and local governments on the Traditional Councils all over the country.  As 
much as five percent (5%) of the statutory revenue of local government areas are mandatorily 
required to be remitted to traditional councils for their upkeep. This guaranteed source of funding of 
traditional authorities was put in place when the military regime under Sani Abachi decreed it in 1995 
(Aiyede 2003; Akinwalere 2003:31). 
Resolving the tradition/modernity nexus  
In the pre-colonial era, as well as substantial part of the colonial era, traditional authorities played a 
significant and active role in the governance and development of local government, yet today the very 
essence of the institution is being questioned. The issue of relevance of traditional authorities in the 
country’s modernizing polity is a highly controversial one, as there are divergent opinions and 
interest.  Egwurube (1985) identifies three schools of thought in this regard.  
One school contends that the institution of traditional rulership should be abolished, as it is an 
anachronism in a democratically elected local government system, guaranteed under Section 7(1) of 
the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions, and the parallel institution of traditional rulership is 
anomalous.  While one envisages a competitive and participatory process, the other is a system based 
on authoritarian, personalised tradition.  The supporters of this school conclude that, if the country is 
serious about ensuring that the citizenry adopts the democratic and participatory culture needed to 
quicken the pace of modernisation, then a decisive step needs to be taken to 'jettison this archaic 
institution once and for all' to enable the people develop the required orientation in line with the 
reality of the present age and time (Ayeni 1985). 
The abolitionists have a point in that the principles behind democratic local government and the 
institution of traditional rulership are opposed to each other; the solution advanced by them does not 
appear realistic.  For one thing, the high degree of acceptance of traditional authorities particularly in 
the rural areas cannot be dismissed as inconsequential, nor would be abolition of the institution of 
traditional rulership easily obliterate rulers' legitimacy and public acceptance. The abolitionist 
solution is confrontational and can create chaos in local government operations (Egwurube, 1985: 38). 
Perhaps sometimes in the distant future when the polity is fully modernised, there may be no need for 
the institution of traditional rulership.  However, at this modernizing stage, it is desirable to handle the 
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issues relating to traditional authorities with caution and tact, if the objective of achieving a 
democratic, stable and durable local government system is to be achieved. 
A second school of thought argues for political enhancement, contending that traditional rulers should 
be allowed to participate in politics to enhance their political position in the present system, 
envisaging a situation where traditional rulers make an effective contribution to local politics. 
The adoption of this strategy is bound to be clouded with a number of difficulties. Section 7(1) of 
both the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions guaranteed a system of local government by 
democratically elected local government councils and as such does not envisage any active role for 
personalised institutions in the operation of local government.  Part II of the Fourth Schedule of the 
1989 Constitution (the 1999 Constitution has no provisions in this regard) set out the functions of a 
Traditional Council at the local government level.  The second clause the Schedule clearly states that 
‘nothing in the schedule shall be construed as conferring any executive, legislative and judicial 
powers on a Traditional Council’.  The chances that the Constitution will be amended to reflect the 
political enhancement solution are very slim.  The high degree of legitimacy traditional rulers enjoy in 
the eyes of the citizenry is based on the belief that the institution of traditional rulership is a sacred 
one.  Subjecting traditional authorities to rigors of the electoral process and petty politics society 
would make them a target of public scrutiny, and would destroy their sacredness thereby destroying 
their major source of strength.  While the intention is to carve out a prominent role in local 
governance for traditional authorities, their strategy may in fact lead to the collapse of the institution 
of traditional rulership in the country (Egwurube 1985). 
The middle–path in the continuum between the abolitionists and the political enhancers is the 
retentionist school of thought, which favours retention of the traditional authorities as participatory 
local government actors in advisory and non-executive capacities. The adoption of the retentionist 
strategy as Egwurube (1985: 35) rightly observed would not only ensure stability and continuity of 
emergent local government system based on democratic and participatory principles, but would also 
tap the strength of traditional authorities in the sphere of citizen mobilisation and acceptance of local 
government policies. This involvement of traditional rulers in local government affairs, in addition to 
their other ceremonial functions, would reduce potential acrimonies and confrontation between local 
government actors and traditional authorities.  While the retentionist strategy may well serve the need 
of the present time, the future of traditional rulership would depend on its adaptability to its evolving 
setting and how ingeniously it modernised to maintain the balance between reconciliation with 
modernity and obliteration of tradition (Ayeni 1985: xxxviii). 
Some developing countries have adopted the radical policy alternative of abolition.  In Africa for 
example, outright legal abolition of traditional authorities has been pursued by Guinea in 1957, 
Burundi in 1960, Mali in 1961, Rwanda in 1962 and Zaire in 1973 (Bamidele 1985:32).  In India, 
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after initially opting for the retentionist policy, abolished the Zamindari (Feudal) institutions through 
the Land Reform Policy, and later through the Constitution of India, 26th Amendment Act, 1971. In all 
these countries, what is evident is that the system got smashed, but not wiped out.  The splintered 
particles of the smashed system still float in the macro and micro political processes.  The experience 
shows that even in a delegitimised state, traditional systems of governance have proved to be a force 
at different levels of the polity.  Outwardly exhibiting democratic pretentions, such dual systems 
continue to display feudal orientations and exploit traditional bases for leadership in various aspects 
of social life, but their activisms have had adverse implications for the growth of genuine democracy 
as well as political modernisation.  
Other countries have adopted a more accommodating retentionist approach, perhaps realizing the 
futility of the abolitionist strategy, such as Senegal in 1960, Upper Volta in 1964, the Central African 
Republic in 1959, Cameroon in 1959 and 1966, and Congo-Brazzaville in 1967 which have attempted 
to adapt traditional institutions to their contemporary political and administrative framework (Dave 
1989),. Nigeria should adopt the mellowed retentionist policy in the face of the radical abolitionist 
measures taken in the countries listed above. Instead of allowing traditional functionaries to exercise 
corrosive influence clandestinely, it is better to clothe them formally with legitimacy. While 
disallowing their active involvement in party politics, they can serve as agents of transition from 
traditionalism to modernism (Gyekye 1987).  
Conclusion 
The relevance of traditional institutions to the transformation of African economies and governance 
systems is highly disputed in the post-colonial literature. This study does not subscribe to the school 
of thought that hold, the view that the traditional system is anachronistic, undemocratic, divisive and 
costly; and as such a hindrance to the development and transformation of the continent. It is sad that, 
while some scholars are quick to comment that traditional rulers were adaptive enough to be used by 
both the colonial and post-colonial State, these scholars are unreceptive to the fact that traditional 
rulers can be adaptive in providing their services to a democratic State as catalysts for development. 
In Nigeria, traditional rulers still record a high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the people. There 
remains the need integrate the institution into the country's contemporary local government system. 
Political and economic development would be more successful when rooted in widely shared 
institutions and cultural values which traditional authorities represent. Traditional institutions 
constitute crucial resources that have the potential to promote grassroots governance and to facilitate 
access of rural communities to public services. The goal of modernisation is to generate a rapid 
increase in social wealth and its driving force is economic development. Traditional rulers in Nigeria 
are in a privileged position to contribute to this goal, and as such should not be jettisoned.  
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Abstract 
The rationale for local fiscal autonomy suggests that local expenditure and local revenue generation 
should remain in close proximity. This is achieved through fiscal decentralisation to local 
government, to ensure efficient provision of local services that align with local needs, and to improve 
accountability to residents. Fiscal decentralisation has found resonance in developing countries 
through local government reforms, but in Africa fiscal decentralisation has been focussed mainly on 
revenue sharing, except in a few cases where some local fiscal autonomy has been achieved.  
Urbanisation in Africa is likely to continue (UN-Habitat, 2008), necessitating an increase in 
municipal service delivery which African cities must finance − hence the need for local fiscal 
autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy is arguably contentious for African cities, partly because provision 
of municipal services must be tempered with considerations of equity and redistribution to the poorer 
urban populations, and because inadequate welfare nets from national government do not subsidise 
the gap in municipal revenue. In the recent past, Kenya and South Africa adopted local government 
reforms in different forms that has yielded different forms of local fiscal autonomy. The paper 
conducts a comparative of local fiscal autonomy in municipal services provision in Nairobi and 
Johannesburg.  
Key words: revenue, African cities, Nairobi, Johannesburg, water services, user fees 
Introduction 
As African cities increase in size and economic output, urban governments face the unenviable 
challenge of providing a vast array of services to a diverse population. While one sector of the urban 
population has high technological and economic capacity, coupled with an ability to pay and a 
sophisticated demand for municipal services, poorer sectors of the city population require consistent 
access to basic urban services as a human right. It is to this diverse group that African cities should 
strive to provide municipal services. Questions then arise about the decisions that these cities make in 
maximising revenue for municipal expenditure − e.g. does the revenue assignment function cater for 
local preferences, and is local discretion evident in local revenue functions? 
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This paper draws on a larger study that explores how two African cities with different revenue 
instruments leverage local revenue, to argue the need for local fiscal autonomy in African cities based 
on case studies of Nairobi and Johannesburg. The theoretical discussion on local fiscal autonomy is 
followed by an examination of user charges for water and sanitation services, as an example of a local 
revenue instrument, to argue for local political oversight and decentralised revenue management. 
Background 
Kenya and South Africa are the major economies in East and Southern African (IIAG, 2012). Kenya 
serves as an important avenue for exports and imports to neighbouring landlocked countries including 
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Kenya is the largest economy in East Africa and the third largest in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and has the lion’s shares of the East Africa’s financial services and corporate 
headquarters (APRM, 2006: 17).  South Africa dominates the sub-Saharan economic landscape and is 
(IIAG, 2012). Cities in both countries need local fiscal autonomy to meet the vast and diverse 
municipal expenditure needs that they face (UN-Habitat, 2009a: 10), and the diverse municipal 
populations of both Nairobi and Johannesburg continue to place a high demand on municipal services. 
It follows that the municipal mandate of both cities should correspond to the local revenue function.  
Nairobi is over 100 years old with a colonial history. The city was chosen as a suitable stop between 
Mombasa and Kisumu during construction of the Kenyan Railway during the late 19th century.  The 
city initially developed along racial lines with the former more affluent European areas better served 
by municipal services, while the African areas remained densely populated and under resourced 
(Obudho, 1997; Nangulu-Ayuku, 2000).  In 2009 the city’s population was estimated to be 3.7m, 
roughly 38% of Kenya’s population (KNBS, 2010).  The downside of rapid urbanization in cities such 
as Nairobi is the growing prevalence of slums and poverty in the under resourced regions of the city 
(UN-Habitat, 2009b: 119).  Access to water and sewerage services remains problematic in these 
impoverished areas (Crow & Odaba, 2010; Sammy, 2004). 
Johannesburg came into existence a decade earlier than Nairobi in 1886.  The city sprang up as a 
mining town and grew into a large city by the mid-20th century (Beavon, 1997).  In 2011, the city’s 
population was 4.4m and is now South Africa’s largest city with an economic base generating 16% of 
the country’s gross domestic product (Stats SA, 2011; City of Johannesburg, 2006).  Johannesburg 
also serves as the corporate headquarters for major banks and companies in Southern Africa (City of 
Johannesburg, 2006). 
Historically, Johannesburg also developed along racial lines (Cameron, 2000; Bevon, 1997; 
Tomlinson, 1991). The city’s residents in the impoverished former townships have limited access to 
water and sanitation, despite the city’s valiant efforts to address redistribution of critical municipal 
services  in line with national and international norms (CoJ, 2005: 30; Stats SA 2001, SACN, 2007 
Richards, O’Leary & Mutsonziwa, 2007).   
Kiwekete                         Fiscal autonomy: Nairobi and Johannesburg  
CJLG November 2013 
143 
However, in both Kenya and South Africa, while the provision of water and sanitation is contentious, 
service provision remains the mandate of local government (K’Akumu, 2006; Nyangena, 2008; Crow 
et al, 2008; van Rooyen et al 2009). The rest of this paper explores how, within the discourse of fiscal 
decentralisation, local fiscal autonomy is manifests in the provision of services by the water utilities in 
Nairobi and Johannesburg. Finally the paper identifies emerging issues in relation to city oversight 
and local revenue management of basic services.  
Methodology 
This paper scrutinizes the experience of revenue autonomy with respect to water and sanitation 
services in Nairobi and Johannesburg. The findings are drawn from a larger study that examines the 
experience of local fiscal autonomy for specific revenue instruments in the two cities. The paper is 
based on an analysis of Kenyan and South African government documents including past and current 
legislation, policies, audited financial statements, and annual reports from the two water utilities. 
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006) and Smoke (2001) identify the assignment of appropriate revenue 
tools to local government as important in the process of sequencing fiscal decentralisation. The 
provision of municipal services by local government heavily relies on the resources that local 
agencies have to finance municipal expenditure. They argue that, even with an intergovernmental 
fiscal transfer system, cities with administrative and managerial capacity should have the authority to 
generate revenue locally.  
Local revenue and user fees in particular enable cities to provide those services where the costs of 
provision are connected to levels of consumption, such as water and sanitation services. Although 
equity principles should underlie the provision of these vital service, user fees that reflect the 
economic cost of these services provides an opportunity for cities to leverage significant revenue. 
Where cities have the potential to generate significant local revenue, there is an argument for revenue 
autonomy, which should be reflected in city management of the water revenue generation and in local 
political oversight of the service.  The case study contrasts how Nairobi and Johannesburg tackle 
these challenges. 
Theoretical considerations for local fiscal autonomy 
Fiscal decentralisation is defined in this paper as the delegation of fiscal resources to local 
government (Oats, 1999; Bird, 2000). Fiscal decentralisation may take two forms: revenue sharing 
and revenue assignment (Bahl, 1999). In revenue sharing, central government allocates revenue 
directly to local government through conditional or unconditional intergovernmental transfers.  In 
revenue assignment, which is the focus of this paper, local government is given the mandate to raise 
revenue locally.  In examining revenue assignment, three aspects are relevant: efficiency; processes, 
and local fiscal autonomy, as a basis for analysis, each examined in more detail below.  
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Efficiency 
Fiscal decentralization has been popularized by economists (Bird, 1993; Musgrave & Musgrave, 
1973; Oates, 1972; Oates, 1999; Tiebout 1956) who propose efficiency as an essential prerequisite for 
fiscal decentralization. The argument is made that fiscal decentralization is effective if there is a clear 
distinction between spheres of government, whereby local government performs specific local 
function with revenue-raising tools to finance the expenditure. This implies a reduced reliance on 
national government to finance local expenditure and enhances local fiscal autonomy. 
Revenue assignment allows local government to access local revenue and claim local fiscal 
autonomy.  However it also raises the possibility of adverse effects on local population or on wider 
spheres. These negative consequences may be felt in three domains: areas within the jurisdiction of 
local government; for the national government; or for the country as a whole. 
First, evidence reveals that revenue assignment may increase the potential for corruption as the close 
proximity between local officials, politicians and residents may increase opportunities corruption in 
revenue collection or service provision (Koldstad & Fjeldstad, 2006; Fjeldstad & Semboja 2000).  
This occurs when the local government system lacks adequate measures of accountability, as has been 
the case with the property tax in Tanzania (Koldstad et al, 2006).   
Second, local governments often do not have the capacity to administer revenue assignment. 
Inadequate physical and human resources, mean that local government is inhibited from generating 
significant local revenue.  The detrimental effect of incapability is documented in the experience of 
developing economies (Asibuo, 1998; GoK, 1996; Sing and Moodley, 2003).  In both Zambia and 
Botswana, the fiscal relationship between the different levels of government remains blurred which 
negatively affects local government revenue-raising capacity (Sharma, 2003; Maipose, 2003). Even 
where countries have a framework that provides for fiscal decentralisation, this does not always 
translate into increase revenue for local government. Ghana, for example, provides for fiscal 
decentralisation in the Constitution, bit in practice this has not occurred. In Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
local authorities also experience erosion of the local revenue-raising powers (Asibuo, 1998; Ndoro, 
2010; Rubvuta, 2010). In addition, the weak local tax base prevents local government from mobilizing 
local revenue (Tannenwald, 2002). 
Third, from a national perspective, fiscal decentralisation may erode fiscal tools operated by national 
government for economic stabilization. For example, income tax is important central government tax, 
and delegating tax collection to local government, means that central government has less access to 
revenue to manage national fiscal policy and the overall economy.  Local fiscal autonomy may thus 
constrain national government from using tax reforms to regulate the economy when need arises 
(Jourmard & Kongsrud, 2003: 19-22; Prud’homme, 1995).  The argument has also been made that 
Kiwekete                         Fiscal autonomy: Nairobi and Johannesburg  
CJLG November 2013 
145 
local fiscal autonomy may lead to a distortion of resource allocation and increase inter-jurisdictional 
disparities (Prud’homme, 1995; Heyns, 1995; Oates; 1999).  This proposition was also reflected 
earlier by Tiebout (1956) who argues that local residents are more likely to relocate to communities 
where they receive maximum benefit for local services, thus 'voting with their feet'. These are 
therefore the factors that may mitigate against fiscal decentralisation. 
Fiscal decentralisation   
The processes and structures of fiscal decentralisation should allow for local revenue mobilisation. 
Literature broadly suggests that fiscal decentralisation includes several components. First is an 
adequate enabling environment reflected in political which is important in implementation as central 
governments in many countries in Africa, remain unwilling to delegate revenue tools (Sharma, 2003). 
Secondly, a promulgated legal framework is required. This should assign appropriate functions and 
appropriate revenue to sub-national governments to reduce the incidence of unfunded mandates that 
leaves local agencies responsible for services with no corresponding revenue, as happened in South 
Africa where municipalities were responsible for some aspects of health care with no funding.  Local 
authorities should also be able to obtain investment capital from central government, capital markets 
or municipal stock, a critical resource for financing municipal infrastructure. Finally, developing an 
appropriate intergovernmental transfer system for revenue-sharing by different levels of government 
is important (Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez¸ 2006; Smoke 2000a; 200b; 2001).  
Local fiscal autonomy 
In contrast to fiscal decentralization, local fiscal autonomy is achieved through taxing and borrowing 
powers granted to local government (Bird, 2000; Bahl 1999). Local fiscal autonomy provides a close 
link between local revenue-raising powers and local expenditure assignments, resulting in a high 
degree of accountability that stems from the proximity of local expenditure and finance (Laubach, 
2005). Furthermore, local fiscal autonomy is seen to make government more responsive to local needs 
(Denters and Lawrence, 2005). In addition the discretion to mobilise local revenue through revenue 
assignment allows for innovations in economic activity, enables local government to explore new 
revenue sources, and presents opportunities for efficiency (Jourmard et al, 2003; Oates, 1999). The 
benefits of local revenue autonomy are three-fold: first, sub-national tax autonomy addresses the 
problem of vertical imbalances in fiscal decentralization, giving local government an opportunity 
significantly to increase local revenue raised; second, the use of local revenue instruments allows for 
discretion in budgeting, and finally municipal borrowing and creditworthiness  is strengthened by 
revenue autonomy enabling local governments to finance long-term capital expenditure (Bahl et al, 
2006: 22). Thus, local revenue assignment enhances the ability of local government to finance 
mandated local expenditure. The section below explores how the local revenue function is manifest in 
the provision of water and sanitation services in Nairobi and Johannesburg.  
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Revenue assignment for water and sanitation  
The provision of water and sanitation services is contentious terrain, particularly access and 
affordability for the urban poor when government opts to charge for the provision for this vital service 
(Crow and Odaba, 2010; Bond and Dugard, 2007; Public Citizen, 2004). Furthermore, the governance 
of water services reflects discrepancies that undermine the intended efficiencies in water supply 
(Estache & Kouassi, 2002). In addition, reports from the minimal citizen participation in governance 
processes highlight the contentious nature of water services (Nyangena, 2008). Corruption has also 
been touted as a consequence of poor water governance (Butterworth and de la Harpe, 2009).  
Historically, where residents pay for water consumption, the local authority water services fall into 
two categories, user fees or trading services (Cowden, 1968). This implies an ‘ability to pay’ whereby 
the water tariffs take into account the fixed infrastructure costs and variable costs of water supplies. 
Where municipal services charge user fees, evidence suggests that local governments are able to profit 
from the service (Bahl and Linn, 1992: 271; Cowden, 1968:116). On this basis water services become 
a viable revenue source for cities. 
This paper proposes a framework that explores how local fiscal autonomy and revenue assignment are 
manifest in local government services through the analysis of the water and sanitation sectors of 
Nairobi and Johannesburg. The intention is to explore the contextual innovations and constraints that 
arise in these two cities. Both cities set up water utilities, which illuminate the intricate fiscal and 
political relationships inherent in local fiscal autonomy.  
Two questions are addressed in this paper.  First, the literature suggests that a regulatory framework is 
basic for revenue assignment to local government. This requires political will at national level to 
promulgate legislation to allow revenue assignment. What are the laws in place to enable the cities to 
finance the provision of water and sanitation services, how do the cities chose to implement the 
proposed legal framework?  
Second, the discretion in implementing the regulatory framework will be examined to explore how 
cities’ political and administrative leadership is used to leverage significant local revenue. This 
question explores how cities have restructured and how they manage this municipal function to 
generate local revenue. The following section compares the Nairobi and Johannesburg water utilities.  
Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company 
Nairobi has been able to leverage significant municipal revenue, and now relies on national 
government to provide less than a quarter of the city’s revenue (CCN, 2010). Historically, water and 
sewerage services have been provided as a municipal function by the city40. The provision of this 
                                                            
40 Legislation mandating water and sanitation services provision was based on Clauses 178 & 180 of the defunct 
Local Government Act (1963) which proved inadequate to support the city’s need for water/ sewerage services.  
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municipal service was plagued by poor service delivery. The water department was “heavily 
centralized” with a structure designed in a way that made it ‘vulnerable to political manipulation 
leading to gross inefficiency’ (Sammy 2004: 16). Furthermore the water fund set up to enhance the 
revenue streams for this function had been depleted by 2001 (NCC, 1998; RoK, 2002a).  
       Figure 1: Institutional Framework for Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company 
 
  Source: Nairobi Water & Sewerage Company website 
A national effort to address issues of scarcity, access, and governance of water resources in Kenya 
saw the realignment of the institutional set-up in the provision of water services. Central government 
passed the Water Act (2002)41 whereby the Ministry of Water provides high-level guiding policy and 
oversight for water management (Figure 1) (RoK, 2002b). The regulations stipulate that water service 
providers be conveyers of water services and not local authorities as was previously the case.  
Within this framework, the Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company was established in 2003, to 
provide water and sanitation services to the city. The utility remains a subsidiary of Nairobi County42. 
Operational autonomy ensures that the entity is run as an enterprise to enhance efficiency and service 
provision. Autonomy also enables the water utility to function without ‘political interference’. 
Management is overseen by an independent board drawn from private sector organizations, 
professional bodies, civil society and senior leadership of Nairobi County43. An important point to 
note is that, in line with the adoption of the new Kenyan Constitution in 2010 and the 2013 and 
general elections in Kenya, the utility continues to operate as a municipal function within the above 
framework (RoK, 2010; 2011). 
                                                            
41 Although new legislation, the Kenya Constitution, the Urban Areas and Cities Act (2011) which came into 
effect on 4 March 2013, the regulatory framework for water services is derived from the Water Act (2002) 
(RoK, 2010; 2011) 
42 Under new legislation Nairobi City Council is replaced by Nairobi County after 4th March 2013 (RoK, 2011). 
43 Previously Mayor; Town Clerk; and Town Treasurer sat on the water utility board, after March 2013 newly 
appointed Governor and County Secretary and Chief Officer now to represent Nairobi. 
Ministry of Water 
Water Resource Management 
Authority                                            
Water Services Regulatory Board 
Water Services Provides (eg: NCWSC) 
Consumers - Users 
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A tri-partite agreement exists between Nairobi County, the water utility and Athi Water Service Board 
that manages the provision of water service delivery in Nairobi. The national legislation requires a 
service level agreement to be in place between the water utility and water provider, that is annually 
reviewed with predetermined targets and performance areas to measure service delivery (NCWSC, 
2004: 5). Within this framework, water tariffs are annually determined for domestic and industrial 
consumers. The issues on political oversight in Nairobi for the city and revenue management will be 
examined further below, in comparison with experience with Johannesburg Water.  
Johannesburg Water 
Historically, the provision of water and sanitation services was the domain of white local authorities 
in the greater Johannesburg area including: Johannesburg; Randburg; Roodeport; Edenvale and the 
Sandton City Councils that raised local revenue from a vibrant economic base through various 
revenues streams (JCC, 1991; Simkins 1991). These authorities also traded services, including the 
wholesale domestic and industrial sale of water, electricity and gas44 to other local authorities. The 
revenue generated by other local authorities within the greater Johannesburg area was miniscule 
compared to white local authorities (AG, 1990; Simkins, 1991, Poto, 1989).  
The fiscal disjuncture between Johannesburg’s local authorities and others in the country was a 
contentious issue on the path to democracy in South Africa.  The local government deliberations that 
took place alongside the national democratic process acknowledged the need to restructure the fiscal 
discrepancy between local authorities (CCLGA, 1991; CWMC, 1982; FWG, 1993; JCC, 1990a; 
1990b; 1990c). Johannesburg’s negotiation and transition phase was further protracted by the 
restructuring and eventual amalgamation of the diversely resourced local authorities of the greater 
Johannesburg area45 (PLANACT 1990, CWMC 1992). In 1993, the Local Government Transition Act 
(1993) merged Johannesburg’s apartheid structures to form a two-tier metropolitan authority of the 
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council and four metropolitan local councils: Northern, Southern, 
Eastern, Western Councils. These interim authorities were eventually merged into the City of 
Johannesburg under a Uni-City structure through the iGoli 2002 and iGoli 2010, the city development 
strategies adopted by the municipal council to provide coherence after the transition processes 
(GJMC, 2002). As metropolitan municipality, Johannesburg is mandated to provide municipal 
services including water and sanitation in parts B, Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). 
Johannesburg Water emerged from the restructuring process as the premier water and sanitation 
provider for Johannesburg.  At inception, the water utility was managed at arm’s length by a 
                                                            
44 Trading services now referred to user fees although the intention of providing these services above cost is still 
retained (Cowden, 1968; Solomon, 1989) 
45 Local government’s negotiation and transition to democracy took over a decade of political negotiations and 
municipal boundary demarcations during the pre-interim; interim and final phases of local government set out in 
the White Paper on Local Government (1998) (see CODESA, 1990; CCLGA1991; Cameron, 2000; 20053). 
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consortium to ‘streamline efficiency’, revenue management, and integrate the disjointed physical and 
human infrastructure from previous local authorities (JW, 2003; 2004). The utility remains wholly 
owned by the City of Johannesburg operating with a vision to provide all municipal residents of 
Johannesburg with adequate water and sanitation services. The water utility remains a significant 
contributor to the city’s revenue (CoJ, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009). 
  Figure 2: Institutional Framework for Johannesburg Water 
 
              Source: City of Johannesburg, (2008: 13) 
Figure 2 shows Johannesburg Water located under the Infrastructure and Services cluster in the city’s 
administrative structure.  Thus shows the city maintains oversight, although Johannesburg Water 
cooperates with Rand Water, at the water board responsible for bulk supply of water. Tariffs are set 
through the the City budget office as part of the city’s annual budgeting processes in line with national 
treasury guidelines. The revenue function is managed by the city, although Johannesburg Water 
manages billing for the water utility’s top customers (JW, 2001: 9; 2004: 4, 5; 2005: 20; 2010: 19). 
Emerging issues 
In both Nairobi and Johannesburg the water utilities have been instrumental in streamlining water and 
sanitation service delivery. Both operational efficiency, and the urban poor’s access to water, have 
improved. However, from a fiscal perspective, several issues emerge as these cities assert local fiscal 
autonomy, explored below.  
Johannesburg Water and Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company are owned by their respective 
local governments. Closer scrutiny reveals that the level of independence of each utility differs 
particularly in the areas of revenue management and political oversight. As a significant contributor to 
city coffers, it is important that the customer billing function maximizes the revenue returns. The 
efficient management of this function enhances the payment levels which in turn enhances local 
Infrastructure and 
Services Cluster 
Johannesburg Water 
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revenue. Political oversight on the other hand is important for local fiscal autonomy to enhance 
accountability to local communities. Adherence to the regulatory framework in terms of local fiscal 
autonomy can then be confirmed, as discussed further below. 
Revenue management  
For Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company, water tariffs are set nationally by the Water Services 
Regulation Board (Figure 1). The utility manages the water revenue function, which includes billing 
of industrial and commercial consumers in the city; revenue collected from the sale of water to 
consumers is ring-fenced for the utility’s expenditure (NCWSC, 2004: 5). While financial ring-
fencing is important for developing the utility and water infrastructure, Nairobi County Council’s 
overall management has been curtailed, and the city has lost oversight over the water revenue stream. 
However, the tri-partite agreement in place between the city, water utility and water service board 
ensures that the Nairobi County Council receives a much smaller percentage of the water income than 
previously (Table 1)46.  
Table 1: Ten Year Revenue Trend from City Water Utilities 
 
Source: Author47 
Table 1 compares income to the water utilities in Nairobi and Johannesburg and the respective city 
councils between 2001 and 2010, the period when significant local government reforms were 
implemented. In the first two years NCWSC was not been established and services were operated by 
Nairobi’s water and sewerage department, under severe fiscal constraints (MoLG, 2002). In the case 
of Johannesburg, utility revenue is appropriated so the income remains equal, as the city manages the 
revenue functions, which limits autonomy of Johannesburg Water (Smith, 2006: 11, 12).  
                                                            
46 Nairobi also receives an additional transfer from central government to subsidise the revenue gap since the 
creation of utility in 2004  (NCC, 2008;2009) 
47 Pooled from Nairobi and Johannesburg audited financial statements from 2000 to 2010. 
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Table 2 below reflects the revenue management function of the two cities, whereby control of each 
utility’s revenue is compared between 2000 to 2010. Johannesburg Water initially controlled between 
15% and 40% the water revenue function (JW, 2001: 9; 2004: 5; 2005:20), as Johannesburg Water 
managed the customer billing for the top customers from inception until 2010 (JW 2010: 12). Table 2 
also illustrates that the City of Johannesburg has finally taken over full control over the water revenue 
function which includes customer management and billing. This centralised control further erodes the 
utility’s revenue management.  
          Table 2: City management of Water Revenue function  
 
        Source: author48 
Conversely, Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company as a water utility still independently 
manages the revenue function as legally prescribed with an annual disbursement to Nairobi County 
Council. The management of water revenues by the urban government has been severely eroded as a 
result. Therefore although the water revenue for both cities has increasing, local management of this 
revenue stream is reflected differently for these two cities. 
Political oversight: 
Political oversight is important in enhancing local fiscal autonomy, which assumes that overall control 
of local revenue remains as close as possible to local expenditure for the purposes of efficiency. In the 
case of Johannesburg Water, the City of Johannesburg continues to maintain political oversight 
through the political structures of the municipal councils; portfolio committees and engagement with 
Johannesburg Water’s Board. The city’s political accountability is also enhanced with increased 
revenue for redistribution. This has been evident in the provision of municipal services in previously 
disadvantaged areas as well as improved water infrastructure in various regions across the city that 
translates to access to a basic level of water services in line with human rights’ standards (CoJ, 2005).  
                                                            
48 These percentages were pulled from annual reports of both water utilities. 
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The independent board of directors for Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company are nominated 
from the private sector, professional bodies and non-governmental organisations. Political 
representation of Nairobi County Council constitutes five members on the utility’s governance board, 
which has reduced the city’s oversight function on the water utility. This distance from utility acts as a 
counterbalance to political interference as was the case in the past but, from a political accountability 
perspective, the city has less revenue for redistribution and has not seen an improvement of water 
infrastructure in impoverished areas of the city (K’Akumu, 2007: 533). 
Conclusion 
Local fiscal autonomy remains an important discourse in municipal service delivery for urban 
governments. City governments are tasked with providing a vast array of municipal services to a 
diverse and growing municipal population, but it is imperative that local governments have 
corresponding powers to over local revenue raising and expenditure to enhance efficiency and 
political accountability. 
In the case of water and sanitation services, Johannesburg Water and Nairobi City Water and 
Sewerage Company are water utilities owned by the city governments of Johannesburg and Nairobi 
respectively; both cities have seen an upward trend in revenue collection. In the case of Johannesburg 
although the revenue function is managed centrally by the municipality, to the detriment of 
Johannesburg Water’s customer billing function, the city’s political accountability is enhanced as 
indicated earlier. Nairobi’s experience differs in that its water utility independently manages the 
revenue function and the city’s oversight is limited to city representation in the board of directors. 
This limited political oversight has reduced city interference with the utility’s revenue, but also 
decreased the city’s overall accountability in the provision to water services to the city. 
The importance of these two aspects of local revenue functions for the cities’ local fiscal autonomy 
continues to highlight concerns over the governance capacity of growing African cities, and how local 
governments can meet the increasing demand for municipal services in the current period of economic 
growth. Two questions are key.  Do trading services such as water and sanitation remain the exclusive 
domain of local government, and what are the implications for local fiscal autonomy of the city of 
different levels of autonomy of water utilities? Secondly, in the increasing debate for revenue 
assignment and in African cities, does the institutional framework enable central government to erode 
water revenues of this local function? 
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Abstract 
The Urban Sustainability Support Alliance (USSA) was a large and multi-faceted NSW wide 
programme, which was delivered between late 2007 and late 2011, to support NSW Councils in 
integrating environmental sustainability into their policies, procedures, operations and programs. To 
support cultural change in 152 government instrumentalities, of different sizes, shapes and 
demographics, required innovation, connection and credibility. A diverse range of support and 
development mechanisms was required.  
The USSA coined the tag line: Supporting Councils on their journey towards sustainability, and was 
evaluated in 2011. This paper charts the journey and reports on that evaluation. It describes the 
USSA program: provides judgments about the value of the programme against its intended outcomes; 
and identifies formative findings for the future so that the necessary support might continue. 
The USSA was a highly successful program, with more than 85% of respondents from almost 80% of 
Councils in NSW indicating that the USSA had raised the profile of sustainability ‘a lot’/’a 
reasonable amount/some’. Of these, 48% indicated that the effect had been substantial. The 
evaluation report concluded that the USSA has provided ‘a lot, but not yet enough’ support to NSW 
Councils on the journey towards sustainability, and that there is still more to do. 
Introduction - about the urban sustainability alliance 
The Urban Sustainability Support Alliance (USSA) Programme supported NSW Councils in their 
journey towards sustainability. The programme was coordinated by the Local Government NSW 
(formerly the Local Government and Shires Associations - LGSA) and was funded by the NSW 
Environmental Trust. 
In the context of this program, the term ‘sustainability’ refers to the capacity to meet the 
environmental needs of local communities, while encouraging current and future actions that aim for 
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beneficial social, economic and environmental outcomes. At both the local and programme level, this 
required engagement of a wide range of stakeholders to build strong, effective partnerships to enable 
long term change. 
The USSA was formed by a partnership of organisations that saw immense value in working together 
to help NSW Councils journey towards sustainability. The organisations representing a unique 
mixture of both State and Local Governments, a university institution, and a peak environmental 
body, banded together to form an alliance. The alliance model was particularly attractive to the 
funding body who had received separate applications for funding from each of the individual 
organisations. The applications shared a common objective around capacity building for sustainability 
in Local Government and this was the beginnings of the USSA, and its state-wide focus to improve 
the sustainability of NSW councils. 
The USSA provided advice and information, conducted training and professional development 
workshops, developed tools and resources, promoted key learning and supported network 
development, cooperation and partnership between councils and stakeholders. 
The USSA offered support to all NSW Councils and this presented a range of challenges; 152 
Councils across NSW, meant 152 different approaches to sustainability and civic leadership. These 
approaches ranged from those had historically ignored the issues, often because of lack of resources 
or understanding, to others that saw sustainability as the driver of all of their policy, activities and 
operations. In order to be both relevant and useful, the support delivered needed to be tailored to the 
individual needs of Councils and their staff, varying in depth and complexity depending on where 
Councils were on their sustainability journey. Support services offered varied from intensive and 
active, to lower key and more passive. 
Intensive support  
Professional development: including in-house training for all Council staff, one-day workshops for 
regional groups of Councils, skills based train-the-trainer, half day training for Councillors. 
Meetings and networks: meetings around a community of practice, on-line forum, specialised 
membership-only network for leaders, face-to-face meetings and phone advice meetings. 
More passive support  
Research and resources: Sustainability Health Check, ‘How to’ learning guides, case studies and 
an online resource database.  
Communication: Email and phone help line, quarterly newsletters, a website and you- tube 
channel, guidance materials and online information, and networking through sustainable-net
49
. 
                                                            
49Sustainablenet is an on-line forum for those interested in sustainability. It currently has 622 Members from Councils across 
NSW Register online at www.sustainablenet.org.au 
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For more information about the range of support provided visit the LGNSW website - 
www.lgnsw.org.au 
Support for driving sustainability forward in Councils is a relatively new concept with little data 
available on what makes an effective support program. Other jurisdictions have much to learn from 
the NSW approach and here in NSW there is much further to go to ensure that sustainability is central 
to all Council business. The evaluation of the USSA programme (LGSA 2011) is ground-breaking in 
terms of its role in assessing the types of support services that are needed to help NSW Councils on 
their journey. 
Sustainability in local government in NSW – a policy context 
In order to be effective, the USSA functioned within and reflected a significant public policy context.  
Council drivers for action on sustainability are many and varied (Pillora S, Blackburn N, Artist S, 
2009). NSW Councils are on the sustainability journey for a range of reasons including senior 
management support especially from the General Manager, Mayor and Councillor Leadership, active 
and engaged community involvement and local media coverage of global and local sustainability 
issues.  
One driver that impacts on all NSW Councils, large or small, is how sustainability is framed within 
current legislation. In summary, information is provided below about the relevant legal requirements 
that all NSW Councils are bound to and how the USSA used this to gain buy-in and support: 
The NSW Local Government Act 1993 (Section 7a) states that local government’s role is: ‘to provide 
the legal framework for an effective, efficient, environmentally responsible open system of local 
government in NSW’. The Act (Section 7e) also requires:  
Councils, Councillors and Council employees to have regard to the principles of Ecologically 
Sustainable Development in carrying out their responsibilities’. 
This Act as amended in 1997 (Section 8) also sets out the requirement for a Council to ‘properly 
manage, develop, protect, restore, enhance and conserve the environment of the area for which it is 
responsible in a manner which is consistent with and promotes the principles of Ecologically 
Sustainable Development’ and ‘to have regard to the long term and cumulative effect of its decisions’. 
In addition, an objective of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (1979) is: ‘to encourage 
Ecologically Sustainable Development’. By inference, therefore, planning instruments which are 
developed under this Act should be founded on the principles of ESD. 
A major development during the life of the USSA project was the Local Government Amendment 
(Planning and Reporting) Act 2009; and section 402 refers to the development of the ten-year 
Community Strategic Plan promoting all future activity within a sustainability framework that: 
 identifies the main priorities and aspirations for the local government area 
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 establishes strategic objectives together with related strategies addressing social, 
environmental, economic and civic leadership issues in an integrated manner 
 ensures that the Community Strategic Plan is adequately informed through consultation 
relating to social, environmental, economic and civic leadership issues. 
The establishment of long term community strategic planning provided a perfect opportunity for the 
USSA to engage with Councils on sustainability. The programme was able to help Councils begin to 
integrate environmental sustainability into their operations, policies and programs. It continues to 
provide a relevant framework for the future. 
Evaluating the USSA – the methodology 
This section describes the complex evaluation methodology for the program. It is developed within 
the context of programme logic (Funnell 1997 and Funnell 2000) and further developed in Rogers 
2008.  
The USSA was funded to meet eight objectives. For the purpose of the programme evaluation these 
were restated as six outcomes, constant for the life of the project. Outcomes were framed as a 
hierarchy as described by Funnel 1997 and Funnel 2000. The intended outcomes for the programme 
were:  
1. The USSA assists Councils in developing, clarifying and promoting an urban sustainability vision 
and agenda for action. 
2. The USSA cultivates networks and alliances of those working to innovate and make change. 
3. The USSA identifies existing resources and tools and helps link these to Council's urban 
sustainability work. 
4. The USSA identifies, facilitates, conducts and promotes relevant research. 
5. The USSA promotes learning through professional development/training, advice and support. 
6. The USSA builds the profile of sustainability work within local government and amongst opinion 
leaders. 
Through the end-stage evaluation process a further outcome was added 
7. The need for ongoing support for Local Government in NSW to continue to progress towards 
integrating sustainability. 
The intent of the evaluation was both summative and formative (Funnel and Rogers 2011). 
Summative, in the sense that it captured and reported on the work that the USSA has undertaken, the 
role it has played and the impact of that work in Councils; formative, in that the evaluation was 
designed to inform a case for a continuation of a sustainability support service for Local Government. 
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The USSA coined the tag line: Supporting Councils on their Journey towards Sustainability. 
Essentially the programme evaluation acted as a marker in that journey. 
Because of the complex and long term nature of the program, and the relatively limited resources 
committed to end stage evaluation, the methodology was purpose built for the program. It comprised 
two elements, each related to collecting and analysing data against outcomes. 
Element 1: Continuing evaluation processes were undertaken through the life of the program. All 
programme components were evaluated and the methodology varied depending on the nature of the 
activity that was being delivered. This range of data was substantial and was drawn together at the end 
of the programme to inform the Findings. Often this data was provided to the funding body as a part 
of regular project reporting and parts of it were reported on within the USSA website. 
Element 2: End stage evaluation was undertaken in the final two months of the program. This was 
necessary in order to obtain additional data so that the Outcomes could be assessed, especially 
Outcomes 6 and 7. The end stage evaluation methodology used additional data collection tools, 
namely:  
An on-line survey: A survey was developed and Councils were informed about the opportunity to 
complete the survey by way of a multifaceted and targeted information strategy. The survey was 
live for a period of four weeks and individual results were confidential. 
Focus group/key informant interviews: One specific evaluative focus group was conducted, with 
participants joining the group via webinar and in person. Membership of the focus group was 
determined by a random sample selection process where participants were derived from a USSA 
Excel database of Council contacts across a spread of Councils, metro, regional and rural. In 
addition, eight key informant interviews were conducted, using the same discussion guide, which 
extended the data. 
Findings – what did the USSA achieve? 
This Section outlines the key findings against each of the outcomes for the project. The detailed 
findings are extensive and impossible to reproduce in detail in this paper. They have been provided to 
the USSA in an in-depth report (LGSA 2011). 
In discussing these findings it is important to acknowledge that the Urban Sustainability Support 
Alliance [USSA] has had a culture of evaluation since its inception. Most individual support elements 
were evaluated in an ongoing way, so data was available from the commencement of the program, 
and is reflected in these findings. 
End stage evaluation methods were also well supported, and much of the data reported upon below 
comes from the end stage methods. In particular, a significant amount of data was able to be gleaned 
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from the survey because the response rate was high. The following provides a snapshot of survey 
respondents: 
 Two hundred and six Council staff and elected officials responded. 
 More than 71% of individual Councils responded [108 Councils], although the percentage 
response is higher than this, given that three Regional Organisations of Councils also 
responded and represented the views of their 32 member Councils. 
 Responses were received from a range of Councils (Graph 1). 
 
Graph 1. Survey responses: participating Councils 
 
 
Only 1.9% of the responses came from elected officials. Staff across a range of Council functions 
provided data, with most drawn from the environment sections of Council, as follows: 
o Executive   8.3% 
o Planning   15.0% 
o Operations   0.5% 
o Compliance   0.5% 
o Engineering   6.3% 
o Community Services  1.5% 
o Environmental/ Sustainability 53.9% 
o Administration   2.4% 
o Other/misc   11.7% 
 
Finding re Outcome 1. There is evidence that the USSA assists Councils in developing, clarifying and 
promoting an urban sustainability vision and an agenda for action. The USSA has had a significant 
level of influence on progressing sustainability in local government: 
It was catalytic through its presence and the activity that it made happen. (Council respondent 
from key informant interview) 
As indicated in Graph 2 below, more than 85% of the survey respondents indicated that the USSA had 
raised the profile of sustainability ‘a lot’/’a reasonable amount’/’some’. Of these, 48% indicated that 
the effect had been substantial (‘a lot’). 
38.3% 
45.1% 
10.2% 
6.3% Participating Councils 
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Graph 2. Building the profile of sustainability 
 
 
Almost 50% of respondents felt that their Council had made a solid beginning in the sustainability 
journey. A further 23% were of the view that their Council was ‘quite advanced’/’very advanced’.  
Table 1. The Sustainability Journey 
I am not even aware there is a journey in my Council 1.0% 
My Council  is interested but they have not done much 7.7% 
My Council has only just begun 18.6% 
My Council has made a solid beginning 49.5% 
My Council is quite well advanced 17.0% 
My Council is very well advanced 6.2% 
 
According to the survey respondents the USSA was of value, as indicated in Graph 3 below: 
Graph 3. Value of the USSA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These are encouraging results and demonstrate that according to those in local government, 
sustainability is on the agenda – movement is happening.   
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Finding re Outcome 2. There is evidence that the USSA cultivates networks and alliances of those 
working to innovate and make change. There is evidence that the USSA enhanced networking about 
sustainability. Graph 4 details the views of Council staff about the extent to which the USSA 
supported the networking process.  
Graph 4. USSA and Networking 
 
 
 
The integrated nature of the USSA added value. For example one respondent said that: In-house 
training helped add value to Council's staff sustainability programme (Green Champions) and the 
whole programme provided additional credibility and tools for spreading the sustainability message 
across Council. Sustainablenet continues to thrive as the network of choice for those interested in 
sustainability to share their understandings and ask questions of their peers.  
The USSA delivered events and networks that enabled people to meet and communicate – to share 
ideas and approaches to integrating sustainability within Council business. For example: All the USSA 
events provide opportunity to meet and reconnect with staff at other Councils across Sydney, who we 
otherwise may not have ever met or exchanged ideas with. Local government needs cross-fertilisation 
between organisations to drive innovation and cultural change (focus group participant). 
The following quote from a regional Council manager adds weight to these results: 
I found the USSA highly valuable in my work on our Urban Sustainability Grant program. 
The cluster meetings, research material, ten tips etc. were especially useful at providing 
opportunity to share projects and key learning and generate ideas and discussion on existing 
and future projects. It was also helpful having the USSA there to discuss issues surrounding 
reporting and project planning which is a significant part of my program. 
Finding re Outcome 3.Significant evidence exists that the USSA has identified existing resources and 
tools and helps link these to Council's urban sustainability work. Particular resources and tools 
provided by the USSA moved Councils forward. For example, the experience of one Sustainability 
officer was that:  
The training was powerful for managers and helped them to set up financial and 
environmental sustainability together. Before that, people were not at all fussed about 
sustainability. Another said: Your programme has assisted the smaller Councils in our area. 
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Since your programme has been running, these Councils do not seem to rely as much on the 
larger Councils to get information. I attribute this to the support being available through the 
USSA program. 
Table 2 below indicates the extent of this engagement with various resources and tools across a four 
point scale – note the total sample size of local government staff for this data is 115 (a sub-set of the 
total survey sample). The breadth of the programme means that it is almost impossible that any single 
Council (respondent) will have engaged with all elements of the program.  
In drilling down, it is of note that over 75% of all rural respondents had had no engagement with the 
research publications. Similarly a significant number had not engaged with the USSA website or 
guidance material and this provides room for more activity in the future. 
        Table 2. Extent of engagement with various elements of the USSA programme 
Answer Options 
Considerable 
engagement 
Some 
engagement 
A little 
engagement 
Not a lot of 
engagement 
Sustainability Training 
delivered by the USSA in my 
Council or ROC 
19 44 20 32 
Network meetings coordinated 
by the USSA e.g. Business 
Network meetings 
8 30 24 53 
Sustainability Health Check 19 31 31 34 
Regional workshops offered 
by the USSA for example: 
Sustainability Planning 
workshops 
15 37 23 40 
The Ten Tips series of 
publications 
6 30 31 48 
USSA Case studies 14 40 33 28 
The Sustainability Tools 
Selector workshops 
23 43 20 29 
Research materials for 
example: Barriers and Drivers 
Report 
15 30 28 42 
The USSA website 19 44 32 20 
The USSA newsletters 24 50 24 17 
 
  
Finding re Outcome 4. Evidence exists that the USSA identifies, facilitates, conducts and promotes 
relevant research which is of value to local government. The research aspects of the USSA were 
valued and reflected upon positively by those who engaged with this part of the program, although 
this element of the programme was probably less known than others.  
There is evidence that some publications were highly valued and really made a difference – in 
particular the University of Technology Sydney Institute of Sustainable (2009) Barriers and Drivers 
to Sustainability in Local Government Report. One key informant respondent said:  
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The Drivers and Barriers [sic] in the Sustainability document were so accurate to the 
situations faced by many Council officers and provided 'tried-and-tested' methods of getting 
past barriers.  
Members of the focus group supported this view, rating this publication highly.  
The Sustainability Tool Selector (Pillora S, and Blackburn N, 2009) seemed much more appropriate 
and useful to more advanced Councils, but was not used much in Councils at the earlier stage of their 
journey. Feedback ranged from: Sustainability Tool Selector - great to find out which tool to use 
when, what their uses and limitations are and how Councils have used them, to: this is beyond my 
Council’s needs. It is notable though, that the Tool Selector workshops were well attended across 
NSW, and evaluated positively; for example, 90% of participants could identify how they had or 
would use the ‘Selector’ to progress their sustainability work. 
Finding re Outcome 5. There is significant evidence that the USSA has promoted learning through 
professional development/training, advice and support: For almost all of the 2,076 local government 
personnel who attended USSA training during the life of the project, feedback was highly positive; 
one respondent, reflecting the views of many, said that: [training was]  
Fantastic and a very valuable mechanism for pushing staff towards sustainability. Another 
commented: The training has given our sustainability programme a significant boost. It would 
probably take some years to achieve that level of communication and support for 
sustainability without the training. Another said: I think it [sic, the training] is of very high 
quality and I feel that it is robust because it encourages Councils to use their own examples of 
what has and hasn't worked. It's based on real experience, not just training based on 
theoretical situations. 
Participants were of the view that: Workshops provided sharing, brainstorming, networking 
opportunities that built on the web based resources important role in keeping sustainability on 
the agenda - building the profile and importance of human resources to drive these internally.  
While more detailed data about the response to the training is available, it is difficult to provide detail 
in this paper because a number of different professional development programmes were offered 
through the USSA. Staff at all levels of the Council were engaged in purpose-built and relevant 
training. 
 
       Canada Bay City Council Training                                     Operations Staff Training – Nambucca Council
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Some snapshot findings are: 
 For the In-House Training, 41 Councils undertook programs, 78 workshops were delivered and 
1,078 staff participated. All participants in all workshops demonstrated a shift towards a greater 
understanding of sustainability, identified actions that they would undertake as a result of the 
workshop and indicated that they were ‘very’ or ‘highly satisfied’ with the training. 
 Councillor training involved the delivery of five workshops and 86 Councillors participated. All 
Councillors attending these workshops reported increased levels of understanding of 
ESD/sustainability and increased appreciation of Council best practice. 
 Councillors indicated that they were committed to getting more involved in sustainable issues, 
championing sustainability in the community and assisting councils to improve sustainability 
performance.: 
 The Evaluating Sustainability Programme involved 96 participants at six workshops. Ninety four 
percent of participants reported a positive shift in their knowledge of outcomes hierarchies and 
programme logic and that they would use information gained from the workshops in their future 
work 
 Sustainability Health Check training involved seven Councils and 105 participants. As a result of 
the training: 
o 89% of participants feel the SHC can assist Council to promote cultural change 
o 95% of participants feel the SHC can encourage the analysis of Council’s policies, 
systems and practices 
o 71% of participants feel the SHC can improved governance 
o 78% of participants feel the SHC can enhance Council’s role in building and engaging 
community awareness 
o 92% of participants feel the SHC can help promote a culture of sustainability across the 
organisation. 
A challenge for the future is that staff and elected officials from over 100 Councils did not have the 
opportunity to attend in-depth training that was offered through the USSA program. There is much 
professional development still to be done. 
Finding re Outcome 6. Some evidence exists that the USSA has built the profile of sustainability work 
within local government and amongst opinion leaders. People value the USSA. From the survey, 21% 
of respondents valued it ‘very highly’ and a further 56% were ‘very positive’/’positive’. Almost 3,000 
Council staff/elected officials have personally come into contact with the USSA through face-to-face 
training/workshops and network meetings during the life of the program. Many more have accessed 
the USSA materials, the website etc. and engaged though Sustainablenet and other on-line activity. 
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Eighty six Councillors from across NSW also attended one-day training workshops, run through the 
LGSA’s Learning Solutions program.  
As one focus group member said, the USSA: raised the bar on sustainability with our opinion 
leaders. 
Finding re Outcome 7.There is a need for ongoing support for Local Government in NSW to continue 
to progress towards integrating sustainability. The evidence supporting this finding is very strong. 
There has been no suggestion that the job is done and Councils have completed ‘the journey’. Even 
among those Councils where respondents to the survey indicated that their Council is ‘quite well 
advanced’(17%) or ‘well advanced’(6%), there was no sense support was no longer required. Most 
Councils though, are not at this level. In the on-line survey, 50% of respondents said that their 
Council had ‘made a solid beginning’ – a further 27% rated their Council at a lower level than this. 
No data at all is available from some 20% of Councils who did not respond to the request for input 
into this particular evaluation process. For Councils at the earlier stage of the journey there is 
significant evidence that continuing support is required. The following quote summaries the views of 
many: 
I hope that it is possible to either continue the USSA in its current form or similar, as I think 
local Councils need the support of a body such as this. As I mentioned earlier, most Council 
staff I know are keen and able to consider sustainability as a higher priority than it is 
currently but need support and advice in how to shift attitudes and views of executive 
management.  
Smaller Councils have particular needs for support and there are significant findings about options for 
providing this level of support more appropriately. Often the problem is not with the commitment to 
sustainability but with its practice: 
In smaller Councils we are not lacking the ideas - we are not lacking the commitment or the 
willingness. We’re lacking the people and the dollars. 
Clearly the programme was effective but as indicated in the title of this paper, it provided ‘a lot but 
not yet enough’. 
Conclusions 
The USSA was developed from scratch, in the absence of other models and examples of support 
structures for sustainability related organisational change in local government. When viewed within 
this context the results of the support processes delivered by the programme are exceptional. It is clear 
that the USSA really made a difference; it connected with local government staff and promoted 
cultural change, together with an improved understanding of sustainability and changes in policy, 
operations and procedures. This was much beyond the traditional Council roles of rates, roads and 
rubbish. 
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The evaluation of the programme makes it clear that the uptake of sustainability is not consistent 
across all Councils. In this respect there is much remaining to be done; the public policy and 
legislation is in place, but cultural change of this level takes time, capacity and resources. There 
remain significant issues for Councils with a limited rate base, and resourcing issues for Councils 
obviously have an impact on uptake. 
The recommendations from the evaluation report point to a number of key activities for the future, 
that are required to further progress the integration of sustainability. These include: specific 
interventions with smaller Councils with a limited rate-base; more training, and establishing a 
network for Councillors are important. Increased opportunities for Councils to learn from each other 
via mentoring or other approaches; more case studies and other examples of effective practice are also 
an important part of the mix. Most Councils still need the opportunity to engage with Quadruple 
Bottom Line {QBL] thinking and planning, and the future should provide them with a supported 
opportunity to do this. 
The journey continues. 
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Abstract 
A number of approaches have been adopted in medical education geared towards training health 
professionals that can improve access to health care by communities most vulnerable to inequalities 
and injustices in health systems. Relevant health professions education is vital for improvements in 
health and health care access.  A symbiotic medical education can improve the quality of health care 
and impact on career choice, yet the challenge to sustain equitable access to improved health and 
healthcare  particularly for those most in need remains a major global challenge ( Ssewankambo, 
2012). Within a decentralized system, such as in Uganda, Local Governments are mandated to ensure 
health promotion and equitable healthcare for the population under their jurisdiction. Whereas public 
service reforms have mainly focused on decentralization and good governance (Mamdani, 2012, 
Stiglitz, 2012), the role of curriculum reforms in addressing health and health care challenges 
through needs-based education of health professionals has been largely ignored. Through an analysis 
of the challenges of health care within a decentralized Local Government setting, this paper, by 
presenting experiences from one public university in Uganda, reveals how a partnership between 
Universities and Local Government can go a long way in addressing health disparities and reduction 
of morbidity and mortality.  
Key Words: health care, reforms, decentralization, education, Uganda 
1.  Background 
A number of approaches have been adopted in medical education geared towards training health 
professionals that can improve access to health care by communities most vulnerable to health 
systems inequalities and injustices (Curran and Rourke 2004; O'Toole et al. 2005; Rabow et al. 2007).  
The most prominent of such approaches is probably Community Based Education (CBE). 
The CBE approach first emerged during the 1970’s in response to population demand for needs-based 
education. At the core of CBE was a paradigm shift away from viewing universities as ivory towers.  
Previous frameworks for CBE have included a taxonomical classification (Magzoub and Schmidt 
2000) or educational objectives based on core competencies (Kligler et al. 2004). An integrated 
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partnership between policy makers, health managers, health professions, academic institutions and 
communities, using a pentagonal model, has been advanced as a transactional model and part of the 
Towards Unity for Health agenda (Boelen 2000). 
Contextually, Mbarara University of Science and Technology (MUST), Uganda’s second public 
university to be opened, at its inception in 1989 embraced CBE as the philosophy for health 
professions’ education within the Faculty of Medicine. The purpose was to establish a curriculum 
which would facilitate the interaction between the local communities, University lecturers and 
students, to make them more directed towards the prevailing and emerging needs within Uganda and 
beyond.  Progressively, CBE has been adopted across all Medical Schools in Uganda. MUST 
continues to tailor its curriculum towards the emerging health and health care needs and demands.    
Theoretical background 
Relevant health professions education is vital for improvements in health and health care access 
(Alwan and Hornby 2002; Maharaj, 2011 ). A symbiotic medical education can improve the quality of 
health care and impact on career choice (Worley et al. 2006), yet the challenge to sustain equitable 
access to improved health and healthcare  particularly to those most in need remains a major global 
challenge (Kirigia 2007; Jeppson, 2005). Educational preparation is also a key factor in the 
sustainability of healthcare practice (Curran and Rourke 2004). The model of medical training at 
MUST is focused on community based medical curriculum, rural practice and experiences, faculty 
values and attitudes. The training is based on interactive problem solving, co-learning approach.  
Inequitable access to healthcare is still surprising within developing countries. As an example, while 
remarkable medical advances have been attained at global level, there is an emerging health crisis in 
sub-Saharan Africa; and it is almost certain that health-related Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) will not be met with work force shortages being a major factor (Dovlo 2007; Magda 2007; 
Verhallen et al. 2006; WHO 2000)  
In most sub-Saharan countries, the health workforce is over-stretched (Jeppsson 2004; Marchal et al.  
2005). Chronic deficiencies in training capacity, distribution and skills mix, and retention in the 
medical and caring professions have left the health services with narrow margins to cope with new 
challenges (Aitken and Kemp 2003; Huddart et al. 2003). An inadequate health work force has 
resulted in a complex situation for rural populations, with a demand for need-based  approaches in the 
education of health professionals (Neufeld et al. 1995; Ssengooba etal, 2007) based on the socio 
economic changes of recent years and resulting health care demands (Cauley et al. 2001), a situation 
that demands scientific inquiry. 
Elsewhere, Zink et al. (2008) have explored how new theories of learning have prompted significant 
changes in medical education in the United States. Medical educators have responded with curricula 
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reform that includes active learning, problem-based learning, and small-group case-based learning − 
local communities and health care workers have in effect become medical educators. This has resulted 
in expansion of the definition of clinical education and impacted on new career decisions. 
Context  
From the 1990s to 2009 the CBE model at MUST laid emphasis on service learning, represented in 
the acronym COBES (Community Based Education and Service). During 2010, there was curriculum 
review that incorporated aspects of leadership and put more emphasis on research. Coincidentally all 
the medical schools in Uganda chose to come together under the MEPI-MESAU consortium in order 
to build synergy in addressing the prevailing health and healthcare bottlenecks in the county using an 
educational approach.  
At MUST, CBE has grown in its depth and scope through providing the Leadership and Community 
Placement (LCP) course using a multidisciplinary approach. The course is geared towards instilling 
leadership knowledge and skills and Primary Health Care management essential for confronting the 
health challenges of the 21st Century. Students are expected to gain the essential skills and tools 
required for playing a leadership role in their work environment. In addition to the grounding in 
primary health care, community diagnosis, health systems and family medicine, students are 
introduced to leadership and management.  A cross-cutting learning outcome is ‘health managers who 
lead’ for effective implementation of Primary Health Care and Uganda’s minimum health care 
package. It is also expected that students will have developed a positive attitude towards working in 
rural / community placements, in turn contributing to the mitigation of health disparity and addressing 
access, acceptability and affordability of health services. 
Systematically, the paper models the Community Based Education (CBE) approach at MUST. The 
methodology is presented below. The paper describes the conceptual framework that enables 
understanding of both the experiences and challenges experienced by using such an approach. 
Strategies to address the challenges of CBE are provided by defining how curriculum review towards 
sustainability of the transactional model has been achieved through interactions between the 
University and health facilities, within a local government context in order to impact on community 
health and health care needs.    
2.   Methodology  
This paper was developed from a theoretical literature review of CBE experiences and their effect on 
equitable health care. Through a comparative analysis of how CBE has been conceptualised in 
different settings in comparison with experiences from Mbarara University of Science and 
Technology (MUST) - Uganda, a conceptual transactional framework of CBE is presented by the 
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author.  Content analysis as proposed by Neuendorf (2002) was employed to generate themes derived 
through a review of community based education reports.  
3.  Transactional framework of CBE 
The CBE program is enhanced through a transactional relationships illustrated in Figure 1 below 
with the students at the centre, with its origins in developmental psychology (Sameroff 1975). The 
transactional model of CBE illustrated below has three key features: 
1. Communities are at the centre 
2. The triangle indicates that all three components ‘external’ to the communities influence each 
other directly, but their relationships are mediated by the communities they serve. 
3. The two-way arrows do not symbolise an interaction, in which partners have a dialogue but 
keep fixed views and positions, but a transaction in which partners change as a result of the 
process of their involvement with each other. 
    Figure 1: Transaction framework for CBE 
 
To illustrate the use of this model, CBE is a platform that ensures ongoing interaction between the 
academic institution, healthcare facilities and students all aimed at targeting improvements in the 
community.  The transactional model represents a dynamic process, and a justification is given below. 
Justification of the transactional model  
Access to quality education and health care is a human right, however health challenges and 
bottlenecks within developing countries remain on the rise (Brenner et al. 2004; Chambers 1994; 
Rigoli and Dussault 2003; WHO 2000), and emerging advances and health interventions are 
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disproportionately targeting the already better served urban areas (Dovlo 2007; Hickey 2005, Jeppson, 
2004). Rural areas have found themselves coping through recruitment of semi-trained and untrained 
health professionals. Whereas promotion of community participation in health promotion is 
recognized as a strategy for improved health of populations (Carney and Hackett 2008; UN 2001; 
WHO/UNICEF 1978) relegation of healthcare to untrained populations can be hazardous.  CBE 
presents an optional strategy to mitigate this situation. 
Education and training of health professionals should be aligned with the national development plans, 
including national health plans and human resources for health plans as well as community health 
needs. Such integrated planning will make it more practical to allocate resources for health 
development across other sectors including education, public service and finance. The graduates of 
health training institutions will be able to get promptly recruited in the services and communities 
where they are most needed. Health training systems should be linked to health services delivery 
systems so that by the time the graduates complete their training, they are fit for purpose and able to 
perform amongst their communities. Educational and community-based programs and strategies play 
an important role in reaching underserved communities. Over the next decade, such strategies will 
continue to contribute to the improvement of health outcomes (Gamm et al. 2010).  Education and 
community-based programs and strategies are designed to reach people beyond traditional health care 
settings., for example in schools, work sites, or communities. 
Each setting provides opportunities to reach people using existing social structures. This maximizes 
impact and reduces the time and resources necessary for programme development.  People often have 
high levels of contact with these settings, both directly and indirectly.  Programs that combine 
multiple − if not all 4 − settings can have a greater impact than programmes using only one setting. 
Using non-traditional settings can help encourage informal information sharing within communities 
through peer social interaction.  Reaching out to people in different settings also allows for greater 
tailoring of health information and education (Gamm et al. 2010). 
Education and training of health professionals could be aligned with national development plans, 
including national health plans and human resources for health plans as well as community health 
needs. Such integrated planning will make it more practical to allocate resources for health 
development across other sectors including education, health, public service, local government and 
finance. The graduates of health training institutions will be able to get positions in the services and 
communities where they are most needed. Health training systems should be linked to health services 
delivery systems so that by the time the graduates complete their training, they are fit for purpose and 
able to perform on location among their communities. 
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4.  Challenges of implementing CBE  
Mission and purpose 
Academic institutions have priorities in research and teaching; health care facilities have a primary 
role to improve the health of local populations. Although a number of local health care staff 
acknowledge that teaching and research are part of their role, they find such tasks difficult, citing lack 
of training or time. Academic staff may not wish to help with local health care when they perceive no 
direct benefit to themselves or their institution.  
Separate organisational accountability 
MUST and its associated teaching hospital are funded by and accountable to the Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Health, whereas other local health care facilities are funded and 
accountable to local government. Prior to the decentralisation policy (Republic of Uganda1999) local 
health facilities were funded directly by the Ministry of Health. Transactions have been successful due 
to goodwill on all sides − despite organisational arrangements rather than because of them. 
Health service policies and delivery 
Uganda has national policies which have enabled local health services to operate in an integrated and 
rational approach to common health problems. “Vertical” programmes such as anti-retroviral therapy 
for HIV/AIDS, whilst very welcome, impose additional stresses on the transaction between health 
care facilities and the academic institution. 
Health service reorganisation 
The management of some of the Lower level health facilities such as Rugazi Health Centre were 
transferred from Mbarara University to the district health authorities in 2001. This was originally 
perceived as a potential threat to the continuity of the CBE programme based there. In fact it has been 
a major benefit as there has been an expansion in staffing and better links with lower health facilities. 
Health care facilities with students 
Most health care students have experience as service users before they start their undergraduate 
studies but are more familiar with hospitals than rural clinics. Students report a relative lack of 
resources and may feel unable to function well without the variety of investigations and treatment that 
is available in their base hospital. Time spent working alongside local health staff leads students to 
understand and respect the clinical skills, management and referral strategies used in peripheral sites. 
There are opportunities for students and their supervisors to offer suggestions about clinical 
management strategies to local health care staff. 
Whereas some of the health facilities such as Rugazi Health Centre are equipped with facilities for 
student teaching and accommodation, lower tier health facilities have not been designed with student 
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teaching in mind. Securing suitable living accommodation for students close to local health care 
facilities is a major challenge.  
CBE raises community expectations and demands which when ignored lead to fatigue. The result of 
this is an increasing demand for healthcare providers against limited resources for training.  Whereas 
CBE contributes to responsiveness of the health care system, unless the policy framework is built on 
addressing the needs of the most deserving populations through, for example social security and 
insurance schemes, access to healthcare cannot be meaningfully addressed. It is recognized that 
MUST requires additional resources to further upgrade its curriculum. The undergraduate curriculum 
should be geared towards strengthening of evidence based education (research on Medical Education), 
development of a skills laboratory and exploring training undergraduate students using other hospitals 
in the region in addition to Mbarara Hospital in order to keep pace with the increasing population 
needs and demands.  
5.  CBE transactions – bringing it all together 
In order to expedite the alleviation of health disparities through an educational model, MUST 
integrated the Leadership Development Program (LDP) into all its undergraduate curricula including 
CBE in 2009.  The LDP course employs a multidisciplinary approach to understanding and addressing 
of health care challenges in practical community settings. The course is geared towards instilling 
leadership knowledge and skills essential for confronting the health challenges of the 21st Century. 
Students are expected to gain the essential leadership and management skills and tools required for 
playing a change role in their work environment. In addition to the grounding in primary health care, 
community diagnosis, health systems and family medicine, students are introduced to and participate 
in leadership and management.  
 
The LDP Course: 
 introduces students to leadership and management in health and the tools required to identify 
the main health challenges within their area of influence; 
 familiarises students with the tools required to focus on priority areas for intervention; 
 introduces the tools, skills and techniques required to create solid, logical and coherent action 
plans that guide students towards achieving measurable results;  
 equips students with the tools and techniques for aligning and mobilising populations to 
address health care challenges; 
 introduces the learners to the tools, techniques and strategies for inspiring, and inspired 
leadership, to address existing and future  health care challenges ;  
 trains students in communities and rural health units under conditions similar to those in 
which they will eventually work as qualified doctors; 
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 enables students and community members to interact and learn from each other in order to 
appreciate each other’s role in health care and delivery. 
A simple core tool used on the course is the challenge model, briefly described below. 
The challenge model  
The LDP is organized around the challenge model. The challenge model offers students a systemic 
approach for working together in multi-disciplinary teams of 6-10 at each placement site to identify 
one priority health challenge and achieve results as illustrated in the picture below.  
The challenge model enables student teams to: 
 create shared visions related to the community health challenge they have prioritized;  
 agree on a measurable result that the team plans to achieve related to the chosen health 
challenge; 
 assess the current situation by scanning both the internal and external environment. By this 
the students determine the accurate baseline of the health challenge they will tackle;  
 identify obstacles and the root causes: students identify the obstacles that they must overcome 
to reach a measurable result and carry out a root-cause analysis to identify the underlying 
causes of obstacles; 
 work with communities and stakeholders to define priority actions to address the health 
challenge; 
 involve communities and stakeholders in addressing community health challenges. 
Students are placed within different host communities. Particular emphasis is on the needy hard-to-
reach areas. They also reside at and participate in host health facilities. Students rotate and participate 
in the health-facility based activities during the mornings and participate in understanding and 
addressing prevailing and emerging health problems within the communities during the afternoons 
where applicable, guided by the course guidelines. The students are required to learn and understand 
the constraints and opportunities that retard or promote good health in the community. They 
appreciate that communities have the potential to identify and provide solutions to many health 
problems. Their work should involve, but is not limited to the following broad areas: health systems, 
child health, growth and development, nutrition, communicable disease control, environmental 
sanitation, obstetric and surgical care, use and misuse of common drugs and health education. 
Together with host communities, students identify and prioritise community health and health care 
issues.  They carry out community meetings / seminars and home visits and facilitate discussions on 
preventive aspects of health care. An added incentive is practicing in a Rural Health facility setting in 
order to understand constants of rural health and healthcare.  
Strategy 
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During the community-based activities phase, teams share with each other and with the host health-
facility personnel what they learn throughout the process of implementing their Leadership Project. 
The course is assessed by MUST Faculty supervisors, in conjunction with Site Supervisors, who play 
the role of mentors and coaches / tutors to the teams and are expected to meet regularly with students, 
to review the LDP course content and to support progress. The MUST faculty is expected to 
constantly follow up the performance of individuals and groups through writing a performance report 
at every visit. On finalising the community based activities students are expected to present a report, 
assessed by the faculty that attracts marks that will feature prominently on the academic transcript. 
The coaches support student teams to prepare the final-results presentation.  The course is assessed 
through group presentations and activity reports. 
Course outputs and outcomes 
The LDP course has led to the development of a number of student-led projects across the 30 rural 
health facility sites within south western Uganda where students undertake the community placement. 
Students are increasingly motivated by participating in competition for the best prizes, for example 
the Hillman Medical Education fund. The LDP course has also provided a platform for collaboration 
with education and healthcare stakeholders most particularly the local government authorities and 
host health facilities.  
Conclusion  
Previous frameworks for CBE have included a taxonomical classification (Magzoub & Schmidt 2000) 
or educational objectives based on core competencies (Kristina et al., 2005). An integrated 
partnership between policy makers, health managers, health professions, academic institutions and 
communities, using a pentagonal model, has been advanced as part of the Towards Unity for Health 
agenda (Boelen  2000). However a simpler framework, with communities at the centre, has more 
resonance and explanatory value in a rural African setting. Practitioners of PHC in Africa are familiar 
with the image of the cooking-pot supported by three stones used in discussions of nutrition − the pot 
can only balance if all three stones are present. The CBE framework resembles the cooking-pot 
analogy. It represents a dynamic system, providing a stable base like the three stone fireplace but 
constantly developing. 'Transactions' are relationships between people in an enterprise which involve 
mutual change. Those involved in CBE should expect to welcome and enjoy transactions, 
experiencing change and development as they learn from each other.  
Examples presented illustrate that when communities are at the centre the links between the other 
components of the framework become stronger. It is suggested that the triangular transactional 
framework involving students, lower health facilities and academia described above is a useful way of 
perceiving the challenges to sustainability of CBE which could provide impetus to quality health care 
within local governments in a most sustainable manner.   
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Abstract 
This paper is a scholastic enquiry on the politics of the marginalised, with special reference to 
Panchayati Raj institutions in the milieu of the Post 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act in India. It is 
a product of my theoretical reading and field based observations in the process of pursuing PhD in 
Political science the area of Dalit participation in Panchayati Raj institutions. 
Introduction 
Providing constitutional status to the local bodies through the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act 
(73rdCAA hence forth) was a milestone in Indian politics. This write up focuses on reservations 
(protective discrimination) for the marginalised (Dalits) elected to positions in Panchayati Raj 
institutions across India. This observation becomes relevant as the 73rdCAA envisages evolving these 
institutions as agencies for planning and implementation of activities for ‘economic development and 
social justice’. The 73rdCAA, though hailed as a landmark act with empowerment content, is fraught 
with difficulties.  
According to George Mathew the 73rdCAA brought two major changes in the Indian political 
System.50 First, democratic decentralisation was further extended in the country with the creation of 
250,000 Gram Panchayati, 6,000 Panchayati Samithies and 500 Zilla Parishads. Every 5 years, 3 
million public representatives are elected, and – as required in the act – these include around 1 million 
women (33%), 660,000 Scheduled Caste members (14.3%) and Scheduled Tribe (8%) members 
whom became representatives in the local Government strata. Second, changes occurred due to the 
creation of numerous Local Bodies (local governments), and the Indian federal system was 
transformed into a multi-federal system as a result of 73rdCAA. (Mathew, 2000) The Act created 
                                                            
50 George Mathew discussed the impact of constitutional amendment from the perspective of reservations (affirmative 
action) of elected positions of Panchayats, and from the statutory provisions. For more elaborate discussion see George 
Mathew 2000,  p.10 
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11th&12th schedules which listed subjects to be devolved to Local Bodies, creating a sense of 
‘constitutionalised devolution’ (Reddy, 2000). 
In fact the numbers do not reflect the political reality on the ground (Sudarshan, 2011). The 
participation of marginalised groups is a mere statutory formality and in essence, in various ways, the 
marginalisation is compounded. This disjunction between the numbers and the essence can be 
understood by analyzing the Indian socio-political process and perspective. 
Romanticism and reality of ‘Little Republics’ 
The concept of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) was heavily influenced by the ideal of Indian 
village as ‘little republic”.51 This romantic description of village was propagated by colonial 
administrators, such as Charles Metcalf, Henry Main, and also by the stalwart of Indian freedom 
struggle, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi) 52(Jodhka, 2012). This view transformed 
in to ‘Gram Swarajya53’ (Gandhi, 1942) and was vividly discussed, influencing the constituent 
assembly. But this romanticism was negated by Ambedkar, Marx54, and Mc Kim Marriot. They 
emphasised the unequal stratification of Indian social order as exclusionary and anti-democratic. The 
echo of those debates can be heard in the rumbling of the 73rdCAA and the contrasting ground reality. 
73rdCAA and Dalits 
Constitutionally Dalits55 have become equal voters and secured some seats but their influence on 
polity is insignificant. Similar exclusion is also reflected in local government bodies. Many attempts 
have been made to promote inclusion from the 1957 Balwantrai Mehta committee promote inclusion56 
(1959) to the 1002 73rdCAA, but with little impact on the living conditions of Dalits. 
The discriminatory caste system ill-treated and marginalised millions of Dalits. That was the reason 
why Dr. B.R. Ambedkar , speaking in 1995, was critical of the PRI System which he thought would 
inevitably strengthen the hold of dominant castes directly or indirectly in rural areas (Ambedkar 
2005). Many struggles and movements were waged on social and political fronts against this inequity 
and discrimination in various parts of India from the mid-1960s to the late-1980s. These movements 
                                                            
51 Dr. B. R. Ambedkar viewed ancient ‘village republics’ as inequality and undemocratic. In the Constituent Assembly 
debates on 4th November 1948 his remarkable statement is that “what is village, a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, 
narrow mindedness and communalism”.   
52 To understand the ‘romantic’,’ modernist’ and ‘social exclusion’ perceptions of Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar 
respectively see Surinder.S.Jodhka2012 
53 The idea of Gram Swaraj was proposed by M.K Gandhi in and was popularized as frame work by many proponents of 
him during India’s national movement. According to him, Gram Swaraj is self-reliant and a complete republic based on 
individual freedom.     
54 Karl Marx, New-York Daily tribune, June 25, 1853; see also 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.html  
55 Ex – untouchables in pre Independent India. Indian Constitution recognizes them as Scheduled Castes. 
56 The study team was headed by Balwant Rai Mehta Committee was appointed by the Government of India in January 1957 
to examine the working of the Community Development Programme and the National Extension Service and to suggest 
measures for their better working. Recommendations of this committee were instrumental in starting the Panchayati Raj 
institutions across all states in India in late 1950s. 
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were largely responsible occasional and half-hearted response from the State. Debate and action in the 
area of decentralised democracy and the enactment of the 73rdCAA is an example for such an attitude. 
When the Adivasis57 and Dalits from various backward regions demanded, through the Naxalite 
movement, radical redistributive reforms (land/forest rights) in 1967, the Union government initiated 
several centrally directed rural development programmers, and State Governments made changes in 
the PRIs to accommodate some of the demands and wean the groups away from radical demands. The 
73rdCAA is further seen as diverting the attention of Dalits from capturing state power, as they were 
becoming involved in mass movements, to rise against atrocities and caste segregation. Furthermore, 
the 1992 Act was also seen as an attempt at national level to destabilise the domination of regional 
parties. Thus social movements and political exigencies influenced the amendment. The shaping of 
PRIs followed the pattern below. 
1. In the initial phase, upper castes and dominant communities were accommodated in the power 
structure through PRIs and the marginalised communities were kept at bay. 
2. From the mid-1960s to 1980s politicisation of downtrodden communities became visible. 
Attempts to accommodate, co-opt the margins were started. 
3. In the post-1980 phase, social movements representing marginalised58 communities had 
influenced politics at the state and sub-state levels, which led to rethinking about 
decentralisation at Union government level. 
In each phase Dalits were scantily accommodated and systematically marginalised. Dalit women  
elected representatives are worst off. Dalits face the ire of socially dominant groups but also of 
government functionaries. Because of this apathy, they did not evince much interest in the PR 
institutions. Sometimes, when Dalits try to exercise their power they are facing violent reactions from 
the upper castes. Despite the technical reservation of electoral seats provided by the 73rdCAA, they 
are still disempowered.   
Failure to secure proper shares or partnerships in the popular power means that none are happy 
(Ardent 1963). Hence as long as genuine partnership is not ensured in the local political system, there 
cannot be any freedom and equality for Dalits and the marginalised.  
 
 
 
                                                            
57 Adivasis are a heterogeneous set of ethnic and tribal groups, who leaving in forest and hilly areas in Indian Constitution 
recognizes them as Scheduled Tribes (ST). 
58 Marginalized in this context refers to Scheduled Castes (S.C),Scheduled Tribes(S.T), Backward Classes(B.Cs) Women 
and Religious Minorities. 
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Abstract 
The supply or lack of services impacts on people's quality of life, and so the Constitution of South 
Africa and other strategy documents emphasise the provision of services to all South African citizens 
irrespective of colour or creed. The services are vast and the responsibility for provision is divided 
between national, provincial and local authorities. This paper focuses on the delivery of services 
whose responsibility and accountability lies with the local municipalities, including: water; 
electricity; sanitation and refuse removal. The paper also explores the background to the recent 
unrest in the country with a focus on Dipaleseng Municipality, looking at its socio-economic 
situation, and challenges which include poverty, economic stability and provision of basic services.  
Sources of data include the South African media, journal articles, relevant documents, websites and 
databases.  
Key words: poverty rate, GDP, unemployment, service delivery. 
 
Background 
South Africa has recently experienced protests and unrest due to dissatisfaction with service delivery. 
Chief amongst the triggers of the unrest is lack of services including housing, sanitation, clean water, 
and electricity etc.  
Figure 1 shows the locations of protests from 2007-2010, and Figure 2 the concerns of protestors 
(Jain, H. 2010: 31). As can be seen from Figure 2, amongst concerns that triggered the protests, 
housing is the top followed by water and electricity, sanitation etc. 
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   Source: Jain (2010) p30   
Figure 1: Location of protests in relation to housing services provision 
Figure 2: Concerns of protestors   
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Housing is primarily the responsibility of the provincial department, but since people have direct 
contact with local authorities they tend to direct grievances about the backlog in housing at 
municipalities. For this reason housing and conditions in the informal settlements will also be briefly 
examined. 
Dipaleseng Municipality 
Dipaleseng Municipality is located in Mpumalanga Province and falls under Gert Sibande District 
Municipality. It covers an area of about 2619.4 km² and has a population of 37,880 (Stats SA, 2007). 
The head office is situated in Balfour, one of the larger towns in the area. Other small towns include 
Dasville, Greylingstad, Grootvlei, Val and Willemsdal (Figure 3). Close to these towns are 
settlements, both urban and rural, but the municipality itself is largely rural. The townships and rural 
settlements include Siyathemba in Balfour, Nthorwane, Ekanini etc. 
 
 Figure 3: Dipaleseng Municipality 
 
 
 
Socio- economic characteristics 
The socio-economic conditions of each municipality can be measured, by poverty rate, 
unemployment, and gross geographic product (GGP59). Figure 4 below shows the decline in the 
poverty rate from 69.31% in 2001 to 60.93% in 200460, which could be attributed to government 
                                                            
59 The Gross Geographic Product (GGP) is a measure used in South Africa to assess the total and sectorial 
economic activity on an annual basis within municipalities 
60 "Poverty income is defined as the minimum income needed to sustain a household and varies according to the size of the 
household. For example, the monthly poverty income in 2009 for a household of four.... was R2, 440 and R3,396 for a 
Zama        Dipaleseng Local Municipality 
CJLG November 2013 
188 
spending on expanded public works programmes (EPWP), and other nationally and provincially 
driven programmes aimed at poverty reduction.  Monitoring poverty levels shows the slow decline in 
poverty rate from 60.93% in 2004 to 59.75% in 2006 (Poverty Database, HSRC, 2006). 
    Figure 4: Dipaleseng - Poverty rate 2001-2006 
 
 
To explore the reasons attributed to the rise/decline of poverty it is important to understand the 
economy of the municipality, and key economic sectors. Mpumalanga as a whole is known for 
production of maize, sunflower, groundnuts, citrus fruits etc. Dipaleseng contributes 3.48 % to 
Mpumalanga's agricultural income.  In 2001 agriculture, community services and trade were the top 
three sectors, with agriculture contributing 21% to the municipality's total GDP (Figure 5). 
In addition crop production, livestock, dairy farming and commercial logging are also prevalent in the 
whole of Mpumalanga; Dipaleseng also plays a role in this sub-sector hence the existence of the 
biggest abattoir (Karan Beef) that employs largely Dipaleseng residents. 
Dipaleseng experienced a severe decline in agricultural income between 2001-2004. Even today it has 
failed to recover fully. From 2004-06 some improvement was seen which can be attributed to LED 
programme, although the economy did not reach the 2001 mark (Figure 6). Dipaleseng has a number 
of small-scale agricultural projects (Dipaleseng IDP2008/09) which include: Mphatlalatsane Cooking 
Oil; Siyafuya Piggeries; Rainbow Nation Piggery; Harambee (farming) and Sinqobile (wood).  
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 Figure 5: Dipaleseng GGP by sector 2001 
 
   Figure 6: GGP- Agricultural Sector 2001-2006 
 
 
The total GGP (all sectors combined) however shows a positive change within the same period 
(Figure 7). This positive change may be attributed to the growth in the secondary sectors e.g. 
manufacturing, trade, finance and community services. With the exception of manufacturing the other 
three sectors were stable from  2001-2004 despite the decline in agriculture (-R 6,297,730) and 
mining (- R404, 332) in this municipality (Economic database, HSRC, 2006). 
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Figure 7: Dipaleseng Total GGP 2001-2006 
 
Provision of basic services   
Key to the adequate provision of services is the understanding of the demographic characteristics of 
the population within the municipality. The total population for Dipaleseng was estimated at 38,726 in 
2009 (SA mid-year estimates 2009 cited in GSDM 2010/11 IDP). Planning for services needs to be 
forecast, and estimating the population growth rate is crucial for medium to long-tern planning. This 
will assist the municipality in developing plans and budgets based on the forecast demand for their 
services. According to the GSDM, the growth rates from 2005 to 2010 are as follows: 
   Ward 1 = 3%    Ward 4 = 3% 
   Ward 2 = 2.5%   Ward 5 = 1.5% 
   Ward 3 = 1.5%   Ward 6 = 2% 
Failure to meet the demand for basic services results in unhealthy, unsafe and hazardous habitats 
which leads to diseases, disasters etc. The services may either be lacking, inadequate or of a lower 
standard. That is why it is crucial to understand the level/standard at which the services are provided 
(Figure 8)  
                Figure 8: Service levels 
Service type Level 1 Basic Level 2 Intermediate Level 3 Full service 
Water Communal standpipes Yard taps, yard tanks In house water 
Sanitation Sewage collection/disposal VIP latrine/septic tanks Full water borne 
Electricity 5-8 Amp/non-grid electricity 20 Amps 60 Amps 
Roads Graded Gravel Paved/tarred & 
kerbs 
Storm water drainage Earth lined open channel Open channel lined Piped system 
Solid waste disposal Communal  (residents) Communal (contractor) Kerbside 
                Source: ETU (n.d.)  
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Housing 
Housing is not the responsibility of the municipality but that of the provincial Department of Human 
Settlements, but is also considered in this paper as it was also part of local grievances. Some 43% of 
the households in Dipaleseng are informal (backyard and free standing shacks). This shows an 
increase of 9% from the 2001 census data which recorded 34% households living in shacks. 43% is a 
huge percentage. Figure 9 shows the varying backlog between rural and urban areas. 
        Figure 9: Status Quo for housing 
 
        Source: Gert Sibande DM IDP 2010/11 Situation 3 
 
Water and sanitation 
According to the Community Household Survey findings of 2007, 48.6% of households in Dipaleseng 
have water inside the dwelling, 32.9% within the yard and 14% use communal taps outside the yards 
(Community Survey, Stats SA 2007). The municipality has made some strides in terms of water 
provision compared to 2001. In 2001 only 20% of households had a water supply in the dwelling, 
56.4% in the yard, 17% were relying on communal taps and 6.3% used other sources. In rural areas 
households mainly rely on other sources of water − boreholes, springs, or dams − due to the lack of 
water supply networks in these settlements. Dipaleseng relies on one pressure tower, which distributes 
water from the Vaal and Haarhoff dams to five reservoirs.  
Among the complaints that the people vented was the lack of water and its poor quality. According to 
the municipality there is only one purification plant that is situated in Fortuna. Dipaleseng relies on it 
but the engineers had long warned that it was fast nearing its capacity (Dipaleseng IDP, 2008/09). 
In 2001 only 38.7% had access to a flush toilet connected to sewer.  The 2007 data from the 
Community Survey shows that 68.1% have flush toilet. This is a remarkable improvement from 
29.4%. In an attempt to even do better the municipality has provided new townships with long-drop 
toilets, meeting an intermediate standard in an effort to eradicate the bucket system of sewage 
disposal (a basic or level 1 standard). About 4.3% households were still using the bucket system in 
2007 compared to 19.1% in 2001. In rural areas each household is responsible for sanitation so many 
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use pit latrines or having no facility. According to the IDP 2008/09 four major sanitation projects 
were prioritized. These were: 
 Sewer reticulation and maintenance in Siyathemba to benefit Wards 2 & 4 
 Completion of sewer pump station in Nthorwane to benefit Ward 6 
 Completion of sewer reticulation in Balfour to benefit Ward 3 
According to Statistics SA Community Survey, 16.5% households had no toilets in 2007 but recently 
only 3.6% households are reported to have no access to any form of sanitation. Figure 10 shows 
current access to toilets by type between key areas.  
 
  Figure 10: Sanitation type by nodal towns 
 
 Source: Gert Sibande DM IDP 2010/11 Situation 3 
 
Electricity supply 
In terms of energy source for lighting most households use electricity (78.5%) and the rest rely on 
other sources e.g. candles, paraffin etc. In 2001, 65.5% households had electricity and the backlog 
was about 32%. By 2007 the backlog was about 21%. The municipality then prioritized a project on 
Massive Electrification of Households, worth R6m, to be funded by the Department of Minerals and 
Energy, which would benefit all the wards within Dipaleseng.  
Refuse removal 
Some 77.3% of households have access to refuse removal by local council once a week, an 
improvement of 11.8% from 2001. The municipality had a backlog of 22.6% in 2007 (Stats SA, 
2007). The municipality has only three solid waste disposal sites in Balfour and Grootvlei. The 
communities in rural areas use own disposal methods (i.e. burning, pit dumps etc).The challenge that 
the municipality faces include financial resources, inadequate equipment and unregistered landfill 
sites. 
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Protests in Dipaleseng  
In 2009 a wave of protest swept the country; there was concern that service delivery demonstrations 
would degenerate into xenophobia, but there was a history of opposition to xenophobia in 
Siyathemba, Balfour's township. The Sowetan reported:  
The community submitted a memorandum to the Dipaleseng Municipality on 8 July 2009. 
Most demands concerned basic issues such as a request for a police station, a mini- hospital 
and high-mass lights. Topping the list were calls for a skills training centre and policies 
governing job recruitment in the area. 
These reflect the fact that while the protest was backed by the community, leadership was 
provided by the township’s youth. It is this generation that suffers most from unemployment 
and lack of housing. Moreover, many of the older leaders are now politicians and tender-
seekers. 
The council failed to respond to the July 8 memorandum, hence the 19 July meeting [was 
called and] voted for a stay away. Some activists suspect that police violence was aimed at 
intimidating them. It had the reverse effect. People fought back and the stay-away lasted four 
days (Sowetan 2009). 
The police fired rubber bullets and teargas as people left the meeting, and protestors set fire to two 
buildings and shops were looted (Sowetan, 2009).  Clearly feelings were running high on both sides.  
In analysing the community demands of 8 July (Appendix 1), it is important to assess: 
 how they fit into the services provided by the municipality 
 are communities aware of who does what between the spheres of government?  
 are they using appropriate channels to voice their dissatisfaction and, if not, how can this be 
remedied? 
 is violent protest justified? 
In the community's memorandum of 8 July 2009, half of the demands fell out of the jurisdiction of the 
municipality. Communities often see municipalities as their channel to reach provincial and national 
government, which makes the municipality the target of misdirected anger and frustrations by the 
citizens. This could be addressed through public participation methods (i.e. ward committee meetings, 
imbizos etc) to explain the following: 
 different roles and responsibilities of the three spheres of government 
 rights and responsibilities of the citizens 
 channels for redress  
 the municipality’s achievements with regard to the IDPs and other development initiatives. 
The municipality has improved in a number of areas as outlined above but has to increase the pace of 
service-improvement to communities that need them most. To prevent similar protests in the future 
the municipalities need to strengthen its communication with the residents. It has to inform them of its 
achievements and also delays/bottlenecks regarding the provision of services.  
Zama        Dipaleseng Local Municipality 
CJLG November 2013 
194 
While the need for communities to voice their dissatisfaction with services is justified as it forms part 
of the democracy the South Africans voted for, the violence coupled with the protests harms interests 
on both sides. 
Way to the future for Dipaleseng  
After the protests a high profile delegation which included President Zuma visited the communities 
and a task team was appointed to look into the grievances outlined in the memorandum. By February 
2010, more protests occurred as citizens, particularly the youth, saw government as being 
unresponsive to their grievances as nothing visible was happening in terms the concerns raised in July 
2009.  
In May 2011 the Acting Minister of CoGTA, Mr Nathi Mthethwa, received the report back from the 
task team. In his response to the report he stated:  
In line with the local Government Turn Around Strategy (LGTAS) that the Cabinet adopted in 
December 2009 as well as the Municipal Turnaround Strategies (MTAS) developed per 
municipality, the lives of the people of Dipaleseng are fast getting turned around for the 
better! The reality of a better life gets closer with every coordinated effort between 
government and local communities. (Acting Minister, CoGTA May 2011) 
 
Visible improvements could be seen in programmes addressing: roads and storm water drainage; 
water and sanitation; housing; electricity; public amenities; social and economic development; 
education and skills development; and public/private partnerships. 
Private sector  
The role of the private sector in supporting development is interesting.  The Burnstone Gold mine 
which is under Great Basin Gold International Mine has employed 108 people from Siyathemba 
Township and other neighboring towns (Mining Weekly, 9 February 2010). Burnstone Gold already 
had various initiatives in place prior to the protests, although the residents still perceived the mine as 
employing people from outside the municipality. The Great Basin Gold company entered into a MoU 
with Mpumalanga Development Agency, among other things promising to:  
 Develop the economy of Mpumalanga Province and Dipaleseng Municipality, and 
 Unlock the economic development potential of Dipaleseng Local Municipality (DLM) by: 
 Working closely with the Municipality for the revitalisation of the economy of settlements 
within Dipaleseng Municipality;  
 Promoting business-to-business linkages, with the intention of promoting local Small Medium 
Enterprises' growth therefore tackling the problems of unemployment and social exclusions 
 Providing financial and non-financial assistance to potential investors and local small and 
medium enterprises, specifically supporting Great Basin Gold's endeavour to provide business 
support to local existing and emerging enterprises 
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 Create a culture of long term sustainable vision to ensure that the growth and development 
programs established under the MoU uphold the principle of sustainable development. 
Currently the mine is supporting at least eight local enterprises: a laundry, cleaning, gardening, 
waste collection, construction, catering, sunflower farming and an employee shuttle service; 
 Provide an avenue for coordination of economic development initiatives to enhance the 
activities of the Dipaleseng Development Programme, implemented in partnership with the 
Municipality. The program was established to integrate the mine employees' housing needs into 
the municipality's current housing and economic development initiatives; and 
 Strengthen cooperative and government/private sector relations. Great Basin Gold has already 
provided capacity building to the Dipaleseng Local Municipality by seconding a Project 
Manager to establish a project management unit and assist the municipality to access 
infrastructure funding. 
Questions   
Various questions remain unanswered as a result of the protest. Does this mean that protesting is the 
language that government understands most?  Do communities need to protest before service delivery 
is speeded up?  What about the non-protesting communities elsewhere? Are they going to be denied 
their right to basic services?  Does protesting and non-protesting mean dissatisfaction and satisfaction 
with the services? 
 
One solution which has been successful in communicating people's needs is the Citizen Report Card 
which is a tool to strengthen public-government communication (Zama 2012).  The CRC is can be 
used across all levels of government to provide feedback from citizens regarding: 
 Availability, reliability and quality of services 
 Access to and satisfaction with services 
 Responsiveness of service provider 
 Willingness to pay 
 Hidden costs ( corruption & support system), and 
 Quality of life 
Feedback is then disseminated through various media where after dialogues between citizens and 
departments for services are conducted. The end product is a social compact which is the contract 
between citizens (recipients of services) and government (service provider). Depending on the 
agreement between citizens and the municipality CRC can be repeated every 2-5 years. This will 
enhance the public officials' performance and improved efficient, effective and quality service 
delivery. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Submitted to Dipaleseng Municipality: 8 July 2009 
 
MEMORANDUM 
 
We as the youth of Dipaleseng we demand the following: 
 
 Training centre-to develop skills 
 Policies governing recruitment-in any public or private sectors around Dipaleseng ( 
Dipaleseng youth must have first preference) 
 Visible and Active youth officers 
 Police station in Siyathemba 
 Mini-Hospital 
 Stadium – Function fully and be fully equipped also accommodate all sporting courts 
maintenance and security 
 To be included in this new financial year 
 Youth Councillor 
 Full-time cleaning campaign 
 C.P.F (C.S.F) must be active or re-launch 
 Public and Private sector should contribute to the development of our youth 
 Youth centre 
 Proper clean water and proper sanitation 
 Quarterly report: on development and expenditure from councillors. 
 To know tendering system. 
 Houses 
 Street lights and much more high mass lights. 
 Paving of all roads and storm water drainage. 
 Municipality must re-claim the land from private sector 
 F.E.T. 
 Dipaleseng incorporated into Gauteng Province 
 All the computers within the library to be utilized and have access to internet 
 Community hall must be available for community 
 Officers of public works must operate daily and train local personnel to work on those offices. 
 
7 days we demand our response (in Siyathemba Hall) 
Youth Representative                                                                      Municipal Representative 
 
